Complete the deployment runbook #74

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# MealQuest deployment runbook
How MealQuest is deployed on office-srvr (10.60.1.14) and how its data is
backed up and restored. Sections marked *task 876134bc* are completed by
that task (Feature 07 deployment runbook); this file currently records the
reverse-proxy route, the backups and the restore procedure.
How MealQuest is deployed on office-srvr (10.60.1.14), how it is reached
through Authentik, Traefik and DNS, how it is updated and rolled back, how
its data is backed up and restored, and how its secrets are rotated. Values
are the ones in use on 2026-10-05. Secrets themselves are never written
here.
Paths used below:
@@ -17,10 +18,213 @@ Paths used below:
| Backup target (NAS, over SSH) | `joshua@10.60.1.50:/volume1/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups` |
| Same target over SFTP (Synology chroot) | `/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups` |
## Prerequisites
On office-srvr (10.60.1.14), as recorded on 2026-10-05:
| Item | Value |
| --- | --- |
| OS | Ubuntu 26.04.1 LTS |
| Docker Engine / Compose plugin | 29.8.2 / 5.6.0 |
| git, rsync, iptables | 2.53.0, 3.4.1, 1.8.11 (nf_tables) |
| Account | `overseer`, with sudo |
| Network | LAN reachability to Traefik (10.60.1.33), Authentik (`auth.cubecraftlabs.com`) and the NAS (10.60.1.50, SSH) |
Elsewhere:
- Admin access to Authentik at <https://auth.cubecraftlabs.com>.
- SSH access to the Traefik host 10.60.1.33.
- Cloudflare access for the `cubecraftlabs.com` zone, and admin access to
both Pi-holes (10.60.1.101 `dns.ccl`, 10.60.1.85 `dns2.ccl`).
- A NAS account `joshua` on 10.60.1.50 with the backup directory
`/volume1/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups` (see "Backups").
- A Gitea token able to read `Maniacs_Mansion/MealQuest`, for the clone.
## Stack and first deploy
*Completed by task 876134bc.* The compose stack is `deploy/compose.yaml`;
start it with `docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --build`.
The compose stack is `deploy/compose.yaml`: the `mealquest` service (built
from the repository `Dockerfile`, runs as uid/gid 10001, listens on 8080 in
the container) and the `litestream` service. Data lives in the named volume
`mealquest-data`.
### 1. Choose and check the port
The container's 8080 is published on `10.60.1.14:8090`. Ports 8080 and 8081
on this host belong to NestQuest, so 8090 was chosen. Before the first
deploy it was checked free with:
```sh
ss -ltnp | grep 8090 # printed nothing
```
After the deploy the same host shows NestQuest on 8080/8081 and MealQuest
on 8090:
```
LISTEN 0 4096 10.60.1.14:8080 0.0.0.0:*
LISTEN 0 4096 10.60.1.14:8081 0.0.0.0:*
LISTEN 0 4096 10.60.1.14:8090 0.0.0.0:*
```
The published host port is fixed in `deploy/compose.yaml`, in
`deploy/systemd/mealquest-firewall.sh` and in the Traefik route; change all
three together.
