diff --git a/deploy/RUNBOOK.md b/deploy/RUNBOOK.md
index 89534f5..df1cc3b 100644
--- a/deploy/RUNBOOK.md
+++ b/deploy/RUNBOOK.md
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
 # MealQuest deployment runbook
 
-How MealQuest is deployed on office-srvr (10.60.1.14) and how its data is
-backed up and restored. Sections marked *task 876134bc* are completed by
-that task (Feature 07 deployment runbook); this file currently records the
-reverse-proxy route, the backups and the restore procedure.
+How MealQuest is deployed on office-srvr (10.60.1.14), how it is reached
+through Authentik, Traefik and DNS, how it is updated and rolled back, how
+its data is backed up and restored, and how its secrets are rotated. Values
+are the ones in use on 2026-10-05. Secrets themselves are never written
+here.
 
 Paths used below:
 
@@ -17,10 +18,213 @@ Paths used below:
 | Backup target (NAS, over SSH) | `joshua@10.60.1.50:/volume1/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups` |
 | Same target over SFTP (Synology chroot) | `/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups` |
 
+## Prerequisites
+
+On office-srvr (10.60.1.14), as recorded on 2026-10-05:
+
+| Item | Value |
+| --- | --- |
+| OS | Ubuntu 26.04.1 LTS |
+| Docker Engine / Compose plugin | 29.8.2 / 5.6.0 |
+| git, rsync, iptables | 2.53.0, 3.4.1, 1.8.11 (nf_tables) |
+| Account | `overseer`, with sudo |
+| Network | LAN reachability to Traefik (10.60.1.33), Authentik (`auth.cubecraftlabs.com`) and the NAS (10.60.1.50, SSH) |
+
+Elsewhere:
+
+- Admin access to Authentik at <https://auth.cubecraftlabs.com>.
+- SSH access to the Traefik host 10.60.1.33.
+- Cloudflare access for the `cubecraftlabs.com` zone, and admin access to
+  both Pi-holes (10.60.1.101 `dns.ccl`, 10.60.1.85 `dns2.ccl`).
+- A NAS account `joshua` on 10.60.1.50 with the backup directory
+  `/volume1/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups` (see "Backups").
+- A Gitea token able to read `Maniacs_Mansion/MealQuest`, for the clone.
+
 ## Stack and first deploy
 
