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Author SHA1 Message Date
dev_agentandClaude Opus 5.5 bb0a9c3129 Refuse OIDC redirect downgrades; stop logging provider error text
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Independent review Codex gpt-6-sol high: APPROVED (0 findings)
The provider HTTP client now has a redirect policy: every redirect target
must pass secureurl.Check, and an https:// request never follows a
redirect to plain http://, so a 307/308 from the token endpoint cannot
resend the client secret in plaintext. Transport errors from the code
exchange no longer include the (possibly provider-supplied) URL.

The callback's provider-error path logs a fixed category instead of the
raw error and error_description query values.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 09:49:44 -04:00
dev_agentandClaude Opus 5.5 e8dafda534 Require HTTPS for OIDC and public URLs; stop logging token responses
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Address review findings on a10b24c:

- F1: the OIDC issuer and the discovered authorization, token and JWKS
  endpoints must be https://; plain http:// is allowed only for the
  loopback hosts localhost, 127.0.0.1 and [::1]. Config rejects a remote
  http:// issuer at startup; auth.New rejects a discovered remote http://
  endpoint, naming it, before it is used.
- F2: a failed code exchange is reduced to a fixed category plus the HTTP
  status; the token endpoint's body and error_description are never logged
  or wrapped into the returned error.
- F3: MEALQUEST_PUBLIC_URL must be https:// unless its host is loopback,
  so the Secure login cookie is always sent back on the callback.

The rule lives once, in internal/secureurl.Check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 09:45:33 -04:00
dev_agentandClaude Opus 5.5 a10b24c86c Add OIDC login and callback against Authentik
CI / ci (push) Successful in 1m27s
Independent review Codex gpt-6-sol high: CHANGES_REQUIRED (1 high, 2 medium)
CI / ci (pull_request) Successful in 1m22s
internal/auth discovers the provider at MEALQUEST_OIDC_ISSUER with
coreos/go-oidc/v3 and runs a confidential-client authorization code flow
with golang.org/x/oauth2 (client_secret_basic).

GET /auth/login stores state, nonce and a PKCE S256 verifier in a
10-minute HMAC-signed HttpOnly __Host- cookie and redirects with scopes
"openid profile email groups offline_access". An optional "return" path
must be same-origin; anything else fails the login with 400.

GET /auth/callback clears the single-use cookie, checks state, exchanges
the code with the verifier, verifies the ID token (RS256 only, issuer,
audience, expiry) and nonce, then hands the claims to a SessionStarter.
cmd/server wires a placeholder that refuses every login until the
session layer lands.

Config gains required MEALQUEST_OIDC_ISSUER, MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_ID,
MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE and MEALQUEST_OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS.

Pins go-oidc v3.21.0 and oauth2 v0.36.0, the newest releases that
support Go 1.25 (oauth2 v0.37.0 requires Go 1.26).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 09:36:57 -04:00
16 changed files with 73 additions and 1680 deletions
+2 -7
View File
@@ -36,19 +36,14 @@ export MEALQUEST_OIDC_ISSUER=https://auth.example.com/application/o/mealquest/
export MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_ID=mealquest
export MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE="$HOME/.mealquest-dev/oidc_client_secret"
export MEALQUEST_OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS=mealquest-admin
# Optional: sessions end after MEALQUEST_SESSION_IDLE unused (default 720h)
# and always MEALQUEST_SESSION_MAX after sign-in (default 4320h).
# export MEALQUEST_SESSION_IDLE=720h
# export MEALQUEST_SESSION_MAX=4320h
make dev
```
`make dev` runs the Go server on `:8080` and the Vite dev server on `:5173`
(which proxies `/api`, `/auth` and `/media` to `:8080`). Open
http://localhost:5173. Configuration is environment-only and fails fast:
every variable above is required except the commented-out session
lifetimes (when set they must be positive, with MAX at least IDLE), and
secrets are read only from files named by `*_FILE` variables. `MEALQUEST_PUBLIC_URL`, `MEALQUEST_OIDC_ISSUER` and the
every variable above is required, and secrets are read only from files named
by `*_FILE` variables. `MEALQUEST_PUBLIC_URL`, `MEALQUEST_OIDC_ISSUER` and the
endpoints the issuer advertises must be `https://`; plain `http://` is
accepted only for `localhost`, `127.0.0.1` and `[::1]`.
+15 -12
View File
@@ -52,23 +52,18 @@ func run(cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger) error {
}
}()
sessions, err := auth.NewSessionManager(db, cfg.SessionIdle, cfg.SessionMax)
if err != nil {
return err
}
authFlow, err := auth.New(ctx, auth.Config{
Issuer: cfg.OIDCIssuer.String(),
ClientID: cfg.OIDCClientID,
ClientSecret: cfg.OIDCClientSecret.Reveal(),
PublicURL: cfg.PublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte(cfg.SecretKey.Reveal()),
AllowedGroups: cfg.OIDCAllowedGroups,
}, sessions, logger)
Issuer: cfg.OIDCIssuer.String(),
ClientID: cfg.OIDCClientID,
ClientSecret: cfg.OIDCClientSecret.Reveal(),
PublicURL: cfg.PublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte(cfg.SecretKey.Reveal()),
}, sessionsPending{}, logger)
if err != nil {
return err
}
router, err := server.NewRouter(logger, version, authFlow, sessions, frontend.Assets())
router, err := server.NewRouter(logger, version, authFlow, frontend.Assets())
if err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -120,6 +115,14 @@ func openStore(ctx context.Context, dataDir string) (*store.Store, error) {
return db, nil
}
// sessionsPending refuses every login until the session layer (Feature 03
// task 2) replaces it.
type sessionsPending struct{}
func (sessionsPending) StartSession(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request, auth.Claims) error {
return errors.New("session layer not implemented")
}
// logListening logs the startup line. Only the public URL's origin is logged
// so no credential-bearing URL component can reach the log.
func logListening(logger *slog.Logger, cfg config.Config) {
-35
View File
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
package auth
import (
"context"
"slices"
)
// Actor is the signed-in household member a request acts for. Handlers
// record Actor.Subject as updated_by on edits.
type Actor struct {
Subject string
Email string
Name string
Groups []string
}
// Actor returns the household member s belongs to.
func (s Session) Actor() Actor {
return Actor{Subject: s.Subject, Email: s.Email, Name: s.Name, Groups: slices.Clone(s.Groups)}
}
type actorKey struct{}
// WithActor returns a copy of ctx carrying actor. The session middleware
// calls it for every authenticated request.
func WithActor(ctx context.Context, actor Actor) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, actorKey{}, actor)
}
// ActorFrom returns the actor WithActor stored in ctx. ok is false when ctx
// has none, which behind the session middleware means a wiring bug.
func ActorFrom(ctx context.Context) (actor Actor, ok bool) {
actor, ok = ctx.Value(actorKey{}).(Actor)
return actor, ok
}
-32
View File
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
package auth
import (
"context"
"slices"
"testing"
)
func TestActorContext(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
if _, ok := ActorFrom(context.Background()); ok {
t.Error("ActorFrom found an actor in an empty context")
}
want := Actor{Subject: "user-123", Email: "cook@example.com", Name: "Home Cook", Groups: []string{"mealquest-admin"}}
got, ok := ActorFrom(WithActor(context.Background(), want))
if !ok || got.Subject != want.Subject || got.Email != want.Email || got.Name != want.Name || !slices.Equal(got.Groups, want.Groups) {
t.Errorf("ActorFrom = %+v (ok=%v), want %+v", got, ok, want)
}
}
func TestSessionActor(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := Session{Subject: "user-123", Email: "cook@example.com", Name: "Home Cook", Groups: []string{"mealquest-admin"}, CSRFToken: "t"}
a := s.Actor()
if a.Subject != s.Subject || a.Email != s.Email || a.Name != s.Name || !slices.Equal(a.Groups, s.Groups) {
t.Errorf("Actor = %+v, want the session's identity", a)
}
a.Groups[0] = "changed"
if s.Groups[0] != "mealquest-admin" {
t.Error("Actor shares the session's groups slice")
}
}
+16 -115
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import (
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"slices"
"time"
"github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
@@ -26,7 +25,6 @@ import (
const (
LoginPath = "/auth/login"
CallbackPath = "/auth/callback"
LogoutPath = "/auth/logout"
)
// providerTimeout bounds every request to the identity provider.