### 2. Clone
The checkout lives at `/home/overseer/mealquest`, next to NestQuest's
`~/nestquest` (not `/opt/mealquest`). Clone over HTTPS with a Gitea token,
then reset the remote to the clean URL so the token is not stored in
`.git/config`:
```sh
cd /home/overseer
git clone https://<user>:<token>@code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/MealQuest.git mealquest
cd mealquest
git remote set-url origin https://code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/MealQuest.git
git remote -v # must show no token
git checkout main
```
### 3. Environment file
`deploy/.env` (git-ignored) is copied from `deploy/.env.example` and is
mode 0600, owned by `overseer`:
```sh
cp deploy/.env.example deploy/.env
chmod 600 deploy/.env
```
Then edit `deploy/.env` to the values below. In particular
**`MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS` must be changed**: `.env.example` ships
`127.0.0.1` (a dev machine), and left as is the service listens only on
the host's loopback, which Traefik cannot reach. Set it to the LAN address
and check:
```sh
sed -i 's/^MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS=.*/MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS=10.60.1.14/' deploy/.env
grep '^MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS=' deploy/.env # MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS=10.60.1.14
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml config | grep -A4 'ports:'
# host_ip: 10.60.1.14, target: 8080, published: "8090"
```
After step 5 the listener is `10.60.1.14:8090` (container port 8080):
```sh
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml port mealquest 8080 # 10.60.1.14:8090
sudo ss -ltnp 'sport = :8090' # 10.60.1.14:8090 only, no 0.0.0.0 or 127.0.0.1
```
Values in use:
| Variable | Value |
| --- | --- |
| `MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS` | `10.60.1.14` |
| `MEALQUEST_PUBLIC_URL` | `https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com` |
| `MEALQUEST_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT` | `10s` |
| `MEALQUEST_TRUSTED_PROXY` | `10.60.1.33` |
| `MEALQUEST_DEFAULT_TZ` | `America/New_York` |
| `MEALQUEST_OIDC_ISSUER` | `https://auth.cubecraftlabs.com/application/o/mealquest/` |
| `MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_ID` | `i6zraqmWsF552b8nmte070LXz0SI5pRdArBxFxeq` (not a secret) |
| `MEALQUEST_OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS` | `mealquest-admin` |
| `MEALQUEST_SESSION_IDLE` / `MEALQUEST_SESSION_MAX` | `720h` / `4320h` |
`MEALQUEST_HTTP_ADDR`, `MEALQUEST_DATA_DIR` and the `*_FILE` variables are
set by `deploy/compose.yaml` and must not appear in `deploy/.env`.
### 4. Secrets
`deploy/secrets/` (git-ignored) is mode 0700, owned by `overseer`. Each
file holds one value, is owned by `10001:10001` (host user `mealquest`) and
is mode 0600. Compose bind-mounts file secrets with their host owner and
mode, so any other owner or mode stops the container reading them and the
service refuses to start.
| File | Content | Mounted at |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `secret_key` | base64 of 32 random bytes; encrypts stored secrets (AES-256-GCM) | `/run/secrets/secret_key` |
| `oidc_client_secret` | Client Secret of the Authentik provider `mealquest` | `/run/secrets/oidc_client_secret` |
| `litestream_key` | dedicated SSH private key for the NAS (see "Backups") | `/etc/litestream/sftp_key` |
```sh
mkdir -p deploy/secrets && chmod 700 deploy/secrets
head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64 > deploy/secrets/secret_key
printf '%s\n' '<Authentik client secret>' > deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret
# litestream_key: see "Backups" > "Database — Litestream"
sudo chown 10001:10001 deploy/secrets/*
sudo chmod 600 deploy/secrets/*
sudo ls -la deploy/secrets # three files, mealquest mealquest, -rw-------
```
The `mealquest` host user (uid/gid 10001) is created in "Media — nightly
rsync"; until it exists `ls` shows the numeric ids.
### 5. Firewall, then the stack
Install the firewall unit first (see "Host firewall"), so port 8090 is
never open to the LAN. Create the media directory (see "Media — nightly
rsync"), then build and start:
```sh
sudo systemctl start mealquest-firewall
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --build
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml ps # mealquest healthy, litestream up
curl -fsS http://10.60.1.14:8090/health
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com/health # 200
```
### Host checkout state on 2026-10-05
The first deploy ran before Feature 07 reached `main`. The checkout is at
`main` `9cddbbb` and the Feature 07 files under `deploy/` were copied in
from the feature branch: `deploy/compose.yaml` and `deploy/.env.example`
are listed in `.git/info/exclude`, the rest show as untracked. Before the
first routine deploy of a `main` that contains `deploy/`, remove those
`.git/info/exclude` lines and the copied files (keep `deploy/.env` and
`deploy/secrets/`), or `git checkout` refuses to overwrite them:
```sh
cd /home/overseer/mealquest
git status --porcelain --untracked-files=all deploy # the copied files
sed -i '/^deploy\/\(compose.yaml\|.env.example\)$/d' .git/info/exclude
git clean -n deploy # dry run: must not list .env or secrets/ (both git-ignored)
git clean -f deploy
```
Then follow "Routine deploy"; the checkout brings the tracked copies back.
