Files
MealQuest/internal/server/origin_test.go
T
dev_agentandClaude Opus 5.5 cdbec3f3a2
CI / ci (push) Successful in 8m28s
CI / ci (pull_request) Successful in 8m20s
Add GET /api/v1/home for the Home dashboard
home.Service aggregates the Home screen from the services that own each
value, at "now" in the household's zone: the date label, tonight's dinner
from the current week's plan (null with no plan), the pending Side quest
count from the deck, the Supply run status of the upcoming week or else
the current one, and recentUpdates.unread.

unread is whether a notification was stored in notification_outbox after
household_settings.updates_seen_at (or at all while it is null), read
through the new notify.StoredSince over the HasNotificationSince query.
Nothing writes updates_seen_at yet; the updates task adds that.

Tests under America/Chicago show tonight's dinner flips at local
midnight, not UTC midnight, and cover no plan, no suggestions, the
Supply run choice and unread.

Maestro task 9ccfc3a6-cc7b-493a-aa4b-2b455d26f4df.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-09 20:19:33 -04:00

146 lines
4.8 KiB
Go

package server
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"testing/fstest"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/forwarded"
)
// traefik is the production proxy's address.
const traefik = "10.60.1.33"
// probeAuth mounts GET /auth/probe, which reports the request's resolved
// origin, in place of the real auth flow.
type probeAuth struct{}
func (probeAuth) Mount(r chi.Router) {
r.Get("/auth/probe", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ip, ipOK := forwarded.ClientIP(r.Context())
scheme, schemeOK := forwarded.Scheme(r.Context())
if !ipOK || !schemeOK {
http.Error(w, "origin not resolved", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s %s", ip, scheme)
})
}
// newOriginRouter builds the production router trusting Traefik, logging
// through forwarded.LogHandler as cmd/server does.
func newOriginRouter(t *testing.T, logs io.Writer) http.Handler {
t.Helper()
trusted, err := forwarded.ParseTrusted(traefik)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
logger := slog.New(forwarded.LogHandler(slog.NewJSONHandler(logs, nil)))
r, err := NewRouter(logger, "dev", trusted, probeAuth{}, stubSessions{}, newTestSettings(t),
newTestSearch(t), newTestAI(t), newTestChat(t), newTestDinners(t), newTestSuggest(t), newTestPlan(t), newTestShopping(t), newTestGoogle(t), newTestPush(t), newTestIdeas(t), newTestHome(t), newTestRunner(t), newTestPhotos(t), fstest.MapFS{"index.html": {Data: []byte(fixtureIndex)}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return r
}
func originRequest(target, peer string, headers map[string]string) *http.Request {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, target, nil)
req.RemoteAddr = peer
for k, v := range headers {
req.Header.Set(k, v)
}
return req
}
func TestRouterResolvesOrigin(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
spoofed := map[string]string{forwarded.HeaderFor: "203.0.113.7", forwarded.HeaderProto: "https"}
tests := []struct {
name string
peer string
want string
}{
{"trusted proxy's forwarded headers are honoured", traefik + ":41000", "203.0.113.7 https"},
{"untrusted peer spoofing them is ignored", "198.51.100.9:5000", "198.51.100.9 http"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
newOriginRouter(t, io.Discard).ServeHTTP(rec, originRequest("/auth/probe", tt.peer, spoofed))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || rec.Body.String() != tt.want {
t.Errorf("probe = %d %q, want 200 %q", rec.Code, rec.Body.String(), tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestRouterLogsResolvedClientIP(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
spoofed := map[string]string{forwarded.HeaderFor: "203.0.113.7", forwarded.HeaderProto: "https"}
tests := []struct {
name string
peer string
want string
}{
{"trusted proxy", traefik + ":41000", "203.0.113.7"},
{"untrusted peer spoofing", "198.51.100.9:5000", "198.51.100.9"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var logs bytes.Buffer
// A failed session lookup is logged with the request's context.
req := originRequest("/api/v1/me", tt.peer, spoofed)
req.AddCookie(brokenSessionCookie)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
newOriginRouter(t, &logs).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 500", rec.Code)
}
var line map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(logs.Bytes(), &line); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("log %q: %v", logs.String(), err)
}
if line["msg"] != "look up session" || line[forwarded.LogAttr] != tt.want {
t.Errorf("log = %v, want the session error with %s=%s", line, forwarded.LogAttr, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestRouterRejectsMalformedForwardedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const badRequestJSON = `{"error":{"code":"bad_request","message":"invalid forwarded headers","retryable":false}}`
for _, headers := range []map[string]string{
{forwarded.HeaderFor: "not-an-ip"},
{forwarded.HeaderProto: "ftp"},
} {
var logs bytes.Buffer
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
newOriginRouter(t, &logs).ServeHTTP(rec, originRequest("/health", traefik+":41000", headers))
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || rec.Body.String() != badRequestJSON {
t.Errorf("%v: response = %d %s, want 400 %s", headers, rec.Code, rec.Body.String(), badRequestJSON)
}
if !bytes.Contains(logs.Bytes(), []byte("rejected forwarded headers")) {
t.Errorf("%v: logs = %q, want the rejection logged", headers, logs.String())
}
// The same headers from an untrusted peer are not examined at all.
rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
newOriginRouter(t, io.Discard).ServeHTTP(rec, originRequest("/health", "198.51.100.9:5000", headers))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("%v from an untrusted peer: status = %d, want 200", headers, rec.Code)
}
}
}