Complete the deployment runbook #74
+538
-15
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
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# MealQuest deployment runbook
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How MealQuest is deployed on office-srvr (10.60.1.14) and how its data is
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backed up and restored. Sections marked *task 876134bc* are completed by
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that task (Feature 07 deployment runbook); this file currently records the
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reverse-proxy route, the backups and the restore procedure.
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How MealQuest is deployed on office-srvr (10.60.1.14), how it is reached
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through Authentik, Traefik and DNS, how it is updated and rolled back, how
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its data is backed up and restored, and how its secrets are rotated. Values
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are the ones in use on 2026-10-05. Secrets themselves are never written
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here.
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Paths used below:
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@@ -17,10 +18,213 @@ Paths used below:
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| Backup target (NAS, over SSH) | `joshua@10.60.1.50:/volume1/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups` |
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| Same target over SFTP (Synology chroot) | `/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups` |
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## Prerequisites
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On office-srvr (10.60.1.14), as recorded on 2026-10-05:
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| Item | Value |
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| --- | --- |
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| OS | Ubuntu 26.04.1 LTS |
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| Docker Engine / Compose plugin | 29.8.2 / 5.6.0 |
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| git, rsync, iptables | 2.53.0, 3.4.1, 1.8.11 (nf_tables) |
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| Account | `overseer`, with sudo |
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| Network | LAN reachability to Traefik (10.60.1.33), Authentik (`auth.cubecraftlabs.com`) and the NAS (10.60.1.50, SSH) |
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Elsewhere:
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- Admin access to Authentik at <https://auth.cubecraftlabs.com>.
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- SSH access to the Traefik host 10.60.1.33.
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- Cloudflare access for the `cubecraftlabs.com` zone, and admin access to
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both Pi-holes (10.60.1.101 `dns.ccl`, 10.60.1.85 `dns2.ccl`).
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- A NAS account `joshua` on 10.60.1.50 with the backup directory
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`/volume1/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups` (see "Backups").
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- A Gitea token able to read `Maniacs_Mansion/MealQuest`, for the clone.
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## Stack and first deploy
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*Completed by task 876134bc.* The compose stack is `deploy/compose.yaml`;
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start it with `docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --build`.
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The compose stack is `deploy/compose.yaml`: the `mealquest` service (built
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from the repository `Dockerfile`, runs as uid/gid 10001, listens on 8080 in
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the container) and the `litestream` service. Data lives in the named volume
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`mealquest-data`.
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### 1. Choose and check the port
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The container's 8080 is published on `10.60.1.14:8090`. Ports 8080 and 8081
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on this host belong to NestQuest, so 8090 was chosen. Before the first
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deploy it was checked free with:
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```sh
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ss -ltnp | grep 8090 # printed nothing
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```
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After the deploy the same host shows NestQuest on 8080/8081 and MealQuest
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on 8090:
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```
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LISTEN 0 4096 10.60.1.14:8080 0.0.0.0:*
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LISTEN 0 4096 10.60.1.14:8081 0.0.0.0:*
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LISTEN 0 4096 10.60.1.14:8090 0.0.0.0:*
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```
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The published host port is fixed in `deploy/compose.yaml`, in
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`deploy/systemd/mealquest-firewall.sh` and in the Traefik route; change all
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three together.
