Merge origin/dev (Feature 03) into Feature 04 integration

Feature 03 made the OIDC variables required, so the Feature 04 boot tests'
loadConfig helper now sets them alongside the secret key file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

README.md

@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ export MEALQUEST_OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS=mealquest-admin
 # and always MEALQUEST_SESSION_MAX after sign-in (default 4320h).
 # export MEALQUEST_SESSION_IDLE=720h
 # export MEALQUEST_SESSION_MAX=4320h
+# Optional: comma-separated IPs/CIDRs of reverse proxies whose
+# X-Forwarded-For/-Proto headers are honoured (production: Traefik). Unset
+# trusts no peer, which is right for local development.
+# export MEALQUEST_TRUSTED_PROXY=10.60.1.33
 make dev
 ```
 
@@ -47,7 +51,8 @@ make dev
 (which proxies `/api`, `/auth` and `/media` to `:8080`). Open
 http://localhost:5173. Configuration is environment-only and fails fast:
 every variable above is required except the commented-out session
-lifetimes (when set they must be positive, with MAX at least IDLE), and
+lifetimes (when set they must be positive, with MAX at least IDLE) and
+trusted proxy list (every entry must be an IP or CIDR), and
 secrets are read only from files named by `*_FILE` variables. `MEALQUEST_PUBLIC_URL`, `MEALQUEST_OIDC_ISSUER` and the
 endpoints the issuer advertises must be `https://`; plain `http://` is
 accepted only for `localhost`, `127.0.0.1` and `[::1]`.

cmd/server/boot_test.go

@@ -3,15 +3,21 @@ package main
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"errors"
 	"io/fs"
 	"log/slog"
-	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"testing/fstest"
 	"time"
 
 	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/config"
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/secretbox"
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/store"
 	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/migrations"
 )
 
@@ -24,6 +30,46 @@ func useBootMigrations(t *testing.T, m fstest.MapFS) {
 	t.Cleanup(func() { bootMigrations = saved })
 }
 
+// loadConfig loads a configuration through config.Load whose secret key file
+// holds keyFile. Tests that call it must not run in parallel.
+func loadConfig(t *testing.T, keyFile string) config.Config {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "secret_key")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(keyPath, []byte(keyFile), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	clientSecretPath := filepath.Join(dir, "oidc_client_secret")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(clientSecretPath, []byte("client-secret\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Setenv(config.EnvHTTPAddr, "127.0.0.1:0")
+	t.Setenv(config.EnvPublicURL, "http://localhost")
+	t.Setenv(config.EnvDataDir, t.TempDir())
+	t.Setenv(config.EnvShutdownTimeout, "1s")
+	t.Setenv(config.EnvSecretKeyFile, keyPath)
+	t.Setenv(config.EnvOIDCIssuer, "https://auth.example.com/application/o/mealquest/")
+	t.Setenv(config.EnvOIDCClientID, "mealquest")
+	t.Setenv(config.EnvOIDCClientSecretFile, clientSecretPath)
+	t.Setenv(config.EnvOIDCAllowedGroups, "mealquest-admin")
+	cfg, err := config.Load()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return cfg
+}
+
+// validKeyFile returns secret key file contents as written by the README:
+// base64 of 32 random bytes followed by a newline.
+func validKeyFile(t *testing.T) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	key := make([]byte, secretbox.KeySize)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(key); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(key) + "\n"
+}
+
 var brokenMigrations = fstest.MapFS{
 	"0000_good.sql":   {Data: []byte("CREATE TABLE good (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY);")},
 	"0001_broken.sql": {Data: []byte("CREATE TABLE broken (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY;")},
@@ -73,12 +119,7 @@ func TestRunMigrationFailureReturnsBeforeListening(t *testing.T) {
 	useBootMigrations(t, brokenMigrations)
 
 	var logs bytes.Buffer
-	cfg := config.Config{
-		HTTPAddr:        "127.0.0.1:0",
-		PublicURL:       &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost"},
-		DataDir:         t.TempDir(),
-		ShutdownTimeout: time.Second,
-	}
+	cfg := loadConfig(t, validKeyFile(t))
 	errc := make(chan error, 1)
 	go func() { errc <- run(cfg, slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logs, nil))) }()
 
@@ -94,3 +135,70 @@ func TestRunMigrationFailureReturnsBeforeListening(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("run started listening despite the migration failure: %s", logs.String())
 	}
 }
+
+func TestOpenSecretBoxAcceptsReadmeKey(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := loadConfig(t, validKeyFile(t))
+	box, err := openSecretBox(cfg.SecretKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	token, err := box.Encrypt([]byte("x"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := box.Decrypt(token); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunBadSecretKeyStopsBoot(t *testing.T) {
+	short := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(make([]byte, 31))
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		keyFile string
+		want    error
+	}{
+		{"not base64", "this is not a base64 key!\n", secretbox.ErrKeyEncoding},
+		{"wrong length", short + "\n", secretbox.ErrKeyLength},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			cfg := loadConfig(t, tt.keyFile)
+			var logs bytes.Buffer
+			errc := make(chan error, 1)
+			go func() { errc <- run(cfg, slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logs, nil))) }()
+
+			var err error
+			select {
+			case err = <-errc:
+			case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
+				t.Fatal("run kept going with a bad secret key")
+			}
+			if !errors.Is(err, tt.want) {
+				t.Fatalf("run error = %v, want %v", err, tt.want)
+			}
+			if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), config.EnvSecretKeyFile) {
+				t.Errorf("error does not name %s: %v", config.EnvSecretKeyFile, err)
+			}
+			if key := strings.TrimSpace(tt.keyFile); strings.Contains(err.Error(), key) {
+				t.Errorf("error leaks the key: %v", err)
+			}
+			if strings.Contains(logs.String(), `"listening"`) {
+				t.Errorf("run started listening despite the bad key: %s", logs.String())
+			}
+			if _, statErr := os.Stat(filepath.Join(cfg.DataDir, store.FileName)); !errors.Is(statErr, fs.ErrNotExist) {
+				t.Errorf("run opened the database before rejecting the key (stat: %v)", statErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadMissingSecretKeyFileStopsBoot(t *testing.T) {
+	loadConfig(t, validKeyFile(t)) // sets every other variable
+	t.Setenv(config.EnvSecretKeyFile, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "missing"))
+	_, err := config.Load()
+	var cfgErr *config.Error
+	if !errors.As(err, &cfgErr) || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), config.EnvSecretKeyFile) {
+		t.Fatalf("Load error = %v, want a config error naming %s", err, config.EnvSecretKeyFile)
+	}
+}

cmd/server/main.go

@@ -15,7 +15,9 @@ import (
 
 	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/auth"
 	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/config"
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/forwarded"
 	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/frontend"
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/secretbox"
 	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/server"
 	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/store"
 	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/migrations"
@@ -31,7 +33,7 @@ func main() {
 		os.Exit(1)
 	}
 
-	logger := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stdout, nil))
+	logger := slog.New(forwarded.LogHandler(slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stdout, nil)))
 	if err := run(cfg, logger); err != nil {
 		logger.Error("server stopped", "error", err)
 		os.Exit(1)
@@ -42,6 +44,10 @@ func run(cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger) error {
 	ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)
 	defer stop()
 
+	if _, err := openSecretBox(cfg.SecretKey); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
 	db, err := openStore(ctx, cfg.DataDir)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
@@ -57,17 +63,18 @@ func run(cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger) error {
 		return err
 	}
 	authFlow, err := auth.New(ctx, auth.Config{
-		Issuer:       cfg.OIDCIssuer.String(),
-		ClientID:     cfg.OIDCClientID,
-		ClientSecret: cfg.OIDCClientSecret.Reveal(),
-		PublicURL:    cfg.PublicURL,
-		SecretKey:    []byte(cfg.SecretKey.Reveal()),
+		Issuer:        cfg.OIDCIssuer.String(),
+		ClientID:      cfg.OIDCClientID,
+		ClientSecret:  cfg.OIDCClientSecret.Reveal(),
+		PublicURL:     cfg.PublicURL,
+		SecretKey:     []byte(cfg.SecretKey.Reveal()),
+		AllowedGroups: cfg.OIDCAllowedGroups,
 	}, sessions, logger)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 
-	router, err := server.NewRouter(logger, version, authFlow, frontend.Assets())
+	router, err := server.NewRouter(logger, version, cfg.TrustedProxy, authFlow, sessions, frontend.Assets())
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -102,6 +109,16 @@ func run(cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// openSecretBox builds the secret box from the configured key, naming the
+// variable whose file holds a bad key. The key itself is never reported.