@@ -45,14 +43,11 @@ type Claims struct {
Groups []string `json:"groups"`
}
// Sessions is the session layer. StartSession is called once per successful
// login with claims from a verified ID token; it must set the session cookie
// on w. EndSession is called on logout; it must end the session r carries,
// if any, and clear the cookie on w. A returned error fails the request with
// 500.
type Sessions interface {
// SessionStarter is the session layer's entry point. StartSession is called
// once per successful login with claims from a verified ID token; it must set
// the session cookie on w. A returned error aborts the login with 500.
type SessionStarter interface {
StartSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, claims Claims) error
EndSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error
}
// Config is what New needs to reach the identity provider.
@@ -66,29 +61,21 @@ type Config struct {
PublicURL *url.URL
// SecretKey is the server key the login cookie's signing key derives from.
SecretKey []byte
// AllowedGroups are the household's groups; a sign-in is refused unless
// the account is in at least one of them.
AllowedGroups []string
}
// Auth serves the login and callback routes.
type Auth struct {
oauth oauth2.Config
verifier *oidc.IDTokenVerifier
provider *oidc.Provider
client *http.Client
cookie loginCookie
sessions Sessions
allowed []string
// endSessionURL is the provider's end_session_endpoint; logout ends
// there so the provider's own session ends too.
endSessionURL string
logger *slog.Logger
sessions SessionStarter
logger *slog.Logger
}
// New discovers the provider at cfg.Issuer and returns the login flow. It
// fails if discovery fails or the issuer the provider reports differs.
func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, sessions Sessions, logger *slog.Logger) (*Auth, error) {
func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, sessions SessionStarter, logger *slog.Logger) (*Auth, error) {
switch {
case cfg.Issuer == "", cfg.ClientID == "", cfg.ClientSecret == "":
return nil, errors.New("auth: issuer, client ID and client secret are required")
@@ -97,9 +84,7 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, sessions Sessions, logger *slog.Logger
case len(cfg.SecretKey) == 0:
return nil, errors.New("auth: secret key is required")
case sessions == nil:
return nil, errors.New("auth: session layer is required")
case len(cfg.AllowedGroups) == 0:
return nil, errors.New("auth: at least one allowed group is required")
return nil, errors.New("auth: session starter is required")
}
if err := checkEndpoint("issuer", cfg.Issuer); err != nil {
@@ -113,8 +98,7 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, sessions Sessions, logger *slog.Logger
}
endpoint := provider.Endpoint()
var discovered struct {
JWKSURI string `json:"jwks_uri"`
EndSessionURI string `json:"end_session_endpoint"`
JWKSURI string `json:"jwks_uri"`
}
if err := provider.Claims(&discovered); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("auth: OIDC discovery: %w", err)
@@ -125,10 +109,6 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, sessions Sessions, logger *slog.Logger
{"authorization endpoint", endpoint.AuthURL},
{"token endpoint", endpoint.TokenURL},
{"JWKS endpoint", discovered.JWKSURI},
{"end session endpoint", discovered.EndSessionURI},
// Groups come from userinfo when the ID token carries none, and the
// access token is sent there.
{"userinfo endpoint", provider.UserInfoEndpoint()},
} {
if err := checkEndpoint(e.name, e.raw); err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -149,13 +129,10 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, sessions Sessions, logger *slog.Logger
ClientID: cfg.ClientID,
SupportedSigningAlgs: []string{oidc.RS256},
}),
provider: provider,
client: client,
allowed: slices.Clone(cfg.AllowedGroups),
cookie: newLoginCookie(cfg.SecretKey),
sessions: sessions,
endSessionURL: discovered.EndSessionURI,
logger: logger,
client: client,
cookie: newLoginCookie(cfg.SecretKey),
sessions: sessions,
logger: logger,
}, nil
}
@@ -192,16 +169,12 @@ func checkRedirect(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
return nil
}
// Mount registers GET LoginPath, GET CallbackPath and POST LogoutPath on r.
// Mount registers GET LoginPath and GET CallbackPath on r.
func (a *Auth) Mount(r chi.Router) {
r.Get(LoginPath, a.login)
r.Get(CallbackPath, a.callback)
r.Post(LogoutPath, a.logout)
}
// EndSessionURL is the provider's end_session_endpoint.
func (a *Auth) EndSessionURL() string { return a.endSessionURL }
// login starts the authorization code flow with PKCE (S256). The optional
// "return" query parameter must be a same-origin path; anything else fails
// the login with 400.
@@ -231,9 +204,7 @@ func (a *Auth) login(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
// callback completes the flow: it checks state against the login cookie,
// exchanges the code, verifies the ID token and nonce, then starts a session
// if the account is in an allowed group. Membership is checked on every
// login, so an account removed from the group is refused at its next one.
// exchanges the code, verifies the ID token and nonce, then starts a session.
func (a *Auth) callback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
ctx := r.Context()
@@ -271,22 +242,6 @@ func (a *Auth) callback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Error(w, "sign-in failed", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
if !a.member(claims.Groups) {
if claims.Groups == nil {
a.logger.WarnContext(ctx, "sign-in refused: no groups claim in the ID token or userinfo", "subject", claims.Subject)
} else {
a.logger.WarnContext(ctx, "sign-in refused: not in an allowed group", "subject", claims.Subject)
}
// A session this browser already holds ends too, so a refused
// sign-in never leaves it signed in.
if err := a.sessions.EndSession(w, r); err != nil {
a.logger.ErrorContext(ctx, "end session", "error", err)
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
a.refuse(w, r)
return
}
if err := a.sessions.StartSession(w, r, claims); err != nil {
a.logger.ErrorContext(ctx, "start session", "error", err)
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
@@ -295,22 +250,9 @@ func (a *Auth) callback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(w, r, state.Return, http.StatusSeeOther)
}
// logout ends the session, clears the cookie and sends the browser to the
// provider's end_session_endpoint to end the provider session as well.
func (a *Auth) logout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
if err := a.sessions.EndSession(w, r); err != nil {
a.logger.ErrorContext(r.Context(), "end session", "error", err)
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, a.endSessionURL, http.StatusSeeOther)
}
// verify exchanges code for tokens and returns the verified ID token claims.
// The verifier enforces RS256, issuer, audience and expiry; nonce is checked
// here. When the ID token has no groups claim, Groups comes from userinfo;
// it stays nil when neither has one.
// here.
func (a *Auth) verify(ctx context.Context, code string, state loginState) (Claims, error) {
token, err := a.oauth.Exchange(context.WithValue(ctx, oauth2.HTTPClient, a.client), code,
oauth2.VerifierOption(state.Verifier))
@@ -335,50 +277,9 @@ func (a *Auth) verify(ctx context.Context, code string, state loginState) (Claim
if claims.Subject == "" {
return Claims{}, errors.New("ID token has no subject")
}
if claims.Groups == nil {
groups, err := a.userinfoGroups(ctx, token, claims.Subject)
if err != nil {
return Claims{}, err
}
claims.Groups = groups
}
return claims, nil
}
// userinfoGroups returns the groups claim from the userinfo endpoint, nil if
// it has none. The userinfo subject must match the ID token's subject.
func (a *Auth) userinfoGroups(ctx context.Context, token *oauth2.Token, subject string) ([]string, error) {
info, err := a.provider.UserInfo(oidc.ClientContext(ctx, a.client), oauth2.StaticTokenSource(token))
if err != nil {
return nil, userinfoError(err)
}
if info.Subject != subject {
return nil, errors.New("userinfo subject does not match the ID token")
}
var claims struct {
Groups []string `json:"groups"`
}
if err := info.Claims(&claims); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode userinfo claims: %w", err)
}
return claims.Groups, nil
}
// userinfoError reduces a failed userinfo request to a fixed category, like
// exchangeError: go-oidc's error text can carry the response body.
func userinfoError(err error) error {
var transport *url.Error
if errors.As(err, &transport) {
return fmt.Errorf("userinfo: request failed: %s: %w", transport.Op, transport.Err)
}
return errors.New("userinfo: endpoint returned an unusable response")
}
// member reports whether groups contains an allowed group.
func (a *Auth) member(groups []string) bool {
return slices.ContainsFunc(groups, func(g string) bool { return slices.Contains(a.allowed, g) })
}
// exchangeError reduces a failed code exchange to a fixed category and safe
// metadata. The oauth2 error text can carry the token endpoint's response
// body or error_description, which may echo credentials, so it is dropped.