## Authentik
Sign-in is OpenID Connect against Authentik at
<https://auth.cubecraftlabs.com>.
| Object | Setting |
| --- | --- |
| Provider | OAuth2/OpenID provider `mealquest`, client type **Confidential** |
| Redirect URI | `https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com/auth/callback` (strict) |
| Signing | RS256, with the instance's signing key |
| Scopes | MealQuest requests `openid profile email groups offline_access`; the provider's scope mappings include openid, profile, email and offline_access, and the `groups` claim is delivered by a property mapping (the default profile mapping carries `groups`) |
| Application | name MealQuest, slug `mealquest`, provider `mealquest` |
| Group | `mealquest-admin`, bound to the application; household members are added to it |
| Client ID | `i6zraqmWsF552b8nmte070LXz0SI5pRdArBxFxeq` (not a secret; in `deploy/.env` as `MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_ID`) |
| Client Secret | in `deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret` only |
MealQuest refuses a sign-in unless the user's `groups` claim (from the ID
token, or from userinfo when the token has none) contains a group in
`MEALQUEST_OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS`.
Check discovery from the Docker host — the service discovers the issuer
at boot and will not start if it cannot:
```sh
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" \
https://auth.cubecraftlabs.com/application/o/mealquest/.well-known/openid-configuration # 200
```
On 2026-10-05 discovery returned 200 with issuer
`https://auth.cubecraftlabs.com/application/o/mealquest/` and
`id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ["RS256"]`.
## Reverse proxy (Traefik)
@@ -67,6 +271,133 @@ http:
frameDeny: true
```
Traefik watches the dynamic directory, so saving the file loads the route;
the certificate comes from `certResolver: myresolver` (Let's Encrypt,
DNS-01 through Cloudflare). Check from the LAN:
```sh
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com/health # 200
```
## DNS
| Where | Record |
| --- | --- |
| Cloudflare, zone `cubecraftlabs.com` | `CNAME mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com` → `cubecraftlabs.com`, **proxied = true** (orange cloud). Because it is proxied, public resolvers answer with Cloudflare's anycast addresses, A and AAAA (AAAA on 2026-10-05: `2606:4700:3032::6815:34ed`, `2606:4700:3035::ac43:cd75`), never the origin |
| Pi-hole primary 10.60.1.101 (`dns.ccl`), Local DNS records | `A mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com` → `10.60.1.33` (Traefik) |
| Pi-hole secondary 10.60.1.85 (`dns2.ccl`), Local DNS records | `A mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com` → `10.60.1.33` (Traefik) |
The local record must be on **both** Pi-holes, or clients using the
secondary go out through Cloudflare. Check:
```sh
for s in 10.60.1.101 10.60.1.85; do dig +short @$s mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com A; done
# 10.60.1.33 from each
```
**AAAA caveat.** The Pi-hole local record is A only, so both Pi-holes still
forward AAAA queries and return Cloudflare's IPv6 addresses
(`2606:4700:3032::6815:34ed`, `2606:4700:3035::ac43:cd75` on 2026-10-05). An
IPv6-capable LAN client may prefer those and reach MealQuest through
Cloudflare instead of directly through Traefik. It still works (Cloudflare
proxies to the public route), but it is not the LAN path. If that matters,
add a local AAAA override or block AAAA for this name on both Pi-holes.
## Host firewall
Docker publishes `10.60.1.14:8090` past the host's INPUT rules, so the
port is restricted in the `DOCKER-USER` chain instead: only Traefik
(10.60.1.33) and the host itself (10.60.1.14) may connect; every other
source is dropped.
Docker DNATs the published port to the container address and port 8080
**before** `DOCKER-USER`, so a plain `-p tcp --dport 8090` rule never
matches. The rules match the original destination `10.60.1.14:8090` with
conntrack (`--ctorigdst 10.60.1.14 --ctorigdstport 8090 --ctdir ORIGINAL`)
and are tagged with the comment `mealquest-firewall`. The script deletes
its own tagged rules and re-inserts them at positions 1–3, so re-runs are
idempotent. NestQuest's 8080/8081 rules below them are left untouched.
| Repository file | Installed as |
| --- | --- |
| `deploy/systemd/mealquest-firewall.sh` | `/usr/local/sbin/mealquest-firewall` (root, 0755) |
| `deploy/systemd/mealquest-firewall.service` | `/etc/systemd/system/mealquest-firewall.service` (root, 0644) |
The unit is `Type=oneshot`, `RemainAfterExit=yes`, `Requires=` and
`PartOf=docker.service`, and `WantedBy=multi-user.target docker.service`:
it re-applies the rules whenever Docker starts or restarts (Docker
recreates `DOCKER-USER` empty), and a failure fails this unit only.