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### 2. Clone
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The checkout lives at `/home/overseer/mealquest`, next to NestQuest's
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`~/nestquest` (not `/opt/mealquest`). Clone over HTTPS with a Gitea token,
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then reset the remote to the clean URL so the token is not stored in
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`.git/config`:
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```sh
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cd /home/overseer
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git clone https://<user>:<token>@code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/MealQuest.git mealquest
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cd mealquest
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git remote set-url origin https://code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/MealQuest.git
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git remote -v # must show no token
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git checkout main
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```
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### 3. Environment file
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`deploy/.env` (git-ignored) is copied from `deploy/.env.example` and is
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mode 0600, owned by `overseer`:
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```sh
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cp deploy/.env.example deploy/.env
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chmod 600 deploy/.env
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```
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Then edit `deploy/.env` to the values below. In particular
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**`MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS` must be changed**: `.env.example` ships
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`127.0.0.1` (a dev machine), and left as is the service listens only on
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the host's loopback, which Traefik cannot reach. Set it to the LAN address
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and check:
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```sh
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sed -i 's/^MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS=.*/MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS=10.60.1.14/' deploy/.env
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grep '^MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS=' deploy/.env # MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS=10.60.1.14
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docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml config | grep -A4 'ports:'
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# host_ip: 10.60.1.14, target: 8080, published: "8090"
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```
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After step 5 the listener is `10.60.1.14:8090` (container port 8080):
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```sh
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docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml port mealquest 8080 # 10.60.1.14:8090
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sudo ss -ltnp 'sport = :8090' # 10.60.1.14:8090 only, no 0.0.0.0 or 127.0.0.1
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```
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Values in use:
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| Variable | Value |
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| --- | --- |
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| `MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS` | `10.60.1.14` |
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| `MEALQUEST_PUBLIC_URL` | `https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com` |
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| `MEALQUEST_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT` | `10s` |
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| `MEALQUEST_TRUSTED_PROXY` | `10.60.1.33` |
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| `MEALQUEST_DEFAULT_TZ` | `America/New_York` |
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| `MEALQUEST_OIDC_ISSUER` | `https://auth.cubecraftlabs.com/application/o/mealquest/` |
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| `MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_ID` | `i6zraqmWsF552b8nmte070LXz0SI5pRdArBxFxeq` (not a secret) |
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| `MEALQUEST_OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS` | `mealquest-admin` |
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| `MEALQUEST_SESSION_IDLE` / `MEALQUEST_SESSION_MAX` | `720h` / `4320h` |
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`MEALQUEST_HTTP_ADDR`, `MEALQUEST_DATA_DIR` and the `*_FILE` variables are
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set by `deploy/compose.yaml` and must not appear in `deploy/.env`.
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### 4. Secrets
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`deploy/secrets/` (git-ignored) is mode 0700, owned by `overseer`. Each
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file holds one value, is owned by `10001:10001` (host user `mealquest`) and
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is mode 0600. Compose bind-mounts file secrets with their host owner and
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mode, so any other owner or mode stops the container reading them and the
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service refuses to start.
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| File | Content | Mounted at |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `secret_key` | base64 of 32 random bytes; encrypts stored secrets (AES-256-GCM) | `/run/secrets/secret_key` |
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| `oidc_client_secret` | Client Secret of the Authentik provider `mealquest` | `/run/secrets/oidc_client_secret` |
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| `litestream_key` | dedicated SSH private key for the NAS (see "Backups") | `/etc/litestream/sftp_key` |
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```sh
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mkdir -p deploy/secrets && chmod 700 deploy/secrets
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head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64 > deploy/secrets/secret_key
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printf '%s\n' '<Authentik client secret>' > deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret
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# litestream_key: see "Backups" > "Database — Litestream"
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sudo chown 10001:10001 deploy/secrets/*
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sudo chmod 600 deploy/secrets/*
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sudo ls -la deploy/secrets # three files, mealquest mealquest, -rw-------
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```
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The `mealquest` host user (uid/gid 10001) is created in "Media — nightly
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rsync"; until it exists `ls` shows the numeric ids.
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### 5. Firewall, then the stack
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Install the firewall unit first (see "Host firewall"), so port 8090 is
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never open to the LAN. Create the media directory (see "Media — nightly
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rsync"), then build and start:
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```sh
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sudo systemctl start mealquest-firewall
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docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --build
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docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml ps # mealquest healthy, litestream up
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curl -fsS http://10.60.1.14:8090/health
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curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com/health # 200
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```
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### Host checkout state on 2026-10-05
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The first deploy ran before Feature 07 reached `main`. The checkout is at
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`main` `9cddbbb` and the Feature 07 files under `deploy/` were copied in
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from the feature branch: `deploy/compose.yaml` and `deploy/.env.example`
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are listed in `.git/info/exclude`, the rest show as untracked. Before the
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first routine deploy of a `main` that contains `deploy/`, remove those
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`.git/info/exclude` lines and the copied files (keep `deploy/.env` and
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`deploy/secrets/`), or `git checkout` refuses to overwrite them:
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```sh
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cd /home/overseer/mealquest
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git status --porcelain --untracked-files=all deploy # the copied files
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sed -i '/^deploy\/\(compose.yaml\|.env.example\)$/d' .git/info/exclude
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git clean -n deploy # dry run: must not list .env or secrets/ (both git-ignored)
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git clean -f deploy
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```
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Then follow "Routine deploy"; the checkout brings the tracked copies back.