+32 -98
View File
@@ -36,9 +36,6 @@ const (
var testPublicURL = &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "meals.example.com"}
// testAllowedGroups are the household's groups in tests.
var testAllowedGroups = []string{"mealquest-admin", "mealquest-family"}
// fakeProvider is an OIDC provider serving discovery, JWKS and a token
// endpoint. Each issued code maps to the ID token the token endpoint returns.
type fakeProvider struct {
@@ -53,12 +50,6 @@ type fakeProvider struct {
// tokenReply, when set, is returned by the token endpoint instead of a
// token.
tokenReply *tokenReply
// userinfo is the userinfo endpoint's response; userinfoHits counts
// requests to it.
userinfo map[string]any
userinfoHits int
// userinfoReply, when set, is returned by the userinfo endpoint instead.
userinfoReply *tokenReply
}
type tokenReply struct {
@@ -82,7 +73,6 @@ func newFakeProvider(t *testing.T) *fakeProvider {
mux.HandleFunc("GET /.well-known/openid-configuration", p.discovery)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /jwks", p.jwks)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /token", p.token)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /userinfo", p.userinfoEndpoint)
p.srv = httptest.NewServer(mux)
t.Cleanup(p.srv.Close)
return p
@@ -96,8 +86,6 @@ func (p *fakeProvider) discovery(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
"authorization_endpoint": p.issuer() + "/authorize",
"token_endpoint": p.issuer() + "/token",
"jwks_uri": p.issuer() + "/jwks",
"userinfo_endpoint": p.issuer() + "/userinfo",
"end_session_endpoint": p.issuer() + "/end-session/",
"response_types_supported": []string{"code"},
"subject_types_supported": []string{"public"},
"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": []string{"RS256", "HS256"},
@@ -159,41 +147,6 @@ func (p *fakeProvider) token(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
})
}
// userinfoEndpoint checks the access token and returns p.userinfo, which
// defaults to the test user without a groups claim.
func (p *fakeProvider) userinfoEndpoint(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != "Bearer access-token" {
http.Error(w, `{"error":"invalid_token"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
p.mu.Lock()
p.userinfoHits++
info, reply := p.userinfo, p.userinfoReply
p.mu.Unlock()
if reply != nil {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(reply.status)
io.WriteString(w, reply.body)
return
}
if info == nil {
info = map[string]any{"sub": "user-123", "email": "cook@example.com"}
}
writeJSON(w, info)
}
func (p *fakeProvider) setUserinfo(info map[string]any) {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
p.userinfo = info
}
func (p *fakeProvider) userinfoRequests() int {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
return p.userinfoHits
}
// authorize stands in for the user signing in at the provider: it records a
// code bound to the PKCE challenge and returns it.
func (p *fakeProvider) authorize(challenge, idToken string) string {
@@ -270,12 +223,11 @@ func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, v any) {
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
}
// memorySessions is an in-memory Sessions that records the claims it was
// handed and how many sessions were ended.
// memorySessions is an in-memory SessionStarter that records the claims it
// was handed.
type memorySessions struct {
mu sync.Mutex
claims []Claims
ended int
err error
}
@@ -290,16 +242,6 @@ func (m *memorySessions) StartSession(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request, cl
return nil
}
func (m *memorySessions) EndSession(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) error {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
if m.err != nil {
return m.err
}
m.ended++
return nil
}
func (m *memorySessions) started() []Claims {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
@@ -337,12 +279,11 @@ func newHarness(t *testing.T) *harness {
sessions := &memorySessions{}
logs := &syncBuffer{}
a, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
Issuer: p.issuer(),
ClientID: testClientID,
ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
PublicURL: testPublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte("server-secret-key"),
AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
Issuer: p.issuer(),
ClientID: testClientID,
ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
PublicURL: testPublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte("server-secret-key"),
}, sessions, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(logs, nil)))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -777,12 +718,11 @@ func TestNewFailsWhenDiscoveryFails(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.NotFoundHandler())
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
Issuer: srv.URL,
ClientID: testClientID,
ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
PublicURL: testPublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte("k"),
AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
Issuer: srv.URL,
ClientID: testClientID,
ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
PublicURL: testPublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte("k"),
}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("New succeeded without a discovery document")
@@ -795,12 +735,11 @@ func TestNewFailsOnIssuerMismatch(t *testing.T) {
// Discovery trims the trailing slash, so this fetches the provider's
// document, which reports the issuer without it.
_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
Issuer: p.issuer() + "/",
ClientID: testClientID,
ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
PublicURL: testPublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte("k"),
AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
Issuer: p.issuer() + "/",
ClientID: testClientID,
ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
PublicURL: testPublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte("k"),
}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("New accepted a provider reporting a different issuer")
@@ -821,12 +760,11 @@ func TestNewRejectsRemoteHTTPIssuer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, issuer := range []string{"http://auth.example.com/application/o/mealquest/", "http://192.0.2.10"} {
_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
Issuer: issuer,
ClientID: testClientID,
ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
PublicURL: testPublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte("k"),
AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
Issuer: issuer,
ClientID: testClientID,
ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
PublicURL: testPublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte("k"),
}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "issuer") {
t.Errorf("New(issuer %q) error = %v, want issuer rejected", issuer, err)
@@ -842,8 +780,6 @@ func TestNewRejectsRemoteHTTPEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
{"authorization_endpoint", "authorization endpoint"},
{"token_endpoint", "token endpoint"},
{"jwks_uri", "JWKS endpoint"},
{"end_session_endpoint", "end session endpoint"},
{"userinfo_endpoint", "userinfo endpoint"},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.field, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -851,12 +787,11 @@ func TestNewRejectsRemoteHTTPEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
p := newFakeProvider(t)
p.discoveryOverrides = map[string]any{tc.field: "http://auth.example.com/" + tc.field}
_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
Issuer: p.issuer(),
ClientID: testClientID,
ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
PublicURL: testPublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte("k"),
AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
Issuer: p.issuer(),
ClientID: testClientID,
ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
PublicURL: testPublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte("k"),
}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.name) {
t.Errorf("New error = %v, want %s rejected", err, tc.name)
@@ -892,12 +827,11 @@ func TestCallbackRefusesTokenRedirectToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
sessions := &memorySessions{}
logs := &syncBuffer{}
a, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
Issuer: p.issuer(),
ClientID: testClientID,
ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
PublicURL: testPublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte("server-secret-key"),
AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
Issuer: p.issuer(),
ClientID: testClientID,
ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
PublicURL: testPublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte("server-secret-key"),
}, sessions, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(logs, nil)))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
-264
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@@ -1,264 +0,0 @@
package auth
import (
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"slices"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// signInWith completes a login whose ID token has claims edited by edit.
func (h *harness) signInWith(t *testing.T, edit func(claims map[string]any)) *http.Response {
t.Helper()
l := h.login(t, LoginPath)
c := h.provider.claims(l.query.Get("nonce"))
edit(c)
return h.callback(l, l.query.Get("state"), h.provider.signRS256(c))
}
// assertRefused checks resp is the refused-sign-in page and starts no
// session.
func assertRefused(t *testing.T, resp *http.Response) {
t.Helper()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("callback status = %d, want 403", resp.StatusCode)
}
if ct := resp.Header.Get("Content-Type"); ct != "text/html; charset=utf-8" {
t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want text/html; charset=utf-8", ct)
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, want := range []string{
"This kitchen is for the household only",
`<form method="post" action="/auth/logout">`,
"Sign out",
} {
if !strings.Contains(string(body), want) {
t.Errorf("refused page lacks %q:\n%s", want, body)
}
}
for _, c := range resp.Cookies() {
// Clearing a session cookie (negative Max-Age) is expected.
if (c.Name == SessionCookieName || c.Name == "test_session") && c.MaxAge >= 0 {
t.Errorf("refused sign-in set session cookie %s", c.Name)
}
}
assertLoginCookieCleared(t, resp)
}
func TestGroupGateMember(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Any one allowed group is enough, alongside groups that are not allowed.