-*Completed by task 876134bc.* The compose stack is `deploy/compose.yaml`;
-start it with `docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --build`.
+The compose stack is `deploy/compose.yaml`: the `mealquest` service (built
+from the repository `Dockerfile`, runs as uid/gid 10001, listens on 8080 in
+the container) and the `litestream` service. Data lives in the named volume
+`mealquest-data`.
+
+### 1. Choose and check the port
+
+The container's 8080 is published on `10.60.1.14:8090`. Ports 8080 and 8081
+on this host belong to NestQuest, so 8090 was chosen. Before the first
+deploy it was checked free with:
+
+```sh
+ss -ltnp | grep 8090   # printed nothing
+```
+
+After the deploy the same host shows NestQuest on 8080/8081 and MealQuest
+on 8090:
+
+```
+LISTEN 0 4096 10.60.1.14:8080 0.0.0.0:*
+LISTEN 0 4096 10.60.1.14:8081 0.0.0.0:*
+LISTEN 0 4096 10.60.1.14:8090 0.0.0.0:*
+```
+
+The published host port is fixed in `deploy/compose.yaml`, in
+`deploy/systemd/mealquest-firewall.sh` and in the Traefik route; change all
+three together.
+
+### 2. Clone
+
+The checkout lives at `/home/overseer/mealquest`, next to NestQuest's
+`~/nestquest` (not `/opt/mealquest`). Clone over HTTPS with a Gitea token,
+then reset the remote to the clean URL so the token is not stored in
+`.git/config`:
+
+```sh
+cd /home/overseer
+git clone https://<user>:<token>@code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/MealQuest.git mealquest
+cd mealquest
+git remote set-url origin https://code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/MealQuest.git
+git remote -v   # must show no token
+git checkout main
+```
+
+### 3. Environment file
+
+`deploy/.env` (git-ignored) is copied from `deploy/.env.example` and is
+mode 0600, owned by `overseer`:
+
+```sh
+cp deploy/.env.example deploy/.env
+chmod 600 deploy/.env
+```
+
+Then edit `deploy/.env` to the values below. In particular
+**`MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS` must be changed**: `.env.example` ships
+`127.0.0.1` (a dev machine), and left as is the service listens only on
+the host's loopback, which Traefik cannot reach. Set it to the LAN address
+and check:
+
+```sh
+sed -i 's/^MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS=.*/MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS=10.60.1.14/' deploy/.env
+grep '^MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS=' deploy/.env      # MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS=10.60.1.14
+docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml config | grep -A4 'ports:'
+#   host_ip: 10.60.1.14, target: 8080, published: "8090"
+```
+
+After step 5 the listener is `10.60.1.14:8090` (container port 8080):
+
+```sh
+docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml port mealquest 8080   # 10.60.1.14:8090
+sudo ss -ltnp 'sport = :8090'                               # 10.60.1.14:8090 only, no 0.0.0.0 or 127.0.0.1
+```
+
+Values in use:
+
+| Variable | Value |
+| --- | --- |
+| `MEALQUEST_BIND_ADDRESS` | `10.60.1.14` |
+| `MEALQUEST_PUBLIC_URL` | `https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com` |
+| `MEALQUEST_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT` | `10s` |
+| `MEALQUEST_TRUSTED_PROXY` | `10.60.1.33` |
+| `MEALQUEST_DEFAULT_TZ` | `America/New_York` |
+| `MEALQUEST_OIDC_ISSUER` | `https://auth.cubecraftlabs.com/application/o/mealquest/` |
+| `MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_ID` | `i6zraqmWsF552b8nmte070LXz0SI5pRdArBxFxeq` (not a secret) |
+| `MEALQUEST_OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS` | `mealquest-admin` |
+| `MEALQUEST_SESSION_IDLE` / `MEALQUEST_SESSION_MAX` | `720h` / `4320h` |
+
+`MEALQUEST_HTTP_ADDR`, `MEALQUEST_DATA_DIR` and the `*_FILE` variables are
+set by `deploy/compose.yaml` and must not appear in `deploy/.env`.
+
+### 4. Secrets
+
+`deploy/secrets/` (git-ignored) is mode 0700, owned by `overseer`. Each
+file holds one value, is owned by `10001:10001` (host user `mealquest`) and
+is mode 0600. Compose bind-mounts file secrets with their host owner and
+mode, so any other owner or mode stops the container reading them and the
+service refuses to start.
+