Install (done on 10.60.1.14 on 2026-10-05):
```sh
cd /home/overseer/mealquest
sudo install -o root -g root -m 0755 deploy/systemd/mealquest-firewall.sh /usr/local/sbin/mealquest-firewall
sudo install -o root -g root -m 0644 deploy/systemd/mealquest-firewall.service /etc/systemd/system/
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
sudo systemctl enable --now mealquest-firewall
```
Check:
```sh
systemctl is-enabled mealquest-firewall; systemctl is-active mealquest-firewall # enabled, active
sudo iptables -S DOCKER-USER
```
Expected head of the chain (recorded 2026-10-05; NestQuest's rules follow):
```
-A DOCKER-USER -s 10.60.1.33/32 -m conntrack --ctorigdst 10.60.1.14 --ctorigdstport 8090 --ctdir ORIGINAL -m comment --comment mealquest-firewall -j RETURN
-A DOCKER-USER -s 10.60.1.14/32 -m conntrack --ctorigdst 10.60.1.14 --ctorigdstport 8090 --ctdir ORIGINAL -m comment --comment mealquest-firewall -j RETURN
-A DOCKER-USER -m conntrack --ctorigdst 10.60.1.14 --ctorigdstport 8090 --ctdir ORIGINAL -m comment --comment mealquest-firewall -j DROP
```
From any other LAN machine, `curl -m 5 http://10.60.1.14:8090/health` must
time out; from 10.60.1.33 and 10.60.1.14 it returns 200.
## Routine deploy and rollback
Production runs `main` (a release); only `overseer` merges `dev` → `main`.
Every deploy builds the image on the host from the checked-out commit.
### Deploy
```sh
cd /home/overseer/mealquest
git fetch origin
git rev-parse --short HEAD # the SHA being replaced: note it for rollback
git checkout --detach origin/main # or a release tag
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --build
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml ps # mealquest healthy, litestream up
curl -fsS http://10.60.1.14:8090/health
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com/health # 200
git rev-parse HEAD # the deployed SHA
```
Record the deployed SHA, the previous SHA and the date in the Maestro task
for the release. Migrations run at start-up; the service refuses to start
if the database has an applied migration it does not know.
If `deploy/.env.example` gained a variable, add it to `deploy/.env` before
`up`; the service fails fast at boot naming any missing required variable.
### Rollback to a previous SHA
```sh
cd /home/overseer/mealquest
git checkout --detach <previous SHA>
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --build
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml ps
curl -fsS http://10.60.1.14:8090/health
```
A rollback across a release that added a migration fails at start-up
(the older binary refuses the newer schema). In that case restore the
database to a point before the upgrade — "Restore the database" with
`-timestamp` set just before the deploy — then start the older SHA.
Changes made since that point are lost; say so to the household.
## Backups
### Database — Litestream
@@ -139,15 +470,8 @@ sudo systemctl start mealquest-media-backup.service
journalctl -u mealquest-media-backup --no-pager -n 30
```
Restore media by reversing the copy into the (empty or stale) media
directory as uid 10001:
```sh
sudo rsync -a --chown=10001:10001 \
-e "ssh -i deploy/secrets/litestream_key -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o UserKnownHostsFile=/etc/mealquest/known_hosts -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes" \
joshua@10.60.1.50:/volume1/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups/media/ \
/var/lib/docker/volumes/mealquest-data/_data/media/
```
To restore media, follow "Restore photos (media)" — never copy back while
the timer or the service can still run.
## Restore the database
@@ -225,6 +549,67 @@ python3 /tmp/mqcount.py /tmp/mqcheck/mealquest.db
Before and after must match exactly.
## Restore photos (media)
Recipe and dinner photos live in `media/` in the data volume and are
backed up nightly to `joshua@10.60.1.50:/volume1/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups/media/`
(see "Media — nightly rsync"). The backup service mirrors with
`rsync --delete`. **An `rsync --delete` run must never see an empty or
partial `media/`**: it would delete the NAS copy you are about to restore
from. Stopping the timer is not enough — it does not stop a run that is
already in flight, and the service can still be started by hand. So stop
**both** the timer and the service, confirm no rsync is running, and do
not start the service until the restore is verified.