h := newHarness(t)
resp := h.signInWith(t, func(c map[string]any) { c["groups"] = []string{"guests", "mealquest-family"} })
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusSeeOther {
t.Fatalf("callback status = %d, want 303", resp.StatusCode)
}
if started := h.sessions.started(); len(started) != 1 || !slices.Equal(started[0].Groups, []string{"guests", "mealquest-family"}) {
t.Errorf("sessions started = %+v, want one with the ID token groups", started)
}
if n := h.provider.userinfoRequests(); n != 0 {
t.Errorf("userinfo requested %d times, want 0 when the ID token has groups", n)
}
}
func TestGroupGateRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
groups any // ID token groups claim; nil removes it
userinfo map[string]any
}{
{name: "non-member", groups: []string{"guests", "MEALQUEST-ADMIN"}},
{name: "empty groups claim", groups: []string{}},
{name: "groups claim missing from ID token and userinfo", groups: nil},
{
name: "non-member in userinfo",
groups: nil,
userinfo: map[string]any{"sub": "user-123", "groups": []string{"guests"}},
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newHarness(t)
if tc.userinfo != nil {
h.provider.setUserinfo(tc.userinfo)
}
resp := h.signInWith(t, func(c map[string]any) {
if tc.groups == nil {
delete(c, "groups")
} else {
c["groups"] = tc.groups
}
})
assertRefused(t, resp)
if started := h.sessions.started(); len(started) != 0 {
t.Errorf("sessions started = %+v, want none", started)
}
if !strings.Contains(h.logs.String(), "sign-in refused") {
t.Errorf("refusal not logged:\n%s", h.logs.String())
}
})
}
}
func TestGroupGateUsesUserinfoWhenIDTokenHasNoGroups(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newHarness(t)
h.provider.setUserinfo(map[string]any{"sub": "user-123", "groups": []string{"mealquest-admin"}})
resp := h.signInWith(t, func(c map[string]any) { delete(c, "groups") })
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusSeeOther {
t.Fatalf("callback status = %d, want 303", resp.StatusCode)
}
if started := h.sessions.started(); len(started) != 1 || !slices.Equal(started[0].Groups, []string{"mealquest-admin"}) {
t.Errorf("sessions started = %+v, want one with the userinfo groups", started)
}
if n := h.provider.userinfoRequests(); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("userinfo requested %d times, want 1", n)
}
}
func TestGroupGateUserinfoFailures(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
userinfo map[string]any
}{
{"subject mismatch", map[string]any{"sub": "someone-else", "groups": []string{"mealquest-admin"}}},
{"malformed groups", map[string]any{"sub": "user-123", "groups": "mealquest-admin"}},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newHarness(t)
h.provider.setUserinfo(tc.userinfo)
resp := h.signInWith(t, func(c map[string]any) { delete(c, "groups") })
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("callback status = %d, want 401", resp.StatusCode)
}
if started := h.sessions.started(); len(started) != 0 {
t.Errorf("sessions started = %+v, want none", started)
}
})
}
}
// A failed userinfo request fails the sign-in without logging the
// endpoint's response, which may echo credentials.
func TestGroupGateUserinfoErrorNotLogged(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newHarness(t)
h.provider.mu.Lock()
h.provider.userinfoReply = &tokenReply{status: http.StatusInternalServerError, body: `{"error":"leaked-s3cret"}`}
h.provider.mu.Unlock()
resp := h.signInWith(t, func(c map[string]any) { delete(c, "groups") })
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("callback status = %d, want 401", resp.StatusCode)
}
if started := h.sessions.started(); len(started) != 0 {
t.Errorf("sessions started = %+v, want none", started)
}
logs := h.logs.String()
if !strings.Contains(logs, "userinfo") || strings.Contains(logs, "leaked-s3cret") {
t.Errorf("logs = %s, want the userinfo failure without the response body", logs)
}
}
// Membership is checked at every login: after removal from the group, the
// next login is refused and starts no session.
func TestGroupGateRemovedMemberRefusedAtNextLogin(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newSessionHarness(t)
h.signIn(t)
if n := len(h.rows(t)); n != 1 {
t.Fatalf("sessions after first login = %d, want 1", n)
}
resp := h.signInWith(t, func(c map[string]any) { c["groups"] = []string{"former-household"} })
assertRefused(t, resp)
if n := len(h.rows(t)); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("sessions after refused login = %d, want still 1", n)
}
}
// A refused sign-in from a browser that still holds a session ends that
// session and clears its cookie.
func TestGroupGateRefusalEndsExistingSession(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newSessionHarness(t)
_, cookie := h.signIn(t)
l := h.login(t, LoginPath)
c := h.provider.claims(l.query.Get("nonce"))
c["groups"] = []string{"former-household"}
code := h.provider.authorize(l.query.Get("code_challenge"), h.provider.signRS256(c))
q := url.Values{"code": {code}, "state": {l.query.Get("state")}}
resp := h.get(CallbackPath+"?"+q.Encode(), l.cookie, cookie)
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("callback status = %d, want 403", resp.StatusCode)
}
if n := len(h.rows(t)); n != 0 {
t.Errorf("sessions after refused login = %d, want 0", n)
}
if _, err := h.use(cookie); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoSession) {
t.Errorf("old session lookup error = %v, want ErrNoSession", err)
}
cleared := false
for _, c := range resp.Cookies() {
cleared = cleared || (c.Name == SessionCookieName && c.MaxAge < 0)
}
if !cleared {
t.Error("refused sign-in did not clear the session cookie")
}
}
func TestGroupGateRefusalEndSessionError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newHarness(t)
h.sessions.err = errors.New("database down")
resp := h.signInWith(t, func(c map[string]any) { c["groups"] = []string{"guests"} })
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Errorf("callback status = %d, want 500", resp.StatusCode)
}
}
func TestNewRequiresAllowedGroups(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
p := newFakeProvider(t)
_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
Issuer: p.issuer(),
ClientID: testClientID,
ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
PublicURL: testPublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte("k"),
}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "allowed group") {
t.Errorf("New error = %v, want missing allowed groups named", err)
}
}
func TestNewRequiresUserinfoEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
p := newFakeProvider(t)
p.discoveryOverrides = map[string]any{"userinfo_endpoint": nil}
_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
Issuer: p.issuer(),
ClientID: testClientID,
ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
PublicURL: testPublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte("k"),
AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "userinfo endpoint") {
t.Errorf("New error = %v, want the missing userinfo endpoint named", err)
}
}
-37
View File
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
package auth
import (
"io"
"net/http"
)
// refusedPage is shown when a sign-in succeeds at the provider but the
// account is not in the household's group. Signing out ends the provider
// session too, so another account can sign in.
const refusedPage = `<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
<title>MealQuest</title>
</head>
<body>
<main>
<h1>This kitchen is for the household only</h1>
<p>The account you signed in with is not part of our kitchen.</p>
<form method="post" action="` + LogoutPath + `">
<button type="submit">Sign out</button>
</form>
</main>
</body>
</html>
`
// refuse writes the refused-sign-in page with 403.
func (a *Auth) refuse(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
if _, err := io.WriteString(w, refusedPage); err != nil {
a.logger.WarnContext(r.Context(), "write refused sign-in page", "error", err)
}
}
-238
View File
@@ -1,238 +0,0 @@
package auth
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"database/sql"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"time"
"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/store"
)
// SessionCookieName is the session cookie. The __Host- prefix makes the
// browser insist on Secure, Path=/ and no Domain.
const SessionCookieName = "__Host-mealquest_session"
// sessionIDBytes is the size of the random session ID: 256 bits.
const sessionIDBytes = 32
// ErrNoSession means the request carries no live session: the cookie is
// missing or malformed, or its session is unknown, ended or expired.
var ErrNoSession = errors.New("auth: no valid session")
// Session is a signed-in household member's server-side session.
type Session struct {
Subject string
Email string
Name string
Groups []string
CSRFToken string
CreatedAt time.Time
// LastSeenAt is the last time the session was used.
LastSeenAt time.Time
// ExpiresAt is when the session ends unless used again first.
ExpiresAt time.Time
}
// SessionManager keeps sessions in the sessions table. The cookie holds only
// the random session ID; the table holds only its SHA-256 hash. A session
// ends after idle without use and always max after it was created.
type SessionManager struct {
db *store.Store
idle time.Duration
max time.Duration
// now is the clock; tests replace it.
now func() time.Time
}
// NewSessionManager returns a SessionManager over db. idle and max must be
// positive with max >= idle.
func NewSessionManager(db *store.Store, idle, max time.Duration) (*SessionManager, error) {
switch {
case db == nil:
return nil, errors.New("auth: session store is required")
case idle <= 0 || max <= 0:
return nil, errors.New("auth: session idle and max lifetimes must be positive")
case max < idle:
return nil, errors.New("auth: session max lifetime must be at least the idle lifetime")
}
return &SessionManager{db: db, idle: idle, max: max, now: time.Now}, nil
}
// StartSession creates a session for claims and sets the session cookie.
func (m *SessionManager) StartSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, claims Claims) error {
if claims.Subject == "" {
return errors.New("auth: session needs a subject")
}
id, csrf := randomToken(), randomToken()
groups := claims.Groups
if groups == nil {
groups = []string{}
}
groupsJSON, err := json.Marshal(groups)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: encode session groups: %w", err)
}
now := m.timestamp()
if _, err := m.db.Writer.ExecContext(r.Context(), `
INSERT INTO sessions (id_hash, subject, email, name, groups, csrf_token, created_at, last_seen_at, expires_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
hashSessionID(id), claims.Subject, claims.Email, claims.Name, string(groupsJSON), csrf,
now, now, m.expiry(now.Time, now.Time),
); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: create session: %w", err)
}
// The cookie outlives idle gaps so a returning device presents its ID;
// the server decides whether the session is still live. Max-Age is whole
// seconds, rounded up so the cookie never ends before the absolute limit.