+func openSecretBox(key config.Secret) (*secretbox.Box, error) {
+	box, err := secretbox.New(key.Reveal())
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", config.EnvSecretKeyFile, err)
+	}
+	return box, nil
+}
+
 // bootMigrations is the migration set applied at boot. Tests replace it to
 // prove a failing migration stops the boot.
 var bootMigrations fs.FS = migrations.FS
@@ -125,6 +142,7 @@ func logListening(logger *slog.Logger, cfg config.Config) {
 	logger.Info("listening",
 		"addr", cfg.HTTPAddr,
 		"public_origin", cfg.PublicOrigin(),
+		"trusted_proxy", cfg.TrustedProxy,
 		"data_dir", cfg.DataDir,
 		"version", version,
 	)

docs/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -29,6 +29,15 @@ docker compose project "mealquest" — 10.60.1.14
 One Go service serves the API, the auth flow, media and the PWA. Its SQLite
 database is replicated by Litestream to the NAS.
 
+Traefik terminates TLS. The service honours `X-Forwarded-For` and
+`X-Forwarded-Proto` only from peers listed in `MEALQUEST_TRUSTED_PROXY`
+(comma-separated IPs/CIDRs; production lists `10.60.1.33`); from any other
+peer they are ignored. The client is the rightmost `X-Forwarded-For` address
+that is not a trusted proxy. The resolved client IP is added as `client_ip`
+to every log line written while handling a request. The OIDC redirect URI
+and the Secure cookies are fixed by `MEALQUEST_PUBLIC_URL`, never by request
+headers, so sign-in works whichever peer the request arrives from.
+
 ## Repository layout
 
 | Path | Purpose |

internal/auth/actor.go

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"slices"
+)
+
+// Actor is the signed-in household member a request acts for. Handlers
+// record Actor.Subject as updated_by on edits.
+type Actor struct {
+	Subject string
+	Email   string
+	Name    string
+	Groups  []string
+}
+
+// Actor returns the household member s belongs to.
+func (s Session) Actor() Actor {
+	return Actor{Subject: s.Subject, Email: s.Email, Name: s.Name, Groups: slices.Clone(s.Groups)}
+}
+
+type sessionKey struct{}
+
+// WithSession returns a copy of ctx carrying s. The session middleware calls
+// it for every authenticated request.
+func WithSession(ctx context.Context, s Session) context.Context {
+	return context.WithValue(ctx, sessionKey{}, s)
+}
+
+// SessionFrom returns the session WithSession stored in ctx. ok is false when
+// ctx has none, which behind the session middleware means a wiring bug.
+func SessionFrom(ctx context.Context) (s Session, ok bool) {
+	s, ok = ctx.Value(sessionKey{}).(Session)
+	return s, ok
+}
+
+// ActorFrom returns the actor of the session WithSession stored in ctx. ok is
+// false when ctx has none.
+func ActorFrom(ctx context.Context) (actor Actor, ok bool) {
+	s, ok := SessionFrom(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		return Actor{}, false
+	}
+	return s.Actor(), true
+}

internal/auth/actor_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"slices"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestActorContext(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	if _, ok := ActorFrom(context.Background()); ok {
+		t.Error("ActorFrom found an actor in an empty context")
+	}
+	if _, ok := SessionFrom(context.Background()); ok {
+		t.Error("SessionFrom found a session in an empty context")
+	}
+	s := Session{Subject: "user-123", Email: "cook@example.com", Name: "Home Cook", Groups: []string{"mealquest-admin"}, CSRFToken: "t"}
+	ctx := WithSession(context.Background(), s)
+	gotSession, ok := SessionFrom(ctx)
+	if !ok || gotSession.Subject != s.Subject || gotSession.CSRFToken != s.CSRFToken {
+		t.Errorf("SessionFrom = %+v (ok=%v), want %+v", gotSession, ok, s)
+	}
+	got, ok := ActorFrom(ctx)
+	if !ok || got.Subject != s.Subject || got.Email != s.Email || got.Name != s.Name || !slices.Equal(got.Groups, s.Groups) {
+		t.Errorf("ActorFrom = %+v (ok=%v), want the session's actor", got, ok)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSessionActor(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	s := Session{Subject: "user-123", Email: "cook@example.com", Name: "Home Cook", Groups: []string{"mealquest-admin"}, CSRFToken: "t"}
+	a := s.Actor()
+	if a.Subject != s.Subject || a.Email != s.Email || a.Name != s.Name || !slices.Equal(a.Groups, s.Groups) {
+		t.Errorf("Actor = %+v, want the session's identity", a)
+	}
+	a.Groups[0] = "changed"
+	if s.Groups[0] != "mealquest-admin" {
+		t.Error("Actor shares the session's groups slice")
+	}
+}

internal/auth/auth.go

@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ import (
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/url"
+	"slices"
+	"sync/atomic"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
@@ -65,15 +67,20 @@ type Config struct {
 	PublicURL *url.URL
 	// SecretKey is the server key the login cookie's signing key derives from.
 	SecretKey []byte
+	// AllowedGroups are the household's groups; a sign-in is refused unless
+	// the account is in at least one of them.
+	AllowedGroups []string
 }
 
 // Auth serves the login and callback routes.
 type Auth struct {
 	oauth    oauth2.Config
 	verifier *oidc.IDTokenVerifier
+	provider *oidc.Provider
 	client   *http.Client
 	cookie   loginCookie
 	sessions Sessions
+	allowed  []string
 	// endSessionURL is the provider's end_session_endpoint; logout ends
 	// there so the provider's own session ends too.
 	endSessionURL string
@@ -92,6 +99,8 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, sessions Sessions, logger *slog.Logger
 		return nil, errors.New("auth: secret key is required")
 	case sessions == nil:
 		return nil, errors.New("auth: session layer is required")
+	case len(cfg.AllowedGroups) == 0:
+		return nil, errors.New("auth: at least one allowed group is required")
 	}
 
 	if err := checkEndpoint("issuer", cfg.Issuer); err != nil {
@@ -99,9 +108,12 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, sessions Sessions, logger *slog.Logger
 	}
 
 	client := &http.Client{Timeout: providerTimeout, CheckRedirect: checkRedirect}
-	provider, err := oidc.NewProvider(oidc.ClientContext(ctx, client), cfg.Issuer)
+	discovery := *client
+	recorder := &statusRecorder{next: http.DefaultTransport}
+	discovery.Transport = recorder
+	provider, err := oidc.NewProvider(oidc.ClientContext(ctx, &discovery), cfg.Issuer)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("auth: OIDC discovery: %w", err)
+		return nil, discoveryError(err, int(recorder.status.Load()))
 	}
 	endpoint := provider.Endpoint()
 	var discovered struct {
@@ -118,6 +130,9 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, sessions Sessions, logger *slog.Logger
 		{"token endpoint", endpoint.TokenURL},
 		{"JWKS endpoint", discovered.JWKSURI},
 		{"end session endpoint", discovered.EndSessionURI},
+		// Groups come from userinfo when the ID token carries none, and the
+		// access token is sent there.
+		{"userinfo endpoint", provider.UserInfoEndpoint()},
 	} {
 		if err := checkEndpoint(e.name, e.raw); err != nil {
 			return nil, err
@@ -138,7 +153,9 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, sessions Sessions, logger *slog.Logger
 			ClientID:             cfg.ClientID,
 			SupportedSigningAlgs: []string{oidc.RS256},
 		}),
+		provider:      provider,
 		client:        client,
+		allowed:       slices.Clone(cfg.AllowedGroups),
 		cookie:        newLoginCookie(cfg.SecretKey),
 		sessions:      sessions,
 		endSessionURL: discovered.EndSessionURI,
@@ -146,6 +163,32 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, sessions Sessions, logger *slog.Logger
 	}, nil
 }
 
+// statusRecorder records the status of the last response it carries.
+type statusRecorder struct {
+	next   http.RoundTripper
+	status atomic.Int32
+}
+
+func (s *statusRecorder) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+	resp, err := s.next.RoundTrip(req)
+	if err == nil {
+		s.status.Store(int32(resp.StatusCode))
+	}
+	return resp, err
+}
+
+// discoveryError reports a failed discovery. go-oidc puts the provider's
+// response body in its error for a non-200 discovery response, so that
+// error is replaced by the status alone. Transport errors carry no response
+// content and keep their cause.