Run from `/home/overseer/mealquest`:
```sh
M=/var/lib/docker/volumes/mealquest-data/_data/media
NAS=/volume1/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups/media
SSH="ssh -i deploy/secrets/litestream_key -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o UserKnownHostsFile=/etc/mealquest/known_hosts -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes"
# 1. Stop the nightly mirror: the timer AND any run in flight.
sudo systemctl stop mealquest-media-backup.timer mealquest-media-backup.service
# 2. Pre-check — all three must hold before media/ is touched. If any
# fails, stop here and find out why.
systemctl is-active mealquest-media-backup.timer # inactive
systemctl is-active mealquest-media-backup.service # inactive (or failed)
pgrep -a -u mealquest rsync || echo "no rsync" # no rsync
sudo $SSH joshua@10.60.1.50 "find $NAS -type f | wc -l"
# ^ note this NAS file count; it must be non-zero and is the target below.
# 3. Stop the app (no writes into media/ meanwhile).
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml stop mealquest
# 4. Recreate the directory if it is gone, owned by the app user.
sudo install -d -o 10001 -g 10001 -m 0755 "$M"
# 5. Copy back from the NAS as uid 10001's files. No --delete in this
# direction: the NAS copy is the source and is only read.
sudo rsync -a --stats --chown=10001:10001 -e "$SSH" "joshua@10.60.1.50:$NAS/" "$M/"
# 6. Post-condition — before anything can mirror again:
sudo find "$M" -type f | wc -l # >= the NAS count from step 2
sudo $SSH joshua@10.60.1.50 "find $NAS -type f | wc -l" # unchanged from step 2
# 7. Start the app, then the timer again. Only now may the service run.
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d
curl -fsS http://10.60.1.14:8090/health
sudo systemctl start mealquest-media-backup.timer
systemctl is-active mealquest-media-backup.timer # active
```
The local count may exceed the NAS count only if `media/` still held
files the NAS never received (photos added since the last nightly run);
the next nightly run then copies them up. If the local count is lower,
the copy did not complete: leave the timer stopped and re-run step 5.
When the database is restored too, restore it first ("Restore the
database"), then the media, so every photo the database refers to is
present. This media restore has not been run against production yet; the
backup direction was checked on 2026-10-05 (see "Media backup checks").
## Restore drill record — 2026-10-05
Drill on 10.60.1.14 against the live (pre-launch, empty-household)
@@ -316,3 +701,141 @@ integrity ok.
| `media` replaced by a symlink to `/etc` | `Result=exit-code`, status 1; `/run/mealquest-data/media is a symlink to /etc; refusing to back it up` |
| `media` removed | `Result=exit-code`, status 1; `media directory /run/mealquest-data/media is missing` |
| `sudo -u mealquest` writing into the volume via `/var/lib/docker/...` | `Permission denied` — uid 10001 cannot traverse `/var/lib/docker` (mode 0710 root) |
## Secret rotation
Rotate a secret when it may have leaked, when someone with access leaves,
or on the owner's schedule. Never paste a secret into a ticket, chat or
this file.
### App key (`deploy/secrets/secret_key`)
The app key encrypts every stored secret: the `_ct` columns
`ai_settings.api_key_ct` (LLM API key), `recipe_search_settings.api_key_ct`
(recipe-search API key), `integrations_google.refresh_token_ct` (Google
Calendar refresh token) and `chat_settings.webhook_url_ct` (Google Chat
webhook URL). **Rotating it re-encrypts nothing**: a value encrypted with
the old key can no longer be read. A `mealquest rotate-key` helper that
re-encrypts in place is planned but does not exist yet.
**What is recoverable today.** The service currently exposes only
household settings; no shipped flow writes or re-enters any of these four
secrets. The re-entry flows are planned: the LLM key in Settings → AI
assistant (the AI settings feature), the recipe-search key (Feature 10),
Google Calendar reconnect (Feature 16) and the Google Chat webhook
(Feature 19). So today the rotation is safe **only if no `_ct` value is
stored**, which the pre-check below proves. If the pre-check finds a
stored value, do not rotate: it could not be re-entered afterwards. Keep
the current key and wait for the matching flow (or the `rotate-key`
helper).
**The pre-check and the key replacement run with the whole stack
stopped**, from the pre-check until the new key is in place. A raw copy of
`mealquest.db` and `mealquest.db-wal` taken while the stack runs is **not**
a consistent snapshot: the two files are copied one after the other, and a
checkpoint (by the app or by Litestream) between the two copies can move
committed pages out of the WAL into `mealquest.db` after `mealquest.db` was
already copied, then reset the WAL before it is copied. The copy then
lacks those commits — possibly a stored `_ct` value — and the pre-check
reports a false 0. A running app could also store a `_ct` value after a
correct pre-check and before the key is replaced. Stopping both containers
removes every writer (Litestream also writes and checkpoints), and the
clean close checkpoints the WAL into `mealquest.db`, so the file alone is
complete.