http.SetCookie(w, sessionCookie(id, cookieMaxAge(m.max)))
return nil
}
// cookieMaxAge is lifetime in whole seconds, rounded up. It rounds the
// quotient rather than adding to lifetime, which would overflow near the
// largest time.Duration.
func cookieMaxAge(lifetime time.Duration) int {
seconds := lifetime / time.Second
if lifetime%time.Second != 0 {
seconds++
}
return int(seconds)
}
// SessionFor returns the live session r carries and slides its last use to
// now. It returns ErrNoSession when there is none; an expired session is
// deleted.
func (m *SessionManager) SessionFor(r *http.Request) (Session, error) {
idHash, err := sessionIDHash(r)
if err != nil {
return Session{}, err
}
now := m.timestamp()
var s Session
live := false
err = m.db.WithTx(r.Context(), func(tx *sql.Tx) error {
var groupsJSON string
var created, lastSeen, expires store.Timestamp
err := tx.QueryRowContext(r.Context(), `
SELECT subject, email, name, groups, csrf_token, created_at, last_seen_at, expires_at
FROM sessions WHERE id_hash = ?`, idHash,
).Scan(&s.Subject, &s.Email, &s.Name, &groupsJSON, &s.CSRFToken, &created, &lastSeen, &expires)
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return nil
}
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: read session: %w", err)
}
if !now.Before(expires.Time) || now.Sub(lastSeen.Time) >= m.idle || now.Sub(created.Time) >= m.max {
if _, err := tx.ExecContext(r.Context(), `DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id_hash = ?`, idHash); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: delete expired session: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(groupsJSON), &s.Groups); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: decode session groups: %w", err)
}
expiresAt := m.expiry(created.Time, now.Time)
if _, err := tx.ExecContext(r.Context(), `
UPDATE sessions SET last_seen_at = ?, expires_at = ? WHERE id_hash = ?`,
now, expiresAt, idHash,
); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: slide session: %w", err)
}
s.CreatedAt, s.LastSeenAt, s.ExpiresAt = created.Time, now.Time, expiresAt.Time
live = true
return nil
})
if err != nil {
return Session{}, err
}
if !live {
return Session{}, ErrNoSession
}
return s, nil
}
// EndSession deletes the session r carries, if any, and clears the cookie.
func (m *SessionManager) EndSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
http.SetCookie(w, sessionCookie("", -1))
idHash, err := sessionIDHash(r)
if errors.Is(err, ErrNoSession) {
return nil
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := m.db.Writer.ExecContext(r.Context(), `DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id_hash = ?`, idHash); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: delete session: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// timestamp is the clock's current instant at stored precision.
func (m *SessionManager) timestamp() store.Timestamp {
return store.Timestamp{Time: m.now().UTC().Truncate(time.Millisecond)}
}
// expiry is when a session created at created and last used at lastSeen
// ends: idle after lastSeen, but never later than max after created.
func (m *SessionManager) expiry(created, lastSeen time.Time) store.Timestamp {
idle, absolute := lastSeen.Add(m.idle), created.Add(m.max)
if absolute.Before(idle) {
return store.Timestamp{Time: absolute}
}
return store.Timestamp{Time: idle}
}
// sessionCookie is the session cookie carrying value, with maxAge seconds;
// a negative maxAge clears it.
func sessionCookie(value string, maxAge int) *http.Cookie {
return &http.Cookie{
Name: SessionCookieName,
Value: value,
Path: "/",
MaxAge: maxAge,
Secure: true,
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
}
}
// sessionIDHash returns the stored hash of r's session ID, or ErrNoSession
// when the cookie is missing or is not a well-formed ID.
func sessionIDHash(r *http.Request) (string, error) {
c, err := r.Cookie(SessionCookieName)
if err != nil {
return "", ErrNoSession
}
raw, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(c.Value)
if err != nil || len(raw) != sessionIDBytes {
return "", ErrNoSession
}
return hashSessionID(c.Value), nil
}
// hashSessionID is the SHA-256 hex digest of the cookie value.
func hashSessionID(id string) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(id))
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
// randomToken returns 256 random bits, base64url-encoded without padding.
// crypto/rand.Read never returns an error; it crashes the program instead.
func randomToken() string {
b := make([]byte, sessionIDBytes)
rand.Read(b)
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
}
-523
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@@ -1,523 +0,0 @@
package auth
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"slices"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/store"
"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/migrations"
)
const (
testIdle = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
testMax = 180 * 24 * time.Hour
)
// testEpoch is the fake clock's starting instant.
var testEpoch = time.Date(2026, 10, 3, 18, 30, 0, 0, time.UTC)
// sessionHarness runs the real login flow against a fake provider with a
// SessionManager over a migrated database and a fake clock.
type sessionHarness struct {
*harness
db *store.Store
sessions *SessionManager
auth *Auth
clock time.Time
}
func newSessionHarness(t *testing.T) *sessionHarness {
t.Helper()
ctx := context.Background()
db, err := store.Open(ctx, t.TempDir())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
})
if err := store.Migrate(ctx, db.Writer, migrations.FS); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
sessions, err := NewSessionManager(db, testIdle, testMax)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
h := &sessionHarness{db: db, sessions: sessions, clock: testEpoch}
sessions.now = func() time.Time { return h.clock }
p := newFakeProvider(t)
logs := &syncBuffer{}
a, err := New(ctx, Config{
Issuer: p.issuer(),
ClientID: testClientID,
ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
PublicURL: testPublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte("server-secret-key"),
AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
}, sessions, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(logs, nil)))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
r := chi.NewRouter()
a.Mount(r)
h.harness = &harness{provider: p, router: r, logs: logs}
h.auth = a
return h
}
func (h *sessionHarness) advance(d time.Duration) { h.clock = h.clock.Add(d) }
// signIn completes a login and returns the callback response and the
// session cookie it set.
func (h *sessionHarness) signIn(t *testing.T) (*http.Response, *http.Cookie) {
t.Helper()
l := h.login(t, LoginPath)
resp := h.callback(l, l.query.Get("state"), h.provider.signRS256(h.provider.claims(l.query.Get("nonce"))))
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusSeeOther {
t.Fatalf("callback status = %d, want 303", resp.StatusCode)
}
for _, c := range resp.Cookies() {
if c.Name == SessionCookieName {
return resp, c
}
}
t.Fatalf("callback set no %s cookie", SessionCookieName)
return nil, nil
}
// use looks up the session cookie c names.
func (h *sessionHarness) use(c *http.Cookie) (Session, error) {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/anything", nil)
if c != nil {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
return h.sessions.SessionFor(req)
}
type sessionRow struct {
idHash, subject, email, name, groups, csrf string
created, lastSeen, expires store.Timestamp
}
func (h *sessionHarness) rows(t *testing.T) []sessionRow {
t.Helper()
rs, err := h.db.Reader.Query(`SELECT id_hash, subject, email, name, groups, csrf_token,
created_at, last_seen_at, expires_at FROM sessions`)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer rs.Close()
var out []sessionRow
for rs.Next() {
var r sessionRow
if err := rs.Scan(&r.idHash, &r.subject, &r.email, &r.name, &r.groups, &r.csrf,
&r.created, &r.lastSeen, &r.expires); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
out = append(out, r)
}
if err := rs.Err(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return out
}
// sessionSetCookie returns the raw Set-Cookie header for the session cookie.
func sessionSetCookie(t *testing.T, resp *http.Response) string {
t.Helper()
for _, v := range resp.Header.Values("Set-Cookie") {
if strings.HasPrefix(v, SessionCookieName+"=") {
return v
}
}
t.Fatalf("no Set-Cookie for %s in %q", SessionCookieName, resp.Header.Values("Set-Cookie"))
return ""
}
// assertSessionCookieAttributes checks the attributes the __Host- prefix
// and D-004 require, on the raw header so nothing is lost in parsing.