+func discoveryError(err error, status int) error {
+	var urlErr *url.Error
+	if !errors.As(err, &urlErr) && status != 0 && status != http.StatusOK {
+		return fmt.Errorf("auth: OIDC discovery: provider answered HTTP %d", status)
+	}
+	return fmt.Errorf("auth: OIDC discovery: %w", err)
+}
+
 // checkEndpoint applies secureurl.Check to the provider URL raw, naming the
 // endpoint in the error.
 func checkEndpoint(name, raw string) error {
@@ -218,7 +261,9 @@ func (a *Auth) login(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 }
 
 // callback completes the flow: it checks state against the login cookie,
-// exchanges the code, verifies the ID token and nonce, then starts a session.
+// exchanges the code, verifies the ID token and nonce, then starts a session
+// if the account is in an allowed group. Membership is checked on every
+// login, so an account removed from the group is refused at its next one.
 func (a *Auth) callback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
 	ctx := r.Context()
@@ -256,6 +301,22 @@ func (a *Auth) callback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, "sign-in failed", http.StatusUnauthorized)
 		return
 	}
+	if !a.member(claims.Groups) {
+		if claims.Groups == nil {
+			a.logger.WarnContext(ctx, "sign-in refused: no groups claim in the ID token or userinfo", "subject", claims.Subject)
+		} else {
+			a.logger.WarnContext(ctx, "sign-in refused: not in an allowed group", "subject", claims.Subject)
+		}
+		// A session this browser already holds ends too, so a refused
+		// sign-in never leaves it signed in.
+		if err := a.sessions.EndSession(w, r); err != nil {
+			a.logger.ErrorContext(ctx, "end session", "error", err)
+			http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+			return
+		}
+		a.refuse(w, r)
+		return
+	}
 	if err := a.sessions.StartSession(w, r, claims); err != nil {
 		a.logger.ErrorContext(ctx, "start session", "error", err)
 		http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
@@ -278,7 +339,8 @@ func (a *Auth) logout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 // verify exchanges code for tokens and returns the verified ID token claims.
 // The verifier enforces RS256, issuer, audience and expiry; nonce is checked
-// here.
+// here. When the ID token has no groups claim, Groups comes from userinfo;
+// it stays nil when neither has one.
 func (a *Auth) verify(ctx context.Context, code string, state loginState) (Claims, error) {
 	token, err := a.oauth.Exchange(context.WithValue(ctx, oauth2.HTTPClient, a.client), code,
 		oauth2.VerifierOption(state.Verifier))
@@ -291,7 +353,7 @@ func (a *Auth) verify(ctx context.Context, code string, state loginState) (Claim
 	}
 	idToken, err := a.verifier.Verify(ctx, raw)
 	if err != nil {
-		return Claims{}, fmt.Errorf("verify ID token: %w", err)
+		return Claims{}, verifyError(err)
 	}
 	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(idToken.Nonce), []byte(state.Nonce)) != 1 {
 		return Claims{}, errors.New("ID token nonce mismatch")
@@ -303,9 +365,61 @@ func (a *Auth) verify(ctx context.Context, code string, state loginState) (Claim
 	if claims.Subject == "" {
 		return Claims{}, errors.New("ID token has no subject")
 	}
+	if claims.Groups == nil {
+		groups, err := a.userinfoGroups(ctx, token, claims.Subject)
+		if err != nil {
+			return Claims{}, err
+		}
+		claims.Groups = groups
+	}
 	return claims, nil
 }
 
+// userinfoGroups returns the groups claim from the userinfo endpoint, nil if
+// it has none. The userinfo subject must match the ID token's subject.
+func (a *Auth) userinfoGroups(ctx context.Context, token *oauth2.Token, subject string) ([]string, error) {
+	info, err := a.provider.UserInfo(oidc.ClientContext(ctx, a.client), oauth2.StaticTokenSource(token))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, userinfoError(err)
+	}
+	if info.Subject != subject {
+		return nil, errors.New("userinfo subject does not match the ID token")
+	}
+	var claims struct {
+		Groups []string `json:"groups"`
+	}
+	if err := info.Claims(&claims); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode userinfo claims: %w", err)
+	}
+	return claims.Groups, nil
+}
+
+// userinfoError reduces a failed userinfo request to a fixed category, like
+// exchangeError: go-oidc's error text can carry the response body.
+func userinfoError(err error) error {
+	var transport *url.Error
+	if errors.As(err, &transport) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("userinfo: request failed: %s: %w", transport.Op, transport.Err)
+	}
+	return errors.New("userinfo: endpoint returned an unusable response")
+}
+
+// verifyError reduces a failed ID token verification to a fixed category.
+// go-oidc's error text can carry the JWKS endpoint's response body or
+// token-supplied values, so only the expiry of an expired token is kept.
+func verifyError(err error) error {
+	var expired *oidc.TokenExpiredError
+	if errors.As(err, &expired) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("verify ID token: token expired at %s", expired.Expiry.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339))
+	}
+	return errors.New("verify ID token: token or provider key set rejected")
+}
+
+// member reports whether groups contains an allowed group.
+func (a *Auth) member(groups []string) bool {
+	return slices.ContainsFunc(groups, func(g string) bool { return slices.Contains(a.allowed, g) })
+}
+
 // exchangeError reduces a failed code exchange to a fixed category and safe
 // metadata. The oauth2 error text can carry the token endpoint's response
 // body or error_description, which may echo credentials, so it is dropped.

internal/auth/auth_test.go

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
 	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
+	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"maps"
@@ -36,6 +37,9 @@ const (
 
 var testPublicURL = &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "meals.example.com"}
 
+// testAllowedGroups are the household's groups in tests.
+var testAllowedGroups = []string{"mealquest-admin", "mealquest-family"}
+
 // fakeProvider is an OIDC provider serving discovery, JWKS and a token
 // endpoint. Each issued code maps to the ID token the token endpoint returns.
 type fakeProvider struct {
@@ -50,6 +54,14 @@ type fakeProvider struct {
 	// tokenReply, when set, is returned by the token endpoint instead of a
 	// token.
 	tokenReply *tokenReply
+	// userinfo is the userinfo endpoint's response; userinfoHits counts
+	// requests to it.
+	userinfo     map[string]any
+	userinfoHits int
+	// userinfoReply, when set, is returned by the userinfo endpoint instead.
+	userinfoReply *tokenReply
+	// jwksReply, when set, is returned by the JWKS endpoint instead.
+	jwksReply *tokenReply
 }
 
 type tokenReply struct {
@@ -73,6 +85,7 @@ func newFakeProvider(t *testing.T) *fakeProvider {
 	mux.HandleFunc("GET /.well-known/openid-configuration", p.discovery)
 	mux.HandleFunc("GET /jwks", p.jwks)
 	mux.HandleFunc("POST /token", p.token)
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /userinfo", p.userinfoEndpoint)
 	p.srv = httptest.NewServer(mux)
 	t.Cleanup(p.srv.Close)
 	return p
@@ -86,6 +99,7 @@ func (p *fakeProvider) discovery(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 		"authorization_endpoint":                p.issuer() + "/authorize",
 		"token_endpoint":                        p.issuer() + "/token",
 		"jwks_uri":                              p.issuer() + "/jwks",
+		"userinfo_endpoint":                     p.issuer() + "/userinfo",
 		"end_session_endpoint":                  p.issuer() + "/end-session/",
 		"response_types_supported":              []string{"code"},
 		"subject_types_supported":               []string{"public"},
@@ -98,6 +112,15 @@ func (p *fakeProvider) discovery(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 }
 
 func (p *fakeProvider) jwks(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	reply := p.jwksReply
+	p.mu.Unlock()
+	if reply != nil {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		w.WriteHeader(reply.status)
+		io.WriteString(w, reply.body)
+		return
+	}
 	writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"keys": []map[string]string{{
 		"kty": "RSA",
 		"kid": testKID,
@@ -148,6 +171,41 @@ func (p *fakeProvider) token(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	})
 }
 
+// userinfoEndpoint checks the access token and returns p.userinfo, which
+// defaults to the test user without a groups claim.