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## Authentik
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Sign-in is OpenID Connect against Authentik at
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<https://auth.cubecraftlabs.com>.
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| Object | Setting |
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| --- | --- |
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| Provider | OAuth2/OpenID provider `mealquest`, client type **Confidential** |
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| Redirect URI | `https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com/auth/callback` (strict) |
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| Signing | RS256, with the instance's signing key |
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| Scopes | MealQuest requests `openid profile email groups offline_access`; the provider's scope mappings include openid, profile, email and offline_access, and the `groups` claim is delivered by a property mapping (the default profile mapping carries `groups`) |
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| Application | name MealQuest, slug `mealquest`, provider `mealquest` |
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| Group | `mealquest-admin`, bound to the application; household members are added to it |
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| Client ID | `i6zraqmWsF552b8nmte070LXz0SI5pRdArBxFxeq` (not a secret; in `deploy/.env` as `MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_ID`) |
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| Client Secret | in `deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret` only |
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MealQuest refuses a sign-in unless the user's `groups` claim (from the ID
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token, or from userinfo when the token has none) contains a group in
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`MEALQUEST_OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS`.
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Check discovery from the Docker host — the service discovers the issuer
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at boot and will not start if it cannot:
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```sh
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curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" \
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https://auth.cubecraftlabs.com/application/o/mealquest/.well-known/openid-configuration # 200
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```
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On 2026-10-05 discovery returned 200 with issuer
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`https://auth.cubecraftlabs.com/application/o/mealquest/` and
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`id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ["RS256"]`.
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## Reverse proxy (Traefik)
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@@ -67,6 +271,133 @@ http:
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frameDeny: true
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```
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Traefik watches the dynamic directory, so saving the file loads the route;
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the certificate comes from `certResolver: myresolver` (Let's Encrypt,
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DNS-01 through Cloudflare). Check from the LAN:
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```sh
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curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com/health # 200
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```
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## DNS
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| Where | Record |
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| --- | --- |
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| Cloudflare, zone `cubecraftlabs.com` | `CNAME mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com` → `cubecraftlabs.com`, **proxied = true** (orange cloud). Because it is proxied, public resolvers answer with Cloudflare's anycast addresses, A and AAAA (AAAA on 2026-10-05: `2606:4700:3032::6815:34ed`, `2606:4700:3035::ac43:cd75`), never the origin |
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| Pi-hole primary 10.60.1.101 (`dns.ccl`), Local DNS records | `A mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com` → `10.60.1.33` (Traefik) |
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| Pi-hole secondary 10.60.1.85 (`dns2.ccl`), Local DNS records | `A mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com` → `10.60.1.33` (Traefik) |
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The local record must be on **both** Pi-holes, or clients using the
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secondary go out through Cloudflare. Check:
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```sh
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for s in 10.60.1.101 10.60.1.85; do dig +short @$s mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com A; done
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# 10.60.1.33 from each
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```
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**AAAA caveat.** The Pi-hole local record is A only, so both Pi-holes still
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forward AAAA queries and return Cloudflare's IPv6 addresses
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(`2606:4700:3032::6815:34ed`, `2606:4700:3035::ac43:cd75` on 2026-10-05). An
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IPv6-capable LAN client may prefer those and reach MealQuest through
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Cloudflare instead of directly through Traefik. It still works (Cloudflare
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proxies to the public route), but it is not the LAN path. If that matters,
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add a local AAAA override or block AAAA for this name on both Pi-holes.
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## Host firewall
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Docker publishes `10.60.1.14:8090` past the host's INPUT rules, so the
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port is restricted in the `DOCKER-USER` chain instead: only Traefik
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(10.60.1.33) and the host itself (10.60.1.14) may connect; every other
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source is dropped.
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Docker DNATs the published port to the container address and port 8080
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**before** `DOCKER-USER`, so a plain `-p tcp --dport 8090` rule never
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matches. The rules match the original destination `10.60.1.14:8090` with
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conntrack (`--ctorigdst 10.60.1.14 --ctorigdstport 8090 --ctdir ORIGINAL`)
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and are tagged with the comment `mealquest-firewall`. The script deletes
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its own tagged rules and re-inserts them at positions 1–3, so re-runs are
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idempotent. NestQuest's 8080/8081 rules below them are left untouched.