+| File | Content | Mounted at |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `secret_key` | base64 of 32 random bytes; encrypts stored secrets (AES-256-GCM) | `/run/secrets/secret_key` |
+| `oidc_client_secret` | Client Secret of the Authentik provider `mealquest` | `/run/secrets/oidc_client_secret` |
+| `litestream_key` | dedicated SSH private key for the NAS (see "Backups") | `/etc/litestream/sftp_key` |
+
+```sh
+mkdir -p deploy/secrets && chmod 700 deploy/secrets
+head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64 > deploy/secrets/secret_key
+printf '%s\n' '<Authentik client secret>' > deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret
+# litestream_key: see "Backups" > "Database — Litestream"
+sudo chown 10001:10001 deploy/secrets/*
+sudo chmod 600 deploy/secrets/*
+sudo ls -la deploy/secrets   # three files, mealquest mealquest, -rw-------
+```
+
+The `mealquest` host user (uid/gid 10001) is created in "Media — nightly
+rsync"; until it exists `ls` shows the numeric ids.
+
+### 5. Firewall, then the stack
+
+Install the firewall unit first (see "Host firewall"), so port 8090 is
+never open to the LAN. Create the media directory (see "Media — nightly
+rsync"), then build and start:
+
+```sh
+sudo systemctl start mealquest-firewall
+docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --build
+docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml ps   # mealquest healthy, litestream up
+curl -fsS http://10.60.1.14:8090/health
+curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com/health   # 200
+```
+
+### Host checkout state on 2026-10-05
+
+The first deploy ran before Feature 07 reached `main`. The checkout is at
+`main` `9cddbbb` and the Feature 07 files under `deploy/` were copied in
+from the feature branch: `deploy/compose.yaml` and `deploy/.env.example`
+are listed in `.git/info/exclude`, the rest show as untracked. Before the
+first routine deploy of a `main` that contains `deploy/`, remove those
+`.git/info/exclude` lines and the copied files (keep `deploy/.env` and
+`deploy/secrets/`), or `git checkout` refuses to overwrite them:
+
+```sh
+cd /home/overseer/mealquest
+git status --porcelain --untracked-files=all deploy   # the copied files
+sed -i '/^deploy\/\(compose.yaml\|.env.example\)$/d' .git/info/exclude
+git clean -n deploy      # dry run: must not list .env or secrets/ (both git-ignored)
+git clean -f deploy
+```
+
+Then follow "Routine deploy"; the checkout brings the tracked copies back.
+
+## Authentik
+
+Sign-in is OpenID Connect against Authentik at
+<https://auth.cubecraftlabs.com>.
+
+| Object | Setting |
+| --- | --- |
+| Provider | OAuth2/OpenID provider `mealquest`, client type **Confidential** |
+| Redirect URI | `https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com/auth/callback` (strict) |
+| Signing | RS256, with the instance's signing key |
+| Scopes | MealQuest requests `openid profile email groups offline_access`; the provider's scope mappings include openid, profile, email and offline_access, and the `groups` claim is delivered by a property mapping (the default profile mapping carries `groups`) |
+| Application | name MealQuest, slug `mealquest`, provider `mealquest` |
+| Group | `mealquest-admin`, bound to the application; household members are added to it |
+| Client ID | `i6zraqmWsF552b8nmte070LXz0SI5pRdArBxFxeq` (not a secret; in `deploy/.env` as `MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_ID`) |
+| Client Secret | in `deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret` only |
+
+MealQuest refuses a sign-in unless the user's `groups` claim (from the ID
+token, or from userinfo when the token has none) contains a group in
+`MEALQUEST_OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS`.
+
+Check discovery from the Docker host — the service discovers the issuer
+at boot and will not start if it cannot:
+
+```sh
+curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" \
+  https://auth.cubecraftlabs.com/application/o/mealquest/.well-known/openid-configuration   # 200
+```
+
+On 2026-10-05 discovery returned 200 with issuer
+`https://auth.cubecraftlabs.com/application/o/mealquest/` and
+`id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ["RS256"]`.
 