Run from `/home/overseer/mealquest`:
```sh
D=/var/lib/docker/volumes/mealquest-data/_data
# 1. Stop the whole stack (app and Litestream) and leave it stopped until
# step 4. Nothing may hold the database open.
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml down
sudo ls -la "$D" # mealquest.db and media/ only: no -wal, no -shm; if
# either exists, the close was not clean — stop here
# 2. Pre-check, on a copy of the now-quiescent database.
rm -rf /tmp/mqcheck && mkdir /tmp/mqcheck
sudo cp -a "$D/mealquest.db" /tmp/mqcheck/ && sudo chown -R "$USER" /tmp/mqcheck
python3 - /tmp/mqcheck/mealquest.db <<'PY'
import sqlite3, sys
c = sqlite3.connect(sys.argv[1])
for t, col in (("ai_settings", "api_key_ct"), ("recipe_search_settings", "api_key_ct"),
("integrations_google", "refresh_token_ct"), ("chat_settings", "webhook_url_ct")):
print(t, col, c.execute(f"select count(*) from {t} where {col} is not null").fetchone()[0])
PY
rm -rf /tmp/mqcheck
# every count must be 0; otherwise start the stack again on the current
# key (docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d) and stop here
# 3. Replace the key, still with the stack stopped.
sudo cp -a deploy/secrets/secret_key /var/tmp/secret_key.old # keep until verified, then shred
head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64 | sudo tee deploy/secrets/secret_key >/dev/null
sudo chown 10001:10001 deploy/secrets/secret_key
sudo chmod 600 deploy/secrets/secret_key
# 4. Start the stack on the new key and check health.
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml ps
curl -fsS http://10.60.1.14:8090/health
```
Then sign in and open household settings to confirm the service runs on
the new key. Finally `sudo shred -u /var/tmp/secret_key.old`. Once the
planned flows ship, this section gains a step per secret to re-enter it
and confirm it works.
### OIDC client secret (`deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret`)
In Authentik, open the provider `mealquest` and regenerate the Client
Secret. Write it to the file (same owner and mode as above) and recreate
the service:
```sh
printf '%s\n' '<new Authentik client secret>' | sudo tee deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret >/dev/null
sudo chown 10001:10001 deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret
sudo chmod 600 deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --force-recreate mealquest
```
Sign in at <https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com> to confirm; sign-ins
fail between regenerating the secret in Authentik and recreating the
service.
### LLM API key
Stored encrypted in the database, not in `deploy/`. In the app, open
**Settings → AI assistant**, choose **Replace**, paste the new key and
**Verify**, and check the verified state is shown. Then revoke the
old key in the provider's console. (The AI assistant settings page is
delivered by its own feature; until it ships there is no stored LLM key
to rotate.)
### VAPID keys (Web Push)
Planned with Web Push (Feature 19): the public key goes in
`deploy/.env` as `MEALQUEST_VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY`, the private key in
`deploy/secrets/vapid_private_key` (owner `10001:10001`, mode 0600), and
the pair is generated with `cmd/vapidgen`. **Changing the VAPID pair
invalidates every push subscription**: each device must turn
notifications on again (`/settings/notifications`) before it receives
pushes. Rotate only when the private key may have leaked, write both
halves, recreate the service with `--force-recreate mealquest`, and tell
the household to re-enable notifications on each device.
### Litestream / NAS key (`deploy/secrets/litestream_key`)
Generate a new keypair as in "Database — Litestream", add the new public
key to `joshua@10.60.1.50:~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, replace the file
(owner `10001:10001`, mode 0600), run
`docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --force-recreate litestream`
and `sudo systemctl start mealquest-media-backup.service`, check both
(`litestream ltx` and the journal), then remove the old public key from
the NAS.
## Context records
The confirmed values in this runbook (port 8090, checkout path, Authentik
group `mealquest-admin`, DNS, firewall, backup target) are also recorded in
the CTXD project `mealquest`: `RUNBOOKS.MD` (deployment procedure) and the
open questions in `CONTEXT.MD`, updated for Feature 07 task 876134bc.