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| Repository file | Installed as |
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| --- | --- |
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| `deploy/systemd/mealquest-firewall.sh` | `/usr/local/sbin/mealquest-firewall` (root, 0755) |
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| `deploy/systemd/mealquest-firewall.service` | `/etc/systemd/system/mealquest-firewall.service` (root, 0644) |
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The unit is `Type=oneshot`, `RemainAfterExit=yes`, `Requires=` and
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`PartOf=docker.service`, and `WantedBy=multi-user.target docker.service`:
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it re-applies the rules whenever Docker starts or restarts (Docker
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recreates `DOCKER-USER` empty), and a failure fails this unit only.
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Install (done on 10.60.1.14 on 2026-10-05):
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```sh
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cd /home/overseer/mealquest
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sudo install -o root -g root -m 0755 deploy/systemd/mealquest-firewall.sh /usr/local/sbin/mealquest-firewall
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sudo install -o root -g root -m 0644 deploy/systemd/mealquest-firewall.service /etc/systemd/system/
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sudo systemctl daemon-reload
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sudo systemctl enable --now mealquest-firewall
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```
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Check:
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```sh
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systemctl is-enabled mealquest-firewall; systemctl is-active mealquest-firewall # enabled, active
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sudo iptables -S DOCKER-USER
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```
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Expected head of the chain (recorded 2026-10-05; NestQuest's rules follow):
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```
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-A DOCKER-USER -s 10.60.1.33/32 -m conntrack --ctorigdst 10.60.1.14 --ctorigdstport 8090 --ctdir ORIGINAL -m comment --comment mealquest-firewall -j RETURN
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-A DOCKER-USER -s 10.60.1.14/32 -m conntrack --ctorigdst 10.60.1.14 --ctorigdstport 8090 --ctdir ORIGINAL -m comment --comment mealquest-firewall -j RETURN
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-A DOCKER-USER -m conntrack --ctorigdst 10.60.1.14 --ctorigdstport 8090 --ctdir ORIGINAL -m comment --comment mealquest-firewall -j DROP
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```
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From any other LAN machine, `curl -m 5 http://10.60.1.14:8090/health` must
|
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time out; from 10.60.1.33 and 10.60.1.14 it returns 200.
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## Routine deploy and rollback
|
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|
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Production runs `main` (a release); only `overseer` merges `dev` → `main`.
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Every deploy builds the image on the host from the checked-out commit.
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### Deploy
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
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cd /home/overseer/mealquest
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git fetch origin
|
||||
git rev-parse --short HEAD # the SHA being replaced: note it for rollback
|
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git checkout --detach origin/main # or a release tag
|
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docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --build
|
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docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml ps # mealquest healthy, litestream up
|
||||
curl -fsS http://10.60.1.14:8090/health
|
||||
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com/health # 200
|
||||
git rev-parse HEAD # the deployed SHA
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Record the deployed SHA, the previous SHA and the date in the Maestro task
|
||||
for the release. Migrations run at start-up; the service refuses to start
|
||||
if the database has an applied migration it does not know.
|
||||
|
||||
If `deploy/.env.example` gained a variable, add it to `deploy/.env` before
|
||||
`up`; the service fails fast at boot naming any missing required variable.
|
||||
|
||||
### Rollback to a previous SHA
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
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cd /home/overseer/mealquest
|
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git checkout --detach <previous SHA>
|
||||
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --build
|
||||
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml ps
|
||||
curl -fsS http://10.60.1.14:8090/health
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
A rollback across a release that added a migration fails at start-up
|
||||
(the older binary refuses the newer schema). In that case restore the
|
||||
database to a point before the upgrade — "Restore the database" with
|
||||
`-timestamp` set just before the deploy — then start the older SHA.
|
||||
Changes made since that point are lost; say so to the household.