func assertSessionCookieAttributes(t *testing.T, raw string) {
t.Helper()
attrs := map[string]bool{}
for _, a := range strings.Split(raw, ";")[1:] {
name, _, _ := strings.Cut(strings.TrimSpace(a), "=")
attrs[strings.ToLower(name)] = true
}
for _, want := range []string{"Path=/", "HttpOnly", "Secure", "SameSite=Lax"} {
if !slices.Contains(strings.Split(raw, "; "), want) {
t.Errorf("session Set-Cookie %q lacks %s", raw, want)
}
}
if attrs["domain"] {
t.Errorf("session Set-Cookie %q has a Domain", raw)
}
}
func sha256Hex(s string) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(s))
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
func TestCallbackStartsSession(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newSessionHarness(t)
resp, cookie := h.signIn(t)
assertSessionCookieAttributes(t, sessionSetCookie(t, resp))
if cookie.MaxAge != int(testMax/time.Second) {
t.Errorf("session cookie MaxAge = %d, want %d", cookie.MaxAge, int(testMax/time.Second))
}
rows := h.rows(t)
if len(rows) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("sessions has %d rows, want 1", len(rows))
}
r := rows[0]
if len(cookie.Value) != 43 {
t.Errorf("session ID %q is %d chars, want 43 (256 bits, base64url)", cookie.Value, len(cookie.Value))
}
if r.idHash != sha256Hex(cookie.Value) {
t.Errorf("id_hash = %q, want the SHA-256 of the cookie value", r.idHash)
}
if r.subject != "user-123" || r.email != "cook@example.com" || r.name != "Home Cook" ||
r.groups != `["mealquest-admin"]` {
t.Errorf("session row = %+v, want the ID token claims", r)
}
if len(r.csrf) != 43 || r.csrf == cookie.Value {
t.Errorf("csrf_token = %q, want a separate 256-bit token", r.csrf)
}
if !r.created.Equal(testEpoch) || !r.lastSeen.Equal(testEpoch) || !r.expires.Equal(testEpoch.Add(testIdle)) {
t.Errorf("created, last_seen, expires = %v, %v, %v, want %v, %v, %v",
r.created, r.lastSeen, r.expires, testEpoch, testEpoch, testEpoch.Add(testIdle))
}
s, err := h.use(cookie)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SessionFor = %v, want the new session", err)
}
if s.Subject != "user-123" || s.CSRFToken != r.csrf || !slices.Equal(s.Groups, []string{"mealquest-admin"}) {
t.Errorf("SessionFor = %+v", s)
}
}
func TestStartSessionStoresOnlyTheHash(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newSessionHarness(t)
_, cookie := h.signIn(t)
var n int
err := h.db.Reader.QueryRow(`SELECT count(*) FROM sessions WHERE
id_hash = ?1 OR subject = ?1 OR email = ?1 OR name = ?1 OR groups = ?1 OR csrf_token = ?1`,
cookie.Value).Scan(&n)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if n != 0 {
t.Error("the raw session ID is stored in the sessions table")
}
}
func TestSessionLastSeenSlides(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newSessionHarness(t)
_, cookie := h.signIn(t)
// Used every 20 days, the session outlives several idle periods.
for range 4 {
h.advance(20 * 24 * time.Hour)
s, err := h.use(cookie)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("at %v SessionFor = %v, want the session", h.clock, err)
}
if !s.LastSeenAt.Equal(h.clock) || !s.ExpiresAt.Equal(h.clock.Add(testIdle)) {
t.Errorf("at %v session last seen %v, expires %v, want %v, %v",
h.clock, s.LastSeenAt, s.ExpiresAt, h.clock, h.clock.Add(testIdle))
}
r := h.rows(t)[0]
if !r.lastSeen.Equal(h.clock) || !r.expires.Equal(h.clock.Add(testIdle)) || !r.created.Equal(testEpoch) {
t.Errorf("at %v row created %v, last seen %v, expires %v", h.clock, r.created, r.lastSeen, r.expires)
}
}
}
func TestSessionIdleExpiry(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newSessionHarness(t)
_, cookie := h.signIn(t)
h.advance(testIdle - time.Millisecond)
if _, err := h.use(cookie); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("just inside the idle limit SessionFor = %v, want the session", err)
}
h.advance(testIdle)
if _, err := h.use(cookie); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoSession) {
t.Fatalf("after idle SessionFor = %v, want ErrNoSession", err)
}
if n := len(h.rows(t)); n != 0 {
t.Errorf("expired session left %d rows, want 0", n)
}
// Turning the clock back cannot revive it.
h.clock = testEpoch
if _, err := h.use(cookie); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoSession) {
t.Errorf("after deletion SessionFor = %v, want ErrNoSession", err)
}
}
func TestSessionAbsoluteExpiry(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newSessionHarness(t)
_, cookie := h.signIn(t)
for h.clock.Before(testEpoch.Add(testMax - 20*24*time.Hour)) {
h.advance(20 * 24 * time.Hour)
if _, err := h.use(cookie); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("at %v SessionFor = %v, want the session", h.clock, err)
}
}
// Last used 20 days before the absolute limit: the idle window would run
// past it, so expiry is capped there.
if r := h.rows(t)[0]; !r.expires.Equal(testEpoch.Add(testMax)) {
t.Errorf("expires_at = %v, want the absolute limit %v", r.expires, testEpoch.Add(testMax))
}
h.clock = testEpoch.Add(testMax - time.Millisecond)
if _, err := h.use(cookie); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("just inside the absolute limit SessionFor = %v, want the session", err)
}
h.clock = testEpoch.Add(testMax)
if _, err := h.use(cookie); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoSession) {
t.Fatalf("at the absolute limit, used 1ms ago, SessionFor = %v, want ErrNoSession", err)
}
if n := len(h.rows(t)); n != 0 {
t.Errorf("expired session left %d rows, want 0", n)
}
}
// A max with fractional seconds rounds the cookie Max-Age up, so the browser
// keeps the cookie until the server-side absolute limit.
func TestSessionCookieOutlivesFractionalMax(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newSessionHarness(t)
h.sessions.idle, h.sessions.max = 1500*time.Millisecond, 2500*time.Millisecond
_, cookie := h.signIn(t)
if cookie.MaxAge != 3 {
t.Errorf("session cookie MaxAge = %d, want 3", cookie.MaxAge)
}
if r := h.rows(t)[0]; !r.expires.Equal(testEpoch.Add(1500 * time.Millisecond)) {
t.Errorf("expires_at = %v, want %v", r.expires, testEpoch.Add(1500*time.Millisecond))
}
h.advance(time.Second)
if _, err := h.use(cookie); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("at 1s SessionFor = %v, want the session", err)
}
h.clock = testEpoch.Add(2500*time.Millisecond - time.Millisecond)
if _, err := h.use(cookie); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("just inside the absolute limit SessionFor = %v, want the session", err)
}
h.clock = testEpoch.Add(2500 * time.Millisecond)
if _, err := h.use(cookie); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoSession) {
t.Errorf("at the absolute limit SessionFor = %v, want ErrNoSession", err)
}
}
// A lifetime near the largest accepted duration still yields a positive,
// rounded-up cookie Max-Age rather than overflowing.
func TestSessionCookieMaxAgeNearLargestMax(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
largest, err := time.ParseDuration("2562047h47m16.854s")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
h := newSessionHarness(t)
h.sessions.max = largest
_, cookie := h.signIn(t)
if want := 9223372037; cookie.MaxAge != want {
t.Errorf("session cookie MaxAge = %d, want %d", cookie.MaxAge, want)
}
}
// A lifetime shortened by configuration applies to existing sessions even
// though their stored expires_at is later.
func TestSessionLifetimeChecksUseCurrentConfig(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newSessionHarness(t)
_, cookie := h.signIn(t)
h.sessions.idle = 24 * time.Hour
h.advance(24 * time.Hour)
if _, err := h.use(cookie); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoSession) {
t.Errorf("past the shortened idle SessionFor = %v, want ErrNoSession", err)
}
_, cookie = h.signIn(t)
h.sessions.idle, h.sessions.max = 24*time.Hour, 48*time.Hour
for range 3 {
h.advance(12 * time.Hour)
if _, err := h.use(cookie); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SessionFor = %v, want the session", err)
}
}
h.advance(12 * time.Hour)
if _, err := h.use(cookie); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoSession) {
t.Errorf("past the shortened max SessionFor = %v, want ErrNoSession", err)
}
// Used recently and with expires_at still ahead, but older than a max
// shortened after that use: only the absolute check ends it.