 ## Reverse proxy (Traefik)
 
@@ -67,6 +271,133 @@ http:
         frameDeny: true
 ```
 
+Traefik watches the dynamic directory, so saving the file loads the route;
+the certificate comes from `certResolver: myresolver` (Let's Encrypt,
+DNS-01 through Cloudflare). Check from the LAN:
+
+```sh
+curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com/health   # 200
+```
+
+## DNS
+
+| Where | Record |
+| --- | --- |
+| Cloudflare, zone `cubecraftlabs.com` | `CNAME mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com` → `cubecraftlabs.com`, **proxied = true** (orange cloud). Because it is proxied, public resolvers answer with Cloudflare's anycast addresses, A and AAAA (AAAA on 2026-10-05: `2606:4700:3032::6815:34ed`, `2606:4700:3035::ac43:cd75`), never the origin |
+| Pi-hole primary 10.60.1.101 (`dns.ccl`), Local DNS records | `A mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com` → `10.60.1.33` (Traefik) |
+| Pi-hole secondary 10.60.1.85 (`dns2.ccl`), Local DNS records | `A mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com` → `10.60.1.33` (Traefik) |
+
+The local record must be on **both** Pi-holes, or clients using the
+secondary go out through Cloudflare. Check:
+
+```sh
+for s in 10.60.1.101 10.60.1.85; do dig +short @$s mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com A; done
+# 10.60.1.33 from each
+```
+
+**AAAA caveat.** The Pi-hole local record is A only, so both Pi-holes still
+forward AAAA queries and return Cloudflare's IPv6 addresses
+(`2606:4700:3032::6815:34ed`, `2606:4700:3035::ac43:cd75` on 2026-10-05). An
+IPv6-capable LAN client may prefer those and reach MealQuest through
+Cloudflare instead of directly through Traefik. It still works (Cloudflare
+proxies to the public route), but it is not the LAN path. If that matters,
+add a local AAAA override or block AAAA for this name on both Pi-holes.
+
+## Host firewall
+
+Docker publishes `10.60.1.14:8090` past the host's INPUT rules, so the
+port is restricted in the `DOCKER-USER` chain instead: only Traefik
+(10.60.1.33) and the host itself (10.60.1.14) may connect; every other
+source is dropped.
+
+Docker DNATs the published port to the container address and port 8080
+**before** `DOCKER-USER`, so a plain `-p tcp --dport 8090` rule never
+matches. The rules match the original destination `10.60.1.14:8090` with
+conntrack (`--ctorigdst 10.60.1.14 --ctorigdstport 8090 --ctdir ORIGINAL`)
+and are tagged with the comment `mealquest-firewall`. The script deletes
+its own tagged rules and re-inserts them at positions 1–3, so re-runs are
+idempotent. NestQuest's 8080/8081 rules below them are left untouched.
+
+| Repository file | Installed as |
+| --- | --- |
+| `deploy/systemd/mealquest-firewall.sh` | `/usr/local/sbin/mealquest-firewall` (root, 0755) |
+| `deploy/systemd/mealquest-firewall.service` | `/etc/systemd/system/mealquest-firewall.service` (root, 0644) |
+
+The unit is `Type=oneshot`, `RemainAfterExit=yes`, `Requires=` and
+`PartOf=docker.service`, and `WantedBy=multi-user.target docker.service`:
+it re-applies the rules whenever Docker starts or restarts (Docker
+recreates `DOCKER-USER` empty), and a failure fails this unit only.
+
+Install (done on 10.60.1.14 on 2026-10-05):
+
+```sh
+cd /home/overseer/mealquest
+sudo install -o root -g root -m 0755 deploy/systemd/mealquest-firewall.sh /usr/local/sbin/mealquest-firewall
+sudo install -o root -g root -m 0644 deploy/systemd/mealquest-firewall.service /etc/systemd/system/
+sudo systemctl daemon-reload
+sudo systemctl enable --now mealquest-firewall
+```
+
+Check:
+
+```sh
+systemctl is-enabled mealquest-firewall; systemctl is-active mealquest-firewall   # enabled, active
+sudo iptables -S DOCKER-USER
+```
+
+Expected head of the chain (recorded 2026-10-05; NestQuest's rules follow):
+
+```
+-A DOCKER-USER -s 10.60.1.33/32 -m conntrack --ctorigdst 10.60.1.14 --ctorigdstport 8090 --ctdir ORIGINAL -m comment --comment mealquest-firewall -j RETURN
+-A DOCKER-USER -s 10.60.1.14/32 -m conntrack --ctorigdst 10.60.1.14 --ctorigdstport 8090 --ctdir ORIGINAL -m comment --comment mealquest-firewall -j RETURN
+-A DOCKER-USER -m conntrack --ctorigdst 10.60.1.14 --ctorigdstport 8090 --ctdir ORIGINAL -m comment --comment mealquest-firewall -j DROP
+```
+
+From any other LAN machine, `curl -m 5 http://10.60.1.14:8090/health` must
+time out; from 10.60.1.33 and 10.60.1.14 it returns 200.
+
+## Routine deploy and rollback
+
+Production runs `main` (a release); only `overseer` merges `dev` → `main`.
+Every deploy builds the image on the host from the checked-out commit.
+
+### Deploy
+
+```sh
+cd /home/overseer/mealquest
+git fetch origin
+git rev-parse --short HEAD          # the SHA being replaced: note it for rollback
+git checkout --detach origin/main   # or a release tag
+docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --build
+docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml ps   # mealquest healthy, litestream up
+curl -fsS http://10.60.1.14:8090/health
+curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com/health   # 200
+git rev-parse HEAD                  # the deployed SHA
+```
+
+Record the deployed SHA, the previous SHA and the date in the Maestro task
+for the release. Migrations run at start-up; the service refuses to start
+if the database has an applied migration it does not know.
+
+If `deploy/.env.example` gained a variable, add it to `deploy/.env` before
+`up`; the service fails fast at boot naming any missing required variable.
+
+### Rollback to a previous SHA
+
+```sh
+cd /home/overseer/mealquest
+git checkout --detach <previous SHA>
+docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --build
+docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml ps
+curl -fsS http://10.60.1.14:8090/health
+```
+
+A rollback across a release that added a migration fails at start-up
+(the older binary refuses the newer schema). In that case restore the
+database to a point before the upgrade — "Restore the database" with
+`-timestamp` set just before the deploy — then start the older SHA.
+Changes made since that point are lost; say so to the household.
+
 ## Backups
 
 ### Database — Litestream
@@ -139,15 +470,8 @@ sudo systemctl start mealquest-media-backup.service
 journalctl -u mealquest-media-backup --no-pager -n 30
 ```
 