|
||||
|
||||
## Backups
|
||||
|
||||
### Database — Litestream
|
||||
@@ -139,15 +470,8 @@ sudo systemctl start mealquest-media-backup.service
|
||||
journalctl -u mealquest-media-backup --no-pager -n 30
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Restore media by reversing the copy into the (empty or stale) media
|
||||
directory as uid 10001:
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
sudo rsync -a --chown=10001:10001 \
|
||||
-e "ssh -i deploy/secrets/litestream_key -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o UserKnownHostsFile=/etc/mealquest/known_hosts -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes" \
|
||||
joshua@10.60.1.50:/volume1/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups/media/ \
|
||||
/var/lib/docker/volumes/mealquest-data/_data/media/
|
||||
```
|
||||
To restore media, follow "Restore photos (media)" — never copy back while
|
||||
the timer or the service can still run.
|
||||
|
||||
## Restore the database
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -225,6 +549,67 @@ python3 /tmp/mqcount.py /tmp/mqcheck/mealquest.db
|
||||
|
||||
Before and after must match exactly.
|
||||
|
||||
## Restore photos (media)
|
||||
|
||||
Recipe and dinner photos live in `media/` in the data volume and are
|
||||
backed up nightly to `joshua@10.60.1.50:/volume1/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups/media/`
|
||||
(see "Media — nightly rsync"). The backup service mirrors with
|
||||
`rsync --delete`. **An `rsync --delete` run must never see an empty or
|
||||
partial `media/`**: it would delete the NAS copy you are about to restore
|
||||
from. Stopping the timer is not enough — it does not stop a run that is
|
||||
already in flight, and the service can still be started by hand. So stop
|
||||
**both** the timer and the service, confirm no rsync is running, and do
|
||||
not start the service until the restore is verified.
|
||||
|
||||
Run from `/home/overseer/mealquest`:
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
M=/var/lib/docker/volumes/mealquest-data/_data/media
|
||||
NAS=/volume1/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups/media
|
||||
SSH="ssh -i deploy/secrets/litestream_key -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o UserKnownHostsFile=/etc/mealquest/known_hosts -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes"
|
||||
|
||||
# 1. Stop the nightly mirror: the timer AND any run in flight.
|
||||
sudo systemctl stop mealquest-media-backup.timer mealquest-media-backup.service
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. Pre-check — all three must hold before media/ is touched. If any
|
||||
# fails, stop here and find out why.
|
||||
systemctl is-active mealquest-media-backup.timer # inactive
|
||||
systemctl is-active mealquest-media-backup.service # inactive (or failed)
|
||||
pgrep -a -u mealquest rsync || echo "no rsync" # no rsync
|
||||
sudo $SSH joshua@10.60.1.50 "find $NAS -type f | wc -l"
|
||||
# ^ note this NAS file count; it must be non-zero and is the target below.
|
||||
|
||||
# 3. Stop the app (no writes into media/ meanwhile).
|
||||
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml stop mealquest
|
||||
|
||||
# 4. Recreate the directory if it is gone, owned by the app user.
|
||||
sudo install -d -o 10001 -g 10001 -m 0755 "$M"
|
||||
|
||||
# 5. Copy back from the NAS as uid 10001's files. No --delete in this
|
||||
# direction: the NAS copy is the source and is only read.
|
||||
sudo rsync -a --stats --chown=10001:10001 -e "$SSH" "joshua@10.60.1.50:$NAS/" "$M/"
|
||||
|
||||
# 6. Post-condition — before anything can mirror again:
|
||||
sudo find "$M" -type f | wc -l # >= the NAS count from step 2
|
||||
sudo $SSH joshua@10.60.1.50 "find $NAS -type f | wc -l" # unchanged from step 2
|
||||
|
||||
# 7. Start the app, then the timer again. Only now may the service run.
|
||||
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d
|
||||
curl -fsS http://10.60.1.14:8090/health
|
||||
sudo systemctl start mealquest-media-backup.timer
|
||||
systemctl is-active mealquest-media-backup.timer # active
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The local count may exceed the NAS count only if `media/` still held
|
||||
files the NAS never received (photos added since the last nightly run);
|
||||
the next nightly run then copies them up. If the local count is lower,
|
||||
the copy did not complete: leave the timer stopped and re-run step 5.
|
||||
|
||||
When the database is restored too, restore it first ("Restore the
|
||||
database"), then the media, so every photo the database refers to is
|
||||
present. This media restore has not been run against production yet; the
|
||||
backup direction was checked on 2026-10-05 (see "Media backup checks").