+func (p *fakeProvider) userinfoEndpoint(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != "Bearer access-token" {
+		http.Error(w, `{"error":"invalid_token"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		return
+	}
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	p.userinfoHits++
+	info, reply := p.userinfo, p.userinfoReply
+	p.mu.Unlock()
+	if reply != nil {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		w.WriteHeader(reply.status)
+		io.WriteString(w, reply.body)
+		return
+	}
+	if info == nil {
+		info = map[string]any{"sub": "user-123", "email": "cook@example.com"}
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, info)
+}
+
+func (p *fakeProvider) setUserinfo(info map[string]any) {
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	defer p.mu.Unlock()
+	p.userinfo = info
+}
+
+func (p *fakeProvider) userinfoRequests() int {
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	defer p.mu.Unlock()
+	return p.userinfoHits
+}
+
 // authorize stands in for the user signing in at the provider: it records a
 // code bound to the PKCE challenge and returns it.
 func (p *fakeProvider) authorize(challenge, idToken string) string {
@@ -261,6 +319,7 @@ func (m *memorySessions) started() []Claims {
 }
 
 type harness struct {
+	auth     *Auth
 	provider *fakeProvider
 	sessions *memorySessions
 	router   http.Handler
@@ -291,18 +350,19 @@ func newHarness(t *testing.T) *harness {
 	sessions := &memorySessions{}
 	logs := &syncBuffer{}
 	a, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
-		Issuer:       p.issuer(),
-		ClientID:     testClientID,
-		ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
-		PublicURL:    testPublicURL,
-		SecretKey:    []byte("server-secret-key"),
+		Issuer:        p.issuer(),
+		ClientID:      testClientID,
+		ClientSecret:  testClientSecret,
+		PublicURL:     testPublicURL,
+		SecretKey:     []byte("server-secret-key"),
+		AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
 	}, sessions, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(logs, nil)))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	r := chi.NewRouter()
 	a.Mount(r)
-	return &harness{provider: p, sessions: sessions, router: r, logs: logs}
+	return &harness{auth: a, provider: p, sessions: sessions, router: r, logs: logs}
 }
 
 func (h *harness) get(target string, cookies ...*http.Cookie) *http.Response {
@@ -680,6 +740,66 @@ func TestCallbackExchangeFailureDoesNotLogProviderResponse(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestCallbackKeySetFailureDoesNotLogProviderResponse(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	const sentinel = "sentinel-jwks-body-5c1e"
+	tests := []struct {
+		name  string
+		reply tokenReply
+	}{
+		{"error response", tokenReply{http.StatusInternalServerError, sentinel}},
+		{"malformed success", tokenReply{http.StatusOK, `{"keys":"` + sentinel + `"`}},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			h := newHarness(t)
+			h.provider.mu.Lock()
+			h.provider.jwksReply = &tc.reply
+			h.provider.mu.Unlock()
+
+			// The returned error, checked through verify directly.
+			l := h.login(t, LoginPath)
+			req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, CallbackPath, nil)
+			req.AddCookie(l.cookie)
+			state, err := h.auth.cookie.read(req, time.Now())
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			code := h.provider.authorize(l.query.Get("code_challenge"), h.provider.signRS256(h.provider.claims(l.query.Get("nonce"))))
+			_, err = h.auth.verify(context.Background(), code, state)
+			if err == nil {
+				t.Fatal("verify succeeded with an unusable key set")
+			}
+			if strings.Contains(err.Error(), sentinel) {
+				t.Errorf("verify error contains the JWKS response: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			// The logs and response, through the callback.
+			l = h.login(t, LoginPath)
+			resp := h.callback(l, l.query.Get("state"), h.provider.signRS256(h.provider.claims(l.query.Get("nonce"))))
+
+			if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+				t.Errorf("callback status = %d, want 401", resp.StatusCode)
+			}
+			body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+			if strings.Contains(string(body), sentinel) {
+				t.Errorf("response contains the JWKS response: %s", body)
+			}
+			logs := h.logs.String()
+			if strings.Contains(logs, sentinel) {
+				t.Errorf("logs contain the JWKS response: %s", logs)
+			}
+			if want := "token or provider key set rejected"; !strings.Contains(logs, want) {
+				t.Errorf("logs = %q, want %q", logs, want)
+			}
+			if len(h.sessions.started()) != 0 {
+				t.Error("a session started")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestLoginCookieExpires(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	c := newLoginCookie([]byte("server-secret-key"))
@@ -730,28 +850,65 @@ func TestNewFailsWhenDiscoveryFails(t *testing.T) {
 	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.NotFoundHandler())
 	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
 	_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
-		Issuer:       srv.URL,
-		ClientID:     testClientID,
-		ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
-		PublicURL:    testPublicURL,
-		SecretKey:    []byte("k"),
+		Issuer:        srv.URL,
+		ClientID:      testClientID,
+		ClientSecret:  testClientSecret,
+		PublicURL:     testPublicURL,
+		SecretKey:     []byte("k"),
+		AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
 	}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("New succeeded without a discovery document")
 	}
 }
 
+func TestNewDiscoveryErrorOmitsProviderBody(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	const sentinel = "sentinel-discovery-body-7f3a"
+	for _, status := range []int{http.StatusNotFound, http.StatusInternalServerError} {
+		t.Run(http.StatusText(status), func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+				w.WriteHeader(status)
+				io.WriteString(w, sentinel)
+			}))
+			t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+			logs := &syncBuffer{}
+			_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
+				Issuer:        srv.URL,
+				ClientID:      testClientID,
+				ClientSecret:  testClientSecret,
+				PublicURL:     testPublicURL,
+				SecretKey:     []byte("k"),
+				AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
+			}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(logs, nil)))
+			if err == nil {
+				t.Fatal("New succeeded without a discovery document")
+			}
+			// cmd/server logs the returned error at startup.
+			slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(logs, nil)).Error("startup failed", "err", err)
+			if strings.Contains(logs.String(), sentinel) {
+				t.Errorf("logs contain the provider response body: %s", logs)
+			}
+			if want := fmt.Sprintf("auth: OIDC discovery: provider answered HTTP %d", status); err.Error() != want {
+				t.Errorf("error = %q, want %q", err, want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestNewFailsOnIssuerMismatch(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	p := newFakeProvider(t)
 	// Discovery trims the trailing slash, so this fetches the provider's
 	// document, which reports the issuer without it.
 	_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
-		Issuer:       p.issuer() + "/",
-		ClientID:     testClientID,
-		ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
-		PublicURL:    testPublicURL,
-		SecretKey:    []byte("k"),
+		Issuer:        p.issuer() + "/",
+		ClientID:      testClientID,
+		ClientSecret:  testClientSecret,
+		PublicURL:     testPublicURL,
+		SecretKey:     []byte("k"),
+		AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
 	}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("New accepted a provider reporting a different issuer")
@@ -772,11 +929,12 @@ func TestNewRejectsRemoteHTTPIssuer(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, issuer := range []string{"http://auth.example.com/application/o/mealquest/", "http://192.0.2.10"} {
 		_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
-			Issuer:       issuer,
-			ClientID:     testClientID,
-			ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
-			PublicURL:    testPublicURL,
-			SecretKey:    []byte("k"),
+			Issuer:        issuer,
+			ClientID:      testClientID,
+			ClientSecret:  testClientSecret,
+			PublicURL:     testPublicURL,
+			SecretKey:     []byte("k"),
+			AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
 		}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
 		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "issuer") {
 			t.Errorf("New(issuer %q) error = %v, want issuer rejected", issuer, err)
@@ -793,6 +951,7 @@ func TestNewRejectsRemoteHTTPEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
 		{"token_endpoint", "token endpoint"},
 		{"jwks_uri", "JWKS endpoint"},
 		{"end_session_endpoint", "end session endpoint"},
+		{"userinfo_endpoint", "userinfo endpoint"},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range tests {
 		t.Run(tc.field, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -800,11 +959,12 @@ func TestNewRejectsRemoteHTTPEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
 			p := newFakeProvider(t)
 			p.discoveryOverrides = map[string]any{tc.field: "http://auth.example.com/" + tc.field}
 			_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
-				Issuer:       p.issuer(),
-				ClientID:     testClientID,
-				ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
-				PublicURL:    testPublicURL,
-				SecretKey:    []byte("k"),
+				Issuer:        p.issuer(),
+				ClientID:      testClientID,
+				ClientSecret:  testClientSecret,
+				PublicURL:     testPublicURL,
+				SecretKey:     []byte("k"),
+				AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
 			}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
 			if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.name) {
 				t.Errorf("New error = %v, want %s rejected", err, tc.name)
@@ -840,11 +1000,12 @@ func TestCallbackRefusesTokenRedirectToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
 			sessions := &memorySessions{}
 			logs := &syncBuffer{}
 			a, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
-				Issuer:       p.issuer(),
-				ClientID:     testClientID,
-				ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
-				PublicURL:    testPublicURL,
-				SecretKey:    []byte("server-secret-key"),
+				Issuer:        p.issuer(),
+				ClientID:      testClientID,
+				ClientSecret:  testClientSecret,
+				PublicURL:     testPublicURL,
+				SecretKey:     []byte("server-secret-key"),
+				AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
 			}, sessions, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(logs, nil)))
 			if err != nil {
 				t.Fatal(err)

internal/auth/gate_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// signInWith completes a login whose ID token has claims edited by edit.