-Restore media by reversing the copy into the (empty or stale) media
-directory as uid 10001:
-
-```sh
-sudo rsync -a --chown=10001:10001 \
-  -e "ssh -i deploy/secrets/litestream_key -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o UserKnownHostsFile=/etc/mealquest/known_hosts -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes" \
-  joshua@10.60.1.50:/volume1/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups/media/ \
-  /var/lib/docker/volumes/mealquest-data/_data/media/
-```
+To restore media, follow "Restore photos (media)" — never copy back while
+the timer or the service can still run.
 
 ## Restore the database
 
@@ -225,6 +549,67 @@ python3 /tmp/mqcount.py /tmp/mqcheck/mealquest.db
 
 Before and after must match exactly.
 
+## Restore photos (media)
+
+Recipe and dinner photos live in `media/` in the data volume and are
+backed up nightly to `joshua@10.60.1.50:/volume1/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups/media/`
+(see "Media — nightly rsync"). The backup service mirrors with
+`rsync --delete`. **An `rsync --delete` run must never see an empty or
+partial `media/`**: it would delete the NAS copy you are about to restore
+from. Stopping the timer is not enough — it does not stop a run that is
+already in flight, and the service can still be started by hand. So stop
+**both** the timer and the service, confirm no rsync is running, and do
+not start the service until the restore is verified.
+
+Run from `/home/overseer/mealquest`:
+
+```sh
+M=/var/lib/docker/volumes/mealquest-data/_data/media
+NAS=/volume1/homes/Joshua/mealquest-backups/media
+SSH="ssh -i deploy/secrets/litestream_key -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o UserKnownHostsFile=/etc/mealquest/known_hosts -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes"
+
+# 1. Stop the nightly mirror: the timer AND any run in flight.
+sudo systemctl stop mealquest-media-backup.timer mealquest-media-backup.service
+
+# 2. Pre-check — all three must hold before media/ is touched. If any
+#    fails, stop here and find out why.
+systemctl is-active mealquest-media-backup.timer     # inactive
+systemctl is-active mealquest-media-backup.service   # inactive (or failed)
+pgrep -a -u mealquest rsync || echo "no rsync"       # no rsync
+sudo $SSH joshua@10.60.1.50 "find $NAS -type f | wc -l"
+#    ^ note this NAS file count; it must be non-zero and is the target below.
+
+# 3. Stop the app (no writes into media/ meanwhile).
+docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml stop mealquest
+
+# 4. Recreate the directory if it is gone, owned by the app user.
+sudo install -d -o 10001 -g 10001 -m 0755 "$M"
+
+# 5. Copy back from the NAS as uid 10001's files. No --delete in this
+#    direction: the NAS copy is the source and is only read.
+sudo rsync -a --stats --chown=10001:10001 -e "$SSH" "joshua@10.60.1.50:$NAS/" "$M/"
+
+# 6. Post-condition — before anything can mirror again:
+sudo find "$M" -type f | wc -l                            # >= the NAS count from step 2
+sudo $SSH joshua@10.60.1.50 "find $NAS -type f | wc -l"   # unchanged from step 2
+
+# 7. Start the app, then the timer again. Only now may the service run.
+docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d
+curl -fsS http://10.60.1.14:8090/health
+sudo systemctl start mealquest-media-backup.timer
+systemctl is-active mealquest-media-backup.timer          # active
+```
+
+The local count may exceed the NAS count only if `media/` still held
+files the NAS never received (photos added since the last nightly run);
+the next nightly run then copies them up. If the local count is lower,
+the copy did not complete: leave the timer stopped and re-run step 5.
+
+When the database is restored too, restore it first ("Restore the
+database"), then the media, so every photo the database refers to is
+present. This media restore has not been run against production yet; the
+backup direction was checked on 2026-10-05 (see "Media backup checks").
+
 ## Restore drill record — 2026-10-05
 