|
||||
|
||||
## Restore drill record — 2026-10-05
|
||||
|
||||
Drill on 10.60.1.14 against the live (pre-launch, empty-household)
|
||||
@@ -316,3 +701,141 @@ integrity ok.
|
||||
| `media` replaced by a symlink to `/etc` | `Result=exit-code`, status 1; `/run/mealquest-data/media is a symlink to /etc; refusing to back it up` |
|
||||
| `media` removed | `Result=exit-code`, status 1; `media directory /run/mealquest-data/media is missing` |
|
||||
| `sudo -u mealquest` writing into the volume via `/var/lib/docker/...` | `Permission denied` — uid 10001 cannot traverse `/var/lib/docker` (mode 0710 root) |
|
||||
|
||||
## Secret rotation
|
||||
|
||||
Rotate a secret when it may have leaked, when someone with access leaves,
|
||||
or on the owner's schedule. Never paste a secret into a ticket, chat or
|
||||
this file.
|
||||
|
||||
### App key (`deploy/secrets/secret_key`)
|
||||
|
||||
The app key encrypts every stored secret: the `_ct` columns
|
||||
`ai_settings.api_key_ct` (LLM API key), `recipe_search_settings.api_key_ct`
|
||||
(recipe-search API key), `integrations_google.refresh_token_ct` (Google
|
||||
Calendar refresh token) and `chat_settings.webhook_url_ct` (Google Chat
|
||||
webhook URL). **Rotating it re-encrypts nothing**: a value encrypted with
|
||||
the old key can no longer be read. A `mealquest rotate-key` helper that
|
||||
re-encrypts in place is planned but does not exist yet.
|
||||
|
||||
**What is recoverable today.** The service currently exposes only
|
||||
household settings; no shipped flow writes or re-enters any of these four
|
||||
secrets. The re-entry flows are planned: the LLM key in Settings → AI
|
||||
assistant (the AI settings feature), the recipe-search key (Feature 10),
|
||||
Google Calendar reconnect (Feature 16) and the Google Chat webhook
|
||||
(Feature 19). So today the rotation is safe **only if no `_ct` value is
|
||||
stored**, which the pre-check below proves. If the pre-check finds a
|
||||
stored value, do not rotate: it could not be re-entered afterwards. Keep
|
||||
the current key and wait for the matching flow (or the `rotate-key`
|
||||
helper).
|
||||
|
||||
**The pre-check and the key replacement run with the whole stack
|
||||
stopped**, from the pre-check until the new key is in place. A raw copy of
|
||||
`mealquest.db` and `mealquest.db-wal` taken while the stack runs is **not**
|
||||
a consistent snapshot: the two files are copied one after the other, and a
|
||||
checkpoint (by the app or by Litestream) between the two copies can move
|
||||
committed pages out of the WAL into `mealquest.db` after `mealquest.db` was
|
||||
already copied, then reset the WAL before it is copied. The copy then
|
||||
lacks those commits — possibly a stored `_ct` value — and the pre-check
|
||||
reports a false 0. A running app could also store a `_ct` value after a
|
||||
correct pre-check and before the key is replaced. Stopping both containers
|
||||
removes every writer (Litestream also writes and checkpoints), and the
|
||||
clean close checkpoints the WAL into `mealquest.db`, so the file alone is
|
||||
complete.
|
||||
|
||||
Run from `/home/overseer/mealquest`:
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
D=/var/lib/docker/volumes/mealquest-data/_data
|
||||
|
||||
# 1. Stop the whole stack (app and Litestream) and leave it stopped until
|
||||
# step 4. Nothing may hold the database open.
|
||||
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml down
|
||||
sudo ls -la "$D" # mealquest.db and media/ only: no -wal, no -shm; if
|
||||
# either exists, the close was not clean — stop here
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. Pre-check, on a copy of the now-quiescent database.