+func (h *harness) signInWith(t *testing.T, edit func(claims map[string]any)) *http.Response {
+	t.Helper()
+	l := h.login(t, LoginPath)
+	c := h.provider.claims(l.query.Get("nonce"))
+	edit(c)
+	return h.callback(l, l.query.Get("state"), h.provider.signRS256(c))
+}
+
+// assertRefused checks resp is the refused-sign-in page and starts no
+// session.
+func assertRefused(t *testing.T, resp *http.Response) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("callback status = %d, want 403", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	if ct := resp.Header.Get("Content-Type"); ct != "text/html; charset=utf-8" {
+		t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want text/html; charset=utf-8", ct)
+	}
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, want := range []string{
+		"This kitchen is for the household only",
+		`<form method="post" action="/auth/logout">`,
+		"Sign out",
+	} {
+		if !strings.Contains(string(body), want) {
+			t.Errorf("refused page lacks %q:\n%s", want, body)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, c := range resp.Cookies() {
+		// Clearing a session cookie (negative Max-Age) is expected.
+		if (c.Name == SessionCookieName || c.Name == "test_session") && c.MaxAge >= 0 {
+			t.Errorf("refused sign-in set session cookie %s", c.Name)
+		}
+	}
+	assertLoginCookieCleared(t, resp)
+}
+
+func TestGroupGateMember(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	// Any one allowed group is enough, alongside groups that are not allowed.
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	resp := h.signInWith(t, func(c map[string]any) { c["groups"] = []string{"guests", "mealquest-family"} })
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusSeeOther {
+		t.Fatalf("callback status = %d, want 303", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	if started := h.sessions.started(); len(started) != 1 || !slices.Equal(started[0].Groups, []string{"guests", "mealquest-family"}) {
+		t.Errorf("sessions started = %+v, want one with the ID token groups", started)
+	}
+	if n := h.provider.userinfoRequests(); n != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("userinfo requested %d times, want 0 when the ID token has groups", n)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGroupGateRefused(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	tests := []struct {
+		name     string
+		groups   any // ID token groups claim; nil removes it
+		userinfo map[string]any
+	}{
+		{name: "non-member", groups: []string{"guests", "MEALQUEST-ADMIN"}},
+		{name: "empty groups claim", groups: []string{}},
+		{name: "groups claim missing from ID token and userinfo", groups: nil},
+		{
+			name:     "non-member in userinfo",
+			groups:   nil,
+			userinfo: map[string]any{"sub": "user-123", "groups": []string{"guests"}},
+		},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			h := newHarness(t)
+			if tc.userinfo != nil {
+				h.provider.setUserinfo(tc.userinfo)
+			}
+			resp := h.signInWith(t, func(c map[string]any) {
+				if tc.groups == nil {
+					delete(c, "groups")
+				} else {
+					c["groups"] = tc.groups
+				}
+			})
+			assertRefused(t, resp)
+			if started := h.sessions.started(); len(started) != 0 {
+				t.Errorf("sessions started = %+v, want none", started)
+			}
+			if !strings.Contains(h.logs.String(), "sign-in refused") {
+				t.Errorf("refusal not logged:\n%s", h.logs.String())
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGroupGateUsesUserinfoWhenIDTokenHasNoGroups(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	h.provider.setUserinfo(map[string]any{"sub": "user-123", "groups": []string{"mealquest-admin"}})
+	resp := h.signInWith(t, func(c map[string]any) { delete(c, "groups") })
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusSeeOther {
+		t.Fatalf("callback status = %d, want 303", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	if started := h.sessions.started(); len(started) != 1 || !slices.Equal(started[0].Groups, []string{"mealquest-admin"}) {
+		t.Errorf("sessions started = %+v, want one with the userinfo groups", started)
+	}
+	if n := h.provider.userinfoRequests(); n != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("userinfo requested %d times, want 1", n)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGroupGateUserinfoFailures(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	tests := []struct {
+		name     string
+		userinfo map[string]any
+	}{
+		{"subject mismatch", map[string]any{"sub": "someone-else", "groups": []string{"mealquest-admin"}}},
+		{"malformed groups", map[string]any{"sub": "user-123", "groups": "mealquest-admin"}},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			h := newHarness(t)
+			h.provider.setUserinfo(tc.userinfo)
+			resp := h.signInWith(t, func(c map[string]any) { delete(c, "groups") })
+			if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+				t.Errorf("callback status = %d, want 401", resp.StatusCode)
+			}
+			if started := h.sessions.started(); len(started) != 0 {
+				t.Errorf("sessions started = %+v, want none", started)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// A failed userinfo request fails the sign-in without logging the
+// endpoint's response, which may echo credentials.
+func TestGroupGateUserinfoErrorNotLogged(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	h.provider.mu.Lock()
+	h.provider.userinfoReply = &tokenReply{status: http.StatusInternalServerError, body: `{"error":"leaked-s3cret"}`}
+	h.provider.mu.Unlock()
+	resp := h.signInWith(t, func(c map[string]any) { delete(c, "groups") })
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Errorf("callback status = %d, want 401", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	if started := h.sessions.started(); len(started) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("sessions started = %+v, want none", started)
+	}
+	logs := h.logs.String()
+	if !strings.Contains(logs, "userinfo") || strings.Contains(logs, "leaked-s3cret") {
+		t.Errorf("logs = %s, want the userinfo failure without the response body", logs)
+	}
+}
+
+// Membership is checked at every login: after removal from the group, the
+// next login is refused and starts no session.
+func TestGroupGateRemovedMemberRefusedAtNextLogin(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	h := newSessionHarness(t)
+	h.signIn(t)
+	if n := len(h.rows(t)); n != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("sessions after first login = %d, want 1", n)
+	}
+
+	resp := h.signInWith(t, func(c map[string]any) { c["groups"] = []string{"former-household"} })
+	assertRefused(t, resp)
+	if n := len(h.rows(t)); n != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("sessions after refused login = %d, want still 1", n)
+	}
+}
+
+// A refused sign-in from a browser that still holds a session ends that
+// session and clears its cookie.
+func TestGroupGateRefusalEndsExistingSession(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	h := newSessionHarness(t)
+	_, cookie := h.signIn(t)
+
+	l := h.login(t, LoginPath)
+	c := h.provider.claims(l.query.Get("nonce"))
+	c["groups"] = []string{"former-household"}
+	code := h.provider.authorize(l.query.Get("code_challenge"), h.provider.signRS256(c))
+	q := url.Values{"code": {code}, "state": {l.query.Get("state")}}
+	resp := h.get(CallbackPath+"?"+q.Encode(), l.cookie, cookie)
+
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("callback status = %d, want 403", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	if n := len(h.rows(t)); n != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("sessions after refused login = %d, want 0", n)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.use(cookie); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoSession) {
+		t.Errorf("old session lookup error = %v, want ErrNoSession", err)
+	}
+	cleared := false
+	for _, c := range resp.Cookies() {
+		cleared = cleared || (c.Name == SessionCookieName && c.MaxAge < 0)
+	}
+	if !cleared {
+		t.Error("refused sign-in did not clear the session cookie")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGroupGateRefusalEndSessionError(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	h.sessions.err = errors.New("database down")
+	resp := h.signInWith(t, func(c map[string]any) { c["groups"] = []string{"guests"} })
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusInternalServerError {
+		t.Errorf("callback status = %d, want 500", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNewRequiresAllowedGroups(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	p := newFakeProvider(t)
+	_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
+		Issuer:       p.issuer(),
+		ClientID:     testClientID,
+		ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
+		PublicURL:    testPublicURL,
+		SecretKey:    []byte("k"),
+	}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "allowed group") {
+		t.Errorf("New error = %v, want missing allowed groups named", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNewRequiresUserinfoEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	p := newFakeProvider(t)
+	p.discoveryOverrides = map[string]any{"userinfo_endpoint": nil}
+	_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
+		Issuer:        p.issuer(),
+		ClientID:      testClientID,
+		ClientSecret:  testClientSecret,
+		PublicURL:     testPublicURL,
+		SecretKey:     []byte("k"),
+		AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
+	}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "userinfo endpoint") {
+		t.Errorf("New error = %v, want the missing userinfo endpoint named", err)
+	}
+}

internal/auth/refused.go

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+)
+
+// refusedPage is shown when a sign-in succeeds at the provider but the
+// account is not in the household's group. Signing out ends the provider
+// session too, so another account can sign in.