h.sessions.idle, h.sessions.max = testIdle, testMax
_, cookie = h.signIn(t)
h.advance(10 * 24 * time.Hour)
if _, err := h.use(cookie); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SessionFor = %v, want the session", err)
}
h.sessions.max = 10 * 24 * time.Hour
h.advance(time.Hour)
if _, err := h.use(cookie); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoSession) {
t.Errorf("past a max shortened after the last use SessionFor = %v, want ErrNoSession", err)
}
}
func TestSessionForRejectsBadCookies(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newSessionHarness(t)
h.signIn(t)
for name, c := range map[string]*http.Cookie{
"missing": nil,
"empty": {Name: SessionCookieName, Value: ""},
"not base64": {Name: SessionCookieName, Value: strings.Repeat("!", 43)},
"short": {Name: SessionCookieName, Value: "AAAA"},
"unknown ID": {Name: SessionCookieName, Value: randomToken()},
"other cookie": {Name: "mealquest_session", Value: randomToken()},
} {
if _, err := h.use(c); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoSession) {
t.Errorf("%s: SessionFor = %v, want ErrNoSession", name, err)
}
}
if n := len(h.rows(t)); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("sessions has %d rows, want the signed-in session only", n)
}
}
func (h *sessionHarness) logout(cookies ...*http.Cookie) *http.Response {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, LogoutPath, nil)
for _, c := range cookies {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
return rec.Result()
}
func TestLogout(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newSessionHarness(t)
_, cookie := h.signIn(t)
_, other := h.signIn(t)
resp := h.logout(cookie)
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusSeeOther {
t.Fatalf("logout status = %d, want 303", resp.StatusCode)
}
want := h.provider.issuer() + "/end-session/"
if got := resp.Header.Get("Location"); got != want || h.auth.EndSessionURL() != want {
t.Errorf("logout redirect = %q, EndSessionURL = %q, want %q", got, h.auth.EndSessionURL(), want)
}
raw := sessionSetCookie(t, resp)
assertSessionCookieAttributes(t, raw)
if !strings.HasPrefix(raw, SessionCookieName+"=;") || !strings.Contains(raw, "Max-Age=0") {
t.Errorf("logout Set-Cookie = %q, want the cookie cleared", raw)
}
rows := h.rows(t)
if len(rows) != 1 || rows[0].idHash != sha256Hex(other.Value) {
t.Errorf("after logout sessions = %+v, want only the other session", rows)
}
if _, err := h.use(cookie); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoSession) {
t.Errorf("logged-out cookie: SessionFor = %v, want ErrNoSession", err)
}
if _, err := h.use(other); err != nil {
t.Errorf("other session: SessionFor = %v, want it untouched", err)
}
}
func TestLogoutWithoutSession(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newSessionHarness(t)
resp := h.logout()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusSeeOther || resp.Header.Get("Location") != h.provider.issuer()+"/end-session/" {
t.Errorf("logout = %d to %q, want 303 to the end session endpoint", resp.StatusCode, resp.Header.Get("Location"))
}
assertSessionCookieAttributes(t, sessionSetCookie(t, resp))
}
func TestLogoutIsPostOnly(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newSessionHarness(t)
_, cookie := h.signIn(t)
if resp := h.get(LogoutPath, cookie); resp.StatusCode != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
t.Errorf("GET %s status = %d, want 405", LogoutPath, resp.StatusCode)
}
if _, err := h.use(cookie); err != nil {
t.Errorf("after GET %s SessionFor = %v, want the session", LogoutPath, err)
}
}
func TestLogoutSessionError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newHarness(t)
h.sessions.err = errors.New("database down")
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.router.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, LogoutPath, nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Errorf("logout status = %d, want 500", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestNewRequiresEndSessionEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
p := newFakeProvider(t)
p.discoveryOverrides = map[string]any{"end_session_endpoint": nil}
_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
Issuer: p.issuer(),
ClientID: testClientID,
ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
PublicURL: testPublicURL,
SecretKey: []byte("k"),
AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "end session endpoint") {
t.Errorf("New error = %v, want the missing end session endpoint named", err)
}
}
func TestNewSessionManagerValidates(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := &store.Store{}
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
db *store.Store
idle, max time.Duration
}{
{"nil store", nil, time.Hour, time.Hour},
{"zero idle", db, 0, time.Hour},
{"negative max", db, time.Hour, -time.Hour},
{"max below idle", db, 2 * time.Hour, time.Hour},
} {
if _, err := NewSessionManager(tc.db, tc.idle, tc.max); err == nil {
t.Errorf("%s: NewSessionManager succeeded", tc.name)
}
}
}
-47
View File
@@ -27,16 +27,6 @@ const (
EnvOIDCClientID = "MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_ID"
EnvOIDCClientSecretFile = "MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE"
EnvOIDCAllowedGroups = "MEALQUEST_OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS"
EnvSessionIdle = "MEALQUEST_SESSION_IDLE"
EnvSessionMax = "MEALQUEST_SESSION_MAX"
)
// Session lifetime defaults (D-004): long enough that the kitchen tablet
// stays signed in.
const (
DefaultSessionIdle = 720 * time.Hour // 30 days
DefaultSessionMax = 4320 * time.Hour // 180 days
)
// Config is the validated service configuration.
@@ -53,11 +43,6 @@ type Config struct {
OIDCClientSecret Secret
// OIDCAllowedGroups lists the groups whose members may sign in.
OIDCAllowedGroups []string
// SessionIdle ends a session left unused this long.
SessionIdle time.Duration
// SessionMax ends every session this long after sign-in, used or not.
SessionMax time.Duration
}
// PublicOrigin returns the scheme and host of PublicURL, the only parts of it
@@ -85,12 +70,6 @@ func load(lookup func(string) (string, bool)) (Config, error) {
OIDCClientID: r.str(EnvOIDCClientID),
OIDCClientSecret: r.secretFile(EnvOIDCClientSecretFile),
OIDCAllowedGroups: r.list(EnvOIDCAllowedGroups),
SessionIdle: r.sessionDuration(EnvSessionIdle, DefaultSessionIdle),
SessionMax: r.sessionDuration(EnvSessionMax, DefaultSessionMax),
}
if cfg.SessionIdle > 0 && cfg.SessionMax > 0 && cfg.SessionMax < cfg.SessionIdle {
r.fail(EnvSessionMax, "must be at least %s (%s)", EnvSessionIdle, cfg.SessionIdle)
}
if len(r.problems) > 0 {
return Config{}, &Error{Problems: r.problems}
@@ -264,32 +243,6 @@ func (r *reader) duration(name string) time.Duration {
if !ok {
return 0
}
return r.parseDuration(name, v)
}
// optionalDuration returns def when name is unset. A set value, even an empty
// one, must be a valid positive duration.
func (r *reader) optionalDuration(name string, def time.Duration) time.Duration {
v, ok := r.lookup(name)
if !ok {
return def
}
return r.parseDuration(name, v)
}
// sessionDuration is optionalDuration restricted to whole milliseconds:
// session expiry is stored as a store.Timestamp, which keeps millisecond
// precision, so a finer duration could not be honoured.
func (r *reader) sessionDuration(name string, def time.Duration) time.Duration {
d := r.optionalDuration(name, def)
if d%time.Millisecond != 0 {
r.fail(name, "duration must be a whole number of milliseconds, got %s", d)
return 0
}
return d
}
func (r *reader) parseDuration(name, v string) time.Duration {
d, err := time.ParseDuration(v)
if err != nil {
r.fail(name, "invalid duration %q (want e.g. 10s, 1m)", v)
-60
View File
@@ -246,53 +246,6 @@ func TestLoad(t *testing.T) {
env: with(map[string]string{EnvOIDCClientID: " "}),
badVars: []string{EnvOIDCClientID},
},
{
name: "session lifetimes set",
env: with(map[string]string{EnvSessionIdle: "24h", EnvSessionMax: "48h"}),
},
{
name: "session max equal to idle",
env: with(map[string]string{EnvSessionIdle: "24h", EnvSessionMax: "24h"}),
},
{
name: "invalid session idle",
env: with(map[string]string{EnvSessionIdle: "a month"}),
badVars: []string{EnvSessionIdle},
},
{
name: "empty session idle",
env: with(map[string]string{EnvSessionIdle: ""}),
badVars: []string{EnvSessionIdle},
},
{
name: "non-positive session max",
env: with(map[string]string{EnvSessionMax: "-1h"}),
badVars: []string{EnvSessionMax},
},
{
name: "whole-millisecond session lifetimes",
env: with(map[string]string{EnvSessionIdle: "1ms", EnvSessionMax: "2ms"}),
},
{
name: "sub-millisecond session idle",
env: with(map[string]string{EnvSessionIdle: "1500us", EnvSessionMax: "2ms"}),
badVars: []string{EnvSessionIdle},
},
{
name: "sub-millisecond session max",
env: with(map[string]string{EnvSessionIdle: "1ms", EnvSessionMax: "1ms500us"}),
badVars: []string{EnvSessionMax},
},
{
name: "session max below idle",
env: with(map[string]string{EnvSessionIdle: "48h", EnvSessionMax: "24h"}),
badVars: []string{EnvSessionMax},
},
{
name: "session max below default idle",
env: with(map[string]string{EnvSessionMax: "719h"}),
badVars: []string{EnvSessionMax},
},
{
name: "several invalid values are all named",
env: with(map[string]string{
@@ -398,19 +351,6 @@ func TestLoadValues(t *testing.T) {
if want := []string{"mealquest-admin", "family"}; !slices.Equal(cfg.OIDCAllowedGroups, want) {
t.Errorf("OIDCAllowedGroups = %q, want %q", cfg.OIDCAllowedGroups, want)
}
if cfg.SessionIdle != 720*time.Hour || cfg.SessionMax != 4320*time.Hour {
t.Errorf("SessionIdle, SessionMax = %v, %v, want defaults 720h, 4320h", cfg.SessionIdle, cfg.SessionMax)
}
env[EnvSessionIdle] = "12h"
env[EnvSessionMax] = "36h"
cfg, err = load(func(k string) (string, bool) { v, ok := env[k]; return v, ok })
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load() error = %v", err)
}
if cfg.SessionIdle != 12*time.Hour || cfg.SessionMax != 36*time.Hour {
t.Errorf("SessionIdle, SessionMax = %v, %v, want 12h, 36h", cfg.SessionIdle, cfg.SessionMax)
}
}
func TestSecretRedacted(t *testing.T) {
+6 -17
View File
@@ -22,10 +22,9 @@ type RouteMounter interface {
}
// NewRouter returns the HTTP handler for the service. version is reported by
// GET /health; auth mounts the /auth routes; sessions guards /api/v1 and
// /media; assets is the web build served for every other GET. /health, /auth
// and the web build are public.