|
||||
rm -rf /tmp/mqcheck && mkdir /tmp/mqcheck
|
||||
sudo cp -a "$D/mealquest.db" /tmp/mqcheck/ && sudo chown -R "$USER" /tmp/mqcheck
|
||||
python3 - /tmp/mqcheck/mealquest.db <<'PY'
|
||||
import sqlite3, sys
|
||||
c = sqlite3.connect(sys.argv[1])
|
||||
for t, col in (("ai_settings", "api_key_ct"), ("recipe_search_settings", "api_key_ct"),
|
||||
("integrations_google", "refresh_token_ct"), ("chat_settings", "webhook_url_ct")):
|
||||
print(t, col, c.execute(f"select count(*) from {t} where {col} is not null").fetchone()[0])
|
||||
PY
|
||||
rm -rf /tmp/mqcheck
|
||||
# every count must be 0; otherwise start the stack again on the current
|
||||
# key (docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d) and stop here
|
||||
|
||||
# 3. Replace the key, still with the stack stopped.
|
||||
sudo cp -a deploy/secrets/secret_key /var/tmp/secret_key.old # keep until verified, then shred
|
||||
head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64 | sudo tee deploy/secrets/secret_key >/dev/null
|
||||
sudo chown 10001:10001 deploy/secrets/secret_key
|
||||
sudo chmod 600 deploy/secrets/secret_key
|
||||
|
||||
# 4. Start the stack on the new key and check health.
|
||||
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d
|
||||
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml ps
|
||||
curl -fsS http://10.60.1.14:8090/health
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Then sign in and open household settings to confirm the service runs on
|
||||
the new key. Finally `sudo shred -u /var/tmp/secret_key.old`. Once the
|
||||
planned flows ship, this section gains a step per secret to re-enter it
|
||||
and confirm it works.
|
||||
|
||||
### OIDC client secret (`deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret`)
|
||||
|
||||
In Authentik, open the provider `mealquest` and regenerate the Client
|
||||
Secret. Write it to the file (same owner and mode as above) and recreate
|
||||
the service:
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
printf '%s\n' '<new Authentik client secret>' | sudo tee deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret >/dev/null
|
||||
sudo chown 10001:10001 deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret
|
||||
sudo chmod 600 deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret
|
||||
docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --force-recreate mealquest
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Sign in at <https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com> to confirm; sign-ins
|
||||
fail between regenerating the secret in Authentik and recreating the
|
||||
service.
|
||||
|
||||
### LLM API key
|
||||
|
||||
Stored encrypted in the database, not in `deploy/`. In the app, open
|
||||
**Settings → AI assistant**, choose **Replace**, paste the new key and
|
||||
**Verify**, and check the verified state is shown. Then revoke the
|
||||
old key in the provider's console. (The AI assistant settings page is
|
||||
delivered by its own feature; until it ships there is no stored LLM key
|
||||
to rotate.)
|
||||
|
||||
### VAPID keys (Web Push)
|
||||
|
||||
Planned with Web Push (Feature 19): the public key goes in
|
||||
`deploy/.env` as `MEALQUEST_VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY`, the private key in
|
||||
`deploy/secrets/vapid_private_key` (owner `10001:10001`, mode 0600), and
|
||||
the pair is generated with `cmd/vapidgen`. **Changing the VAPID pair
|
||||
invalidates every push subscription**: each device must turn
|
||||
notifications on again (`/settings/notifications`) before it receives
|
||||
pushes. Rotate only when the private key may have leaked, write both
|
||||
halves, recreate the service with `--force-recreate mealquest`, and tell
|
||||
the household to re-enable notifications on each device.
|
||||
|
||||
### Litestream / NAS key (`deploy/secrets/litestream_key`)
|
||||
|
||||
Generate a new keypair as in "Database — Litestream", add the new public
|
||||
key to `joshua@10.60.1.50:~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, replace the file
|
||||
(owner `10001:10001`, mode 0600), run
|
||||
`docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --force-recreate litestream`
|
||||
and `sudo systemctl start mealquest-media-backup.service`, check both
|
||||
(`litestream ltx` and the journal), then remove the old public key from
|
||||
the NAS.
|
||||
|
||||
## Context records
|
||||
|
||||
The confirmed values in this runbook (port 8090, checkout path, Authentik
|
||||
group `mealquest-admin`, DNS, firewall, backup target) are also recorded in
|
||||
the CTXD project `mealquest`: `RUNBOOKS.MD` (deployment procedure) and the
|
||||
open questions in `CONTEXT.MD`, updated for Feature 07 task 876134bc.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user