+const refusedPage = `<!doctype html>
+<html lang="en">
+<head>
+<meta charset="utf-8">
+<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
+<title>MealQuest</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<main>
+<h1>This kitchen is for the household only</h1>
+<p>The account you signed in with is not part of our kitchen.</p>
+<form method="post" action="` + LogoutPath + `">
+<button type="submit">Sign out</button>
+</form>
+</main>
+</body>
+</html>
+`
+
+// refuse writes the refused-sign-in page with 403.
+func (a *Auth) refuse(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
+	if _, err := io.WriteString(w, refusedPage); err != nil {
+		a.logger.WarnContext(r.Context(), "write refused sign-in page", "error", err)
+	}
+}

internal/auth/session_test.go

@@ -62,11 +62,12 @@ func newSessionHarness(t *testing.T) *sessionHarness {
 	p := newFakeProvider(t)
 	logs := &syncBuffer{}
 	a, err := New(ctx, Config{
-		Issuer:       p.issuer(),
-		ClientID:     testClientID,
-		ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
-		PublicURL:    testPublicURL,
-		SecretKey:    []byte("server-secret-key"),
+		Issuer:        p.issuer(),
+		ClientID:      testClientID,
+		ClientSecret:  testClientSecret,
+		PublicURL:     testPublicURL,
+		SecretKey:     []byte("server-secret-key"),
+		AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
 	}, sessions, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(logs, nil)))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
@@ -490,11 +491,12 @@ func TestNewRequiresEndSessionEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
 	p := newFakeProvider(t)
 	p.discoveryOverrides = map[string]any{"end_session_endpoint": nil}
 	_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
-		Issuer:       p.issuer(),
-		ClientID:     testClientID,
-		ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
-		PublicURL:    testPublicURL,
-		SecretKey:    []byte("k"),
+		Issuer:        p.issuer(),
+		ClientID:      testClientID,
+		ClientSecret:  testClientSecret,
+		PublicURL:     testPublicURL,
+		SecretKey:     []byte("k"),
+		AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
 	}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
 	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "end session endpoint") {
 		t.Errorf("New error = %v, want the missing end session endpoint named", err)

internal/config/config.go

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/forwarded"
 	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/secureurl"
 )
 
@@ -30,6 +31,8 @@ const (
 
 	EnvSessionIdle = "MEALQUEST_SESSION_IDLE"
 	EnvSessionMax  = "MEALQUEST_SESSION_MAX"
+
+	EnvTrustedProxy = "MEALQUEST_TRUSTED_PROXY"
 )
 
 // Session lifetime defaults (D-004): long enough that the kitchen tablet
@@ -58,6 +61,10 @@ type Config struct {
 	SessionIdle time.Duration
 	// SessionMax ends every session this long after sign-in, used or not.
 	SessionMax time.Duration
+
+	// TrustedProxy lists the reverse proxies whose X-Forwarded-For and
+	// X-Forwarded-Proto headers are honoured. Empty trusts no peer.
+	TrustedProxy forwarded.Trusted
 }
 
 // PublicOrigin returns the scheme and host of PublicURL, the only parts of it
@@ -88,6 +95,8 @@ func load(lookup func(string) (string, bool)) (Config, error) {
 
 		SessionIdle: r.sessionDuration(EnvSessionIdle, DefaultSessionIdle),
 		SessionMax:  r.sessionDuration(EnvSessionMax, DefaultSessionMax),
+
+		TrustedProxy: r.trustedProxy(EnvTrustedProxy),
 	}
 	if cfg.SessionIdle > 0 && cfg.SessionMax > 0 && cfg.SessionMax < cfg.SessionIdle {
 		r.fail(EnvSessionMax, "must be at least %s (%s)", EnvSessionIdle, cfg.SessionIdle)
@@ -177,6 +186,18 @@ func (r *reader) list(name string) []string {
 	return items
 }
 
+// trustedProxy parses an optional comma-separated list of IP addresses and
+// CIDR prefixes with forwarded.ParseTrusted. Unset or blank trusts no peer.
+func (r *reader) trustedProxy(name string) forwarded.Trusted {
+	v, _ := r.lookup(name)
+	t, err := forwarded.ParseTrusted(v)
+	if err != nil {
+		r.fail(name, "%v", err)
+		return nil
+	}
+	return t
+}
+
 func (r *reader) listenAddr(name string) string {
 	v, ok := r.required(name)
 	if !ok {

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package config
 import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
+	"net/netip"
 	"net/url"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -11,6 +12,8 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
+
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/forwarded"
 )
 
 func TestLoad(t *testing.T) {
@@ -293,6 +296,48 @@ func TestLoad(t *testing.T) {
 			env:     with(map[string]string{EnvSessionMax: "719h"}),
 			badVars: []string{EnvSessionMax},
 		},
+		{
+			name: "trusted proxy IP",
+			env:  with(map[string]string{EnvTrustedProxy: "10.60.1.33"}),
+		},
+		{
+			name: "trusted proxy IPs and CIDRs",
+			env:  with(map[string]string{EnvTrustedProxy: "10.60.1.33, 172.16.0.0/12,2001:db8::/32,::1"}),
+		},
+		{
+			name: "blank trusted proxy trusts no peer",
+			env:  with(map[string]string{EnvTrustedProxy: "  "}),
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "trusted proxy not an IP",
+			env:     with(map[string]string{EnvTrustedProxy: "traefik"}),
+			badVars: []string{EnvTrustedProxy},
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "trusted proxy invalid CIDR",
+			env:     with(map[string]string{EnvTrustedProxy: "10.60.1.0/33"}),
+			badVars: []string{EnvTrustedProxy},
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "trusted proxy CIDR with host bits",
+			env:     with(map[string]string{EnvTrustedProxy: "10.60.1.33/24"}),
+			badVars: []string{EnvTrustedProxy},
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "trusted proxy empty entry",
+			env:     with(map[string]string{EnvTrustedProxy: "10.60.1.33,,10.60.1.34"}),
+			badVars: []string{EnvTrustedProxy},
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "trusted proxy trusting everyone",
+			env:     with(map[string]string{EnvTrustedProxy: "0.0.0.0/0"}),
+			badVars: []string{EnvTrustedProxy},
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "trusted proxy with port",
+			env:     with(map[string]string{EnvTrustedProxy: "10.60.1.33:443"}),
+			badVars: []string{EnvTrustedProxy},
+		},
 		{
 			name: "several invalid values are all named",
 			env: with(map[string]string{
@@ -402,8 +447,13 @@ func TestLoadValues(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("SessionIdle, SessionMax = %v, %v, want defaults 720h, 4320h", cfg.SessionIdle, cfg.SessionMax)
 	}
 
+	if cfg.TrustedProxy != nil {
+		t.Errorf("TrustedProxy = %v, want none when unset", cfg.TrustedProxy)
+	}
+
 	env[EnvSessionIdle] = "12h"
 	env[EnvSessionMax] = "36h"
+	env[EnvTrustedProxy] = "10.60.1.33, 172.16.0.0/12"
 	cfg, err = load(func(k string) (string, bool) { v, ok := env[k]; return v, ok })
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("load() error = %v", err)
@@ -411,6 +461,10 @@ func TestLoadValues(t *testing.T) {
 	if cfg.SessionIdle != 12*time.Hour || cfg.SessionMax != 36*time.Hour {
 		t.Errorf("SessionIdle, SessionMax = %v, %v, want 12h, 36h", cfg.SessionIdle, cfg.SessionMax)
 	}
+	want := forwarded.Trusted{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.60.1.33/32"), netip.MustParsePrefix("172.16.0.0/12")}
+	if !slices.Equal(cfg.TrustedProxy, want) {
+		t.Errorf("TrustedProxy = %v, want %v", cfg.TrustedProxy, want)
+	}
 }
 
 func TestSecretRedacted(t *testing.T) {

internal/forwarded/forwarded.go

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+// Package forwarded resolves where a request really came from. The service
+// runs behind a reverse proxy (Traefik), so the TCP peer is usually the proxy;
+// the X-Forwarded-For and X-Forwarded-Proto headers it adds are believed only
+// when the peer is a trusted proxy. From anyone else they are ignored, so a
+// client cannot spoof its address or scheme.