 Drill on 10.60.1.14 against the live (pre-launch, empty-household)
@@ -316,3 +701,141 @@ integrity ok.
 | `media` replaced by a symlink to `/etc` | `Result=exit-code`, status 1; `/run/mealquest-data/media is a symlink to /etc; refusing to back it up` |
 | `media` removed | `Result=exit-code`, status 1; `media directory /run/mealquest-data/media is missing` |
 | `sudo -u mealquest` writing into the volume via `/var/lib/docker/...` | `Permission denied` — uid 10001 cannot traverse `/var/lib/docker` (mode 0710 root) |
+
+## Secret rotation
+
+Rotate a secret when it may have leaked, when someone with access leaves,
+or on the owner's schedule. Never paste a secret into a ticket, chat or
+this file.
+
+### App key (`deploy/secrets/secret_key`)
+
+The app key encrypts every stored secret: the `_ct` columns
+`ai_settings.api_key_ct` (LLM API key), `recipe_search_settings.api_key_ct`
+(recipe-search API key), `integrations_google.refresh_token_ct` (Google
+Calendar refresh token) and `chat_settings.webhook_url_ct` (Google Chat
+webhook URL). **Rotating it re-encrypts nothing**: a value encrypted with
+the old key can no longer be read. A `mealquest rotate-key` helper that
+re-encrypts in place is planned but does not exist yet.
+
+**What is recoverable today.** The service currently exposes only
+household settings; no shipped flow writes or re-enters any of these four
+secrets. The re-entry flows are planned: the LLM key in Settings → AI
+assistant (the AI settings feature), the recipe-search key (Feature 10),
+Google Calendar reconnect (Feature 16) and the Google Chat webhook
+(Feature 19). So today the rotation is safe **only if no `_ct` value is
+stored**, which the pre-check below proves. If the pre-check finds a
+stored value, do not rotate: it could not be re-entered afterwards. Keep
+the current key and wait for the matching flow (or the `rotate-key`
+helper).
+
+**The pre-check and the key replacement run with the whole stack
+stopped**, from the pre-check until the new key is in place. A raw copy of
+`mealquest.db` and `mealquest.db-wal` taken while the stack runs is **not**
+a consistent snapshot: the two files are copied one after the other, and a
+checkpoint (by the app or by Litestream) between the two copies can move
+committed pages out of the WAL into `mealquest.db` after `mealquest.db` was
+already copied, then reset the WAL before it is copied. The copy then
+lacks those commits — possibly a stored `_ct` value — and the pre-check
+reports a false 0. A running app could also store a `_ct` value after a
+correct pre-check and before the key is replaced. Stopping both containers
+removes every writer (Litestream also writes and checkpoints), and the
+clean close checkpoints the WAL into `mealquest.db`, so the file alone is
+complete.
+
+Run from `/home/overseer/mealquest`:
+
+```sh
+D=/var/lib/docker/volumes/mealquest-data/_data
+
+# 1. Stop the whole stack (app and Litestream) and leave it stopped until
+#    step 4. Nothing may hold the database open.
+docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml down
+sudo ls -la "$D"   # mealquest.db and media/ only: no -wal, no -shm; if
+                   # either exists, the close was not clean — stop here
+
+# 2. Pre-check, on a copy of the now-quiescent database.
+rm -rf /tmp/mqcheck && mkdir /tmp/mqcheck
+sudo cp -a "$D/mealquest.db" /tmp/mqcheck/ && sudo chown -R "$USER" /tmp/mqcheck
+python3 - /tmp/mqcheck/mealquest.db <<'PY'
+import sqlite3, sys
+c = sqlite3.connect(sys.argv[1])
+for t, col in (("ai_settings", "api_key_ct"), ("recipe_search_settings", "api_key_ct"),
+               ("integrations_google", "refresh_token_ct"), ("chat_settings", "webhook_url_ct")):