func NewRouter(logger *slog.Logger, version string, auth RouteMounter, sessions SessionLookup, assets fs.FS) (http.Handler, error) {
// GET /health; auth mounts the /auth routes; assets is the web build served
// for every other GET.
func NewRouter(logger *slog.Logger, version string, auth RouteMounter, assets fs.FS) (http.Handler, error) {
notFound := apiErrorHandler(logger, http.StatusNotFound, "not_found", "not found")
methodNotAllowed := apiErrorHandler(logger, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "method_not_allowed", "method not allowed")
@@ -40,23 +39,13 @@ func NewRouter(logger *slog.Logger, version string, auth RouteMounter, sessions
r.Get("/health", health(logger, version))
auth.Mount(r)
// The session middleware wraps the whole /api/v1 and /media subrouters
// rather than being added with Use: chi skips a subrouter's middleware
// when it has no routes, which would leave it unguarded.
signedIn := requireSession(logger, sessions)
apiV1, media := chi.NewRouter(), chi.NewRouter()
for _, sub := range []*chi.Mux{apiV1, media} {
sub.MethodNotAllowed(methodNotAllowed)
sub.NotFound(notFound)
}
r.Route("/api", func(r chi.Router) {
r.MethodNotAllowed(methodNotAllowed)
r.NotFound(notFound)
r.Mount("/v1", signedIn(apiV1))
})
r.Mount("/media", signedIn(media))
// Catch-all for the PWA. Unknown /auth paths reach the frontend handler,
// which passes them to notFound rather than the SPA fallback.
// Catch-all for the PWA. Unknown /auth paths and /media (no routes yet)
// reach the frontend handler, which passes them to notFound rather than
// the SPA fallback.
r.Method(http.MethodGet, "/*", web)
r.Method(http.MethodHead, "/*", web)
return r, nil
+2 -7
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ func newTestRouter(t *testing.T, version string) http.Handler {
"index.html": {Data: []byte(fixtureIndex)},
"assets/index-AbC123.js": {Data: []byte(fixtureAsset)},
}
r, err := NewRouter(logger, version, stubAuth{}, stubSessions{}, assets)
r, err := NewRouter(logger, version, stubAuth{}, assets)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -126,8 +126,6 @@ func TestReservedPathsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
}{
{http.MethodGet, "/api"},
{http.MethodGet, "/api/unknown"},
{http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/unknown"},
{http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/unknown"},
{http.MethodPost, "/api/unknown"},
{http.MethodGet, "/auth/unknown"},
{http.MethodGet, "/media/photo.jpg"},
@@ -139,11 +137,8 @@ func TestReservedPathsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tt.method+" "+tt.path, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Signed in, so /api/v1 and /media reach their routers.
req := httptest.NewRequest(tt.method, tt.path, nil)
req.AddCookie(validSessionCookie)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
router.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(tt.method, tt.path, nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 404", rec.Code)
-37
View File
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/auth"
)
// SessionLookup finds the live session a request carries; it returns
// auth.ErrNoSession when there is none. *auth.SessionManager implements it.
type SessionLookup interface {
SessionFor(r *http.Request) (auth.Session, error)
}
// requireSession is the RequireSession middleware. It passes requests with a
// live session to next with the session's actor in the context (read it with
// auth.ActorFrom); others get 401 unauthenticated.
func requireSession(logger *slog.Logger, sessions SessionLookup) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
unauthenticated := apiErrorHandler(logger, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthenticated", "sign in required")
internal := apiErrorHandler(logger, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal", "internal error")
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
s, err := sessions.SessionFor(r)
switch {
case errors.Is(err, auth.ErrNoSession):
unauthenticated(w, r)
case err != nil:
logger.ErrorContext(r.Context(), "look up session", "error", err)
internal(w, r)
default:
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(auth.WithActor(r.Context(), s.Actor())))
}
})
}
}
-151
View File
@@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"errors"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"slices"
"testing"
"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/auth"
)
const (
unauthenticatedJSON = `{"error":{"code":"unauthenticated","message":"sign in required","retryable":false}}`
internalJSON = `{"error":{"code":"internal","message":"internal error","retryable":false}}`
)
var (
validSessionCookie = &http.Cookie{Name: auth.SessionCookieName, Value: "valid"}
brokenSessionCookie = &http.Cookie{Name: auth.SessionCookieName, Value: "broken"}
testSession = auth.Session{
Subject: "user-123",
Email: "cook@example.com",
Name: "Home Cook",
Groups: []string{"mealquest-admin"},
}
)
// stubSessions knows one valid session cookie; the broken cookie fails the
// lookup as a database error would.
type stubSessions struct{}
func (stubSessions) SessionFor(r *http.Request) (auth.Session, error) {
c, err := r.Cookie(auth.SessionCookieName)
switch {
case err != nil:
return auth.Session{}, auth.ErrNoSession
case c.Value == validSessionCookie.Value:
return testSession, nil
case c.Value == brokenSessionCookie.Value:
return auth.Session{}, errors.New("database down")
default:
return auth.Session{}, auth.ErrNoSession
}
}
func TestProtectedPathsRequireSession(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
router := newTestRouter(t, "dev")
for _, tc := range []struct {
method, path string
cookie *http.Cookie
}{
{http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/settings/household", nil},
{http.MethodPatch, "/api/v1/settings/household", nil},
{http.MethodGet, "/api/v1", nil},
{http.MethodGet, "/media/photo.jpg", nil},
{http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/settings/household", &http.Cookie{Name: auth.SessionCookieName, Value: "unknown"}},
} {
t.Run(tc.method+" "+tc.path, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := httptest.NewRequest(tc.method, tc.path, nil)
if tc.cookie != nil {
req.AddCookie(tc.cookie)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 401", rec.Code)
}
if ct := rec.Header().Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/json" {
t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want application/json", ct)
}
if got := rec.Body.String(); got != unauthenticatedJSON {
t.Errorf("body = %s, want %s", got, unauthenticatedJSON)
}
})
}
}
func TestPublicPathsNeedNoSession(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
router := newTestRouter(t, "dev")
for _, path := range []string{"/health", "/auth/login", "/", "/assets/index-AbC123.js", "/quests/42"} {
t.Run(path, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, path, nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("GET %s without a cookie = %d, want 200", path, rec.Code)
}
})
}
}
func TestSessionLookupFailure(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/settings/household", nil)
req.AddCookie(brokenSessionCookie)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
newTestRouter(t, "dev").ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError || rec.Body.String() != internalJSON {
t.Errorf("response = %d %s, want 500 %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String(), internalJSON)
}
}
func TestRequireSessionAttachesActor(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var got auth.Actor
var ok bool
next := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
got, ok = auth.ActorFrom(r.Context())
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
})
h := requireSession(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), stubSessions{})(next)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/settings/household", nil)
req.AddCookie(validSessionCookie)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want the handler's 204", rec.Code)
}
if !ok || got.Subject != "user-123" || got.Email != "cook@example.com" || got.Name != "Home Cook" ||
!slices.Equal(got.Groups, []string{"mealquest-admin"}) {
t.Errorf("actor = %+v (ok=%v), want the session's household member", got, ok)
}
}
func TestRequireSessionStopsUnauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
called := false
next := http.HandlerFunc(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) { called = true })
h := requireSession(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), stubSessions{})(next)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/settings/household", nil))
if called || rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("handler called = %v, status = %d; want not called and 401", called, rec.Code)
}
}