+package forwarded
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/netip"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// Header names honoured from trusted proxies.
+const (
+	HeaderFor   = "X-Forwarded-For"
+	HeaderProto = "X-Forwarded-Proto"
+)
+
+// ErrInvalidHeader marks a malformed forwarded header from a trusted peer.
+var ErrInvalidHeader = errors.New("invalid forwarded header")
+
+// Trusted is the set of proxy addresses whose forwarded headers are honoured.
+// The zero value trusts no peer.
+type Trusted []netip.Prefix
+
+// ParseTrusted parses a comma-separated list of IP addresses and CIDR
+// prefixes. A blank list trusts no peer. Each entry must be a plain address
+// or a prefix with no host bits set; zones, IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms and
+// zero-length prefixes, which would trust every peer, are rejected.
+func ParseTrusted(s string) (Trusted, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(s) == "" {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	var t Trusted
+	for _, entry := range strings.Split(s, ",") {
+		entry = strings.TrimSpace(entry)
+		if entry == "" {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("empty entry in comma-separated list %q", s)
+		}
+		p, err := parseEntry(entry)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		t = append(t, p)
+	}
+	return t, nil
+}
+
+func parseEntry(entry string) (netip.Prefix, error) {
+	var p netip.Prefix
+	if strings.Contains(entry, "/") {
+		var err error
+		p, err = netip.ParsePrefix(entry)
+		if err != nil {
+			return netip.Prefix{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid CIDR %q", entry)
+		}
+		if p != p.Masked() {
+			return netip.Prefix{}, fmt.Errorf("CIDR %q has host bits set (did you mean %s?)", entry, p.Masked())
+		}
+	} else {
+		a, err := netip.ParseAddr(entry)
+		if err != nil {
+			return netip.Prefix{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid IP address %q", entry)
+		}
+		if a.Zone() != "" {
+			return netip.Prefix{}, fmt.Errorf("IP address %q must not have a zone", entry)
+		}
+		p = netip.PrefixFrom(a, a.BitLen())
+	}
+	switch {
+	case p.Addr().Is4In6():
+		return netip.Prefix{}, fmt.Errorf("%q is IPv4-mapped IPv6; write the IPv4 form", entry)
+	case p.Bits() == 0:
+		return netip.Prefix{}, fmt.Errorf("%q would trust every peer", entry)
+	}
+	return p, nil
+}
+
+// Contains reports whether a is a trusted proxy address. IPv4-mapped IPv6
+// addresses, as a dual-stack listener reports IPv4 peers, match their IPv4
+// form.
+func (t Trusted) Contains(a netip.Addr) bool {
+	a = normalize(a)
+	for _, p := range t {
+		if p.Contains(a) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func normalize(a netip.Addr) netip.Addr { return a.Unmap().WithZone("") }
+
+// Origin is where a request came from.
+type Origin struct {
+	// ClientIP is the client's address.
+	ClientIP netip.Addr
+	// Scheme is "https" or "http": the scheme the client used.
+	Scheme string
+}
+
+// Resolve works out r's Origin. When the TCP peer (r.RemoteAddr) is not in
+// trusted, both forwarded headers are ignored: the client is the peer and the
+// scheme is that of the connection.
+//
+// When the peer is trusted:
+//   - X-Forwarded-For entries (across all its header lines, in order) are
+//     walked right to left, skipping trusted proxy addresses; the first
+//     untrusted address is the client. Entries left of it are client-supplied
+//     and not examined. If every entry is trusted the leftmost is the client;
+//     with no X-Forwarded-For the peer is the client.
+//   - X-Forwarded-Proto, if present, must be a single "http" or "https" and
+//     is the scheme; without it the connection's scheme is used.
+//
+// A malformed header from a trusted peer is an error wrapping
+// ErrInvalidHeader; any other error means RemoteAddr is not an IP and port.
+func Resolve(r *http.Request, trusted Trusted) (Origin, error) {
+	peer, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(r.RemoteAddr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Origin{}, fmt.Errorf("peer address %q is not an IP and port", r.RemoteAddr)
+	}
+	o := Origin{ClientIP: normalize(peer.Addr()), Scheme: "http"}
+	if r.TLS != nil {
+		o.Scheme = "https"
+	}
+	if !trusted.Contains(o.ClientIP) {
+		return o, nil
+	}
+	if values := r.Header.Values(HeaderFor); len(values) > 0 {
+		o.ClientIP, err = clientFromChain(strings.Split(strings.Join(values, ","), ","), trusted)
+		if err != nil {
+			return Origin{}, err
+		}
+	}
+	switch values := r.Header.Values(HeaderProto); len(values) {
+	case 0:
+	case 1:
+		switch scheme := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(values[0])); scheme {
+		case "http", "https":
+			o.Scheme = scheme
+		default:
+			return Origin{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s %q is not http or https", ErrInvalidHeader, HeaderProto, values[0])
+		}
+	default:
+		return Origin{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %d %s headers, want one", ErrInvalidHeader, len(values), HeaderProto)
+	}
+	return o, nil
+}
+
+// clientFromChain returns the rightmost untrusted address in chain, or the
+// leftmost address when all are trusted.
+func clientFromChain(chain []string, trusted Trusted) (netip.Addr, error) {
+	var client netip.Addr
+	for i := len(chain) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
+		a, err := netip.ParseAddr(strings.TrimSpace(chain[i]))
+		if err != nil {
+			return netip.Addr{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s entry %q is not an IP address", ErrInvalidHeader, HeaderFor, strings.TrimSpace(chain[i]))
+		}
+		client = normalize(a)
+		if !trusted.Contains(client) {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	return client, nil
+}
+
+type contextKey struct{}
+
+// NewContext returns ctx carrying o.
+func NewContext(ctx context.Context, o Origin) context.Context {
+	return context.WithValue(ctx, contextKey{}, o)
+}
+
+// FromContext returns the Origin ctx carries; ok is false when the request
+// was not resolved.
+func FromContext(ctx context.Context) (o Origin, ok bool) {
+	o, ok = ctx.Value(contextKey{}).(Origin)
+	return o, ok
+}
+
+// ClientIP returns the resolved client address ctx carries.
+func ClientIP(ctx context.Context) (netip.Addr, bool) {
+	o, ok := FromContext(ctx)
+	return o.ClientIP, ok
+}
+
+// Scheme returns the resolved request scheme ctx carries.
+func Scheme(ctx context.Context) (string, bool) {
+	o, ok := FromContext(ctx)
+	return o.Scheme, ok
+}
+
+// LogAttr is the log attribute key for the resolved client address.
+const LogAttr = "client_ip"
+
+// LogHandler wraps h so every record logged with a resolved request's
+// context carries the client address as LogAttr.