+    print(t, col, c.execute(f"select count(*) from {t} where {col} is not null").fetchone()[0])
+PY
+rm -rf /tmp/mqcheck
+# every count must be 0; otherwise start the stack again on the current
+# key (docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d) and stop here
+
+# 3. Replace the key, still with the stack stopped.
+sudo cp -a deploy/secrets/secret_key /var/tmp/secret_key.old   # keep until verified, then shred
+head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64 | sudo tee deploy/secrets/secret_key >/dev/null
+sudo chown 10001:10001 deploy/secrets/secret_key
+sudo chmod 600 deploy/secrets/secret_key
+
+# 4. Start the stack on the new key and check health.
+docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d
+docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml ps
+curl -fsS http://10.60.1.14:8090/health
+```
+
+Then sign in and open household settings to confirm the service runs on
+the new key. Finally `sudo shred -u /var/tmp/secret_key.old`. Once the
+planned flows ship, this section gains a step per secret to re-enter it
+and confirm it works.
+
+### OIDC client secret (`deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret`)
+
+In Authentik, open the provider `mealquest` and regenerate the Client
+Secret. Write it to the file (same owner and mode as above) and recreate
+the service:
+
+```sh
+printf '%s\n' '<new Authentik client secret>' | sudo tee deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret >/dev/null
+sudo chown 10001:10001 deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret
+sudo chmod 600 deploy/secrets/oidc_client_secret
+docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --force-recreate mealquest
+```
+
+Sign in at <https://mealquest.cubecraftlabs.com> to confirm; sign-ins
+fail between regenerating the secret in Authentik and recreating the
+service.
+
+### LLM API key
+
+Stored encrypted in the database, not in `deploy/`. In the app, open
+**Settings → AI assistant**, choose **Replace**, paste the new key and
+**Verify**, and check the verified state is shown. Then revoke the
+old key in the provider's console. (The AI assistant settings page is
+delivered by its own feature; until it ships there is no stored LLM key
+to rotate.)
+
+### VAPID keys (Web Push)
+
+Planned with Web Push (Feature 19): the public key goes in
+`deploy/.env` as `MEALQUEST_VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY`, the private key in
+`deploy/secrets/vapid_private_key` (owner `10001:10001`, mode 0600), and
+the pair is generated with `cmd/vapidgen`. **Changing the VAPID pair
+invalidates every push subscription**: each device must turn
+notifications on again (`/settings/notifications`) before it receives
+pushes. Rotate only when the private key may have leaked, write both
+halves, recreate the service with `--force-recreate mealquest`, and tell
+the household to re-enable notifications on each device.
+
+### Litestream / NAS key (`deploy/secrets/litestream_key`)
+
+Generate a new keypair as in "Database — Litestream", add the new public
+key to `joshua@10.60.1.50:~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, replace the file
+(owner `10001:10001`, mode 0600), run
+`docker compose -f deploy/compose.yaml up -d --force-recreate litestream`
+and `sudo systemctl start mealquest-media-backup.service`, check both
+(`litestream ltx` and the journal), then remove the old public key from
+the NAS.
+
+## Context records
+
+The confirmed values in this runbook (port 8090, checkout path, Authentik
+group `mealquest-admin`, DNS, firewall, backup target) are also recorded in
+the CTXD project `mealquest`: `RUNBOOKS.MD` (deployment procedure) and the
+open questions in `CONTEXT.MD`, updated for Feature 07 task 876134bc.