+func LogHandler(h slog.Handler) slog.Handler { return logHandler{h} }
+
+type logHandler struct{ slog.Handler }
+
+func (h logHandler) Handle(ctx context.Context, rec slog.Record) error {
+	if ip, ok := ClientIP(ctx); ok {
+		rec = rec.Clone()
+		rec.AddAttrs(slog.String(LogAttr, ip.String()))
+	}
+	return h.Handler.Handle(ctx, rec)
+}
+
+func (h logHandler) WithAttrs(attrs []slog.Attr) slog.Handler {
+	return logHandler{h.Handler.WithAttrs(attrs)}
+}
+
+func (h logHandler) WithGroup(name string) slog.Handler {
+	return logHandler{h.Handler.WithGroup(name)}
+}

internal/forwarded/forwarded_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+package forwarded
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"errors"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/netip"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestParseTrusted(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	tests := []struct {
+		in      string
+		want    []string
+		wantErr string
+	}{
+		{in: "", want: nil},
+		{in: "   ", want: nil},
+		{in: "10.60.1.33", want: []string{"10.60.1.33/32"}},
+		{in: "10.60.1.33, 172.16.0.0/12", want: []string{"10.60.1.33/32", "172.16.0.0/12"}},
+		{in: "2001:db8::1,2001:db8::/32", want: []string{"2001:db8::1/128", "2001:db8::/32"}},
+		{in: "traefik", wantErr: "invalid IP address"},
+		{in: "10.60.1.33:443", wantErr: "invalid IP address"},
+		{in: "10.60.1.0/33", wantErr: "invalid CIDR"},
+		{in: "10.60.1.33/24", wantErr: "did you mean 10.60.1.0/24"},
+		{in: "10.60.1.33,,10.60.1.34", wantErr: "empty entry"},
+		{in: "10.60.1.33,", wantErr: "empty entry"},
+		{in: "fe80::1%eth0", wantErr: "zone"},
+		{in: "::ffff:10.60.1.33", wantErr: "IPv4-mapped"},
+		{in: "0.0.0.0/0", wantErr: "every peer"},
+		{in: "::/0", wantErr: "every peer"},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		got, err := ParseTrusted(tt.in)
+		if tt.wantErr != "" {
+			if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErr) {
+				t.Errorf("ParseTrusted(%q) error = %v, want one containing %q", tt.in, err, tt.wantErr)
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("ParseTrusted(%q) error = %v", tt.in, err)
+			continue
+		}
+		var gotStr []string
+		for _, p := range got {
+			gotStr = append(gotStr, p.String())
+		}
+		if !slices.Equal(gotStr, tt.want) {
+			t.Errorf("ParseTrusted(%q) = %v, want %v", tt.in, gotStr, tt.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTrustedContainsMappedIPv4(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	trusted := mustTrusted(t, "10.60.1.33")
+	if !trusted.Contains(netip.MustParseAddr("::ffff:10.60.1.33")) {
+		t.Error("IPv4-mapped form of a trusted address is not trusted")
+	}
+	if Trusted(nil).Contains(netip.MustParseAddr("10.60.1.33")) {
+		t.Error("an empty set trusts a peer")
+	}
+}
+
+func mustTrusted(t *testing.T, s string) Trusted {
+	t.Helper()
+	tr, err := ParseTrusted(s)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return tr
+}
+
+func TestResolve(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	// 10.60.1.33 is Traefik; 10.60.2.0/24 is an inner proxy tier.
+	trusted := mustTrusted(t, "10.60.1.33,10.60.2.0/24")
+	tests := []struct {
+		name       string
+		peer       string
+		tls        bool
+		xff        []string
+		xfp        []string
+		wantIP     string
+		wantScheme string
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "untrusted peer, no headers",
+			peer: "198.51.100.9:5000", wantIP: "198.51.100.9", wantScheme: "http",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "untrusted peer over TLS",
+			peer: "198.51.100.9:5000", tls: true, wantIP: "198.51.100.9", wantScheme: "https",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "untrusted peer spoofing both headers is ignored",
+			peer: "198.51.100.9:5000", xff: []string{"203.0.113.7"}, xfp: []string{"https"},
+			wantIP: "198.51.100.9", wantScheme: "http",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "untrusted peer's malformed headers are ignored, not rejected",
+			peer: "198.51.100.9:5000", xff: []string{"not-an-ip"}, xfp: []string{"gopher"},
+			wantIP: "198.51.100.9", wantScheme: "http",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "trusted peer: client from X-Forwarded-For, scheme from X-Forwarded-Proto",
+			peer: "10.60.1.33:41000", xff: []string{"203.0.113.7"}, xfp: []string{"https"},
+			wantIP: "203.0.113.7", wantScheme: "https",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "trusted peer seen as IPv4-mapped IPv6",
+			peer: "[::ffff:10.60.1.33]:41000", xff: []string{"203.0.113.7"}, xfp: []string{"https"},
+			wantIP: "203.0.113.7", wantScheme: "https",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "trusted peer without headers is itself the client",
+			peer: "10.60.1.33:41000", wantIP: "10.60.1.33", wantScheme: "http",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "rightmost untrusted address wins over a client-supplied prefix",
+			peer: "10.60.1.33:41000", xff: []string{"1.2.3.4, 203.0.113.7"}, xfp: []string{"https"},
+			wantIP: "203.0.113.7", wantScheme: "https",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "trusted proxies in the chain are skipped",
+			peer: "10.60.1.33:41000", xff: []string{"1.2.3.4, 203.0.113.7, 10.60.2.5"}, xfp: []string{"https"},
+			wantIP: "203.0.113.7", wantScheme: "https",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "several header lines form one chain",
+			peer: "10.60.1.33:41000", xff: []string{"1.2.3.4", "203.0.113.7, 10.60.2.5"},
+			wantIP: "203.0.113.7", wantScheme: "http",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "garbage left of the client is not examined",
+			peer: "10.60.1.33:41000", xff: []string{"spoofed, 203.0.113.7"},
+			wantIP: "203.0.113.7", wantScheme: "http",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "all trusted: leftmost is the client",
+			peer: "10.60.1.33:41000", xff: []string{"10.60.2.5, 10.60.2.6"},
+			wantIP: "10.60.2.5", wantScheme: "http",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "IPv6 client",
+			peer: "10.60.1.33:41000", xff: []string{"2001:db8::7"}, xfp: []string{"HTTPS"},
+			wantIP: "2001:db8::7", wantScheme: "https",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "trusted peer may downgrade to http",
+			peer: "10.60.1.33:41000", tls: true, xfp: []string{"http"},
+			wantIP: "10.60.1.33", wantScheme: "http",
+		},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			r := request(tt.peer, tt.xff, tt.xfp)
+			if tt.tls {
+				r.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{}
+			}
+			o, err := Resolve(r, trusted)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Resolve error = %v", err)
+			}
+			if o.ClientIP.String() != tt.wantIP || o.Scheme != tt.wantScheme {
+				t.Errorf("Resolve = %s %s, want %s %s", o.ClientIP, o.Scheme, tt.wantIP, tt.wantScheme)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveRejectsMalformedHeadersFromTrustedPeer(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	trusted := mustTrusted(t, "10.60.1.33")
+	for _, tt := range []struct {
+		name     string
+		xff, xfp []string
+	}{
+		{"X-Forwarded-For not an IP", []string{"not-an-ip"}, nil},
+		{"X-Forwarded-For with a port", []string{"203.0.113.7:5000"}, nil},
+		{"X-Forwarded-For empty entry", []string{"203.0.113.7, "}, nil},
+		{"X-Forwarded-For empty", []string{""}, nil},
+		{"X-Forwarded-Proto unknown scheme", nil, []string{"ftp"}},
+		{"X-Forwarded-Proto list", nil, []string{"https, http"}},
+		{"X-Forwarded-Proto repeated", nil, []string{"https", "https"}},
+	} {
+		_, err := Resolve(request("10.60.1.33:41000", tt.xff, tt.xfp), trusted)
+		if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidHeader) {
+			t.Errorf("%s: Resolve error = %v, want ErrInvalidHeader", tt.name, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveBadPeerAddress(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	r := request("@", nil, nil)
+	_, err := Resolve(r, nil)
+	if err == nil || errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidHeader) {
+		t.Errorf("Resolve error = %v, want a peer address error", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func request(peer string, xff, xfp []string) *http.Request {
+	r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	r.RemoteAddr = peer
+	for _, v := range xff {
+		r.Header.Add(HeaderFor, v)
+	}
+	for _, v := range xfp {
+		r.Header.Add(HeaderProto, v)
+	}
+	return r
+}
+
+func TestContextHelpers(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	if _, ok := ClientIP(context.Background()); ok {
+		t.Error("ClientIP ok on an unresolved context")
+	}
+	if _, ok := Scheme(context.Background()); ok {
+		t.Error("Scheme ok on an unresolved context")
+	}
+	ctx := NewContext(context.Background(), Origin{ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"), Scheme: "https"})
+	if ip, ok := ClientIP(ctx); !ok || ip.String() != "203.0.113.7" {
+		t.Errorf("ClientIP = %s %v, want 203.0.113.7 true", ip, ok)
+	}
+	if s, ok := Scheme(ctx); !ok || s != "https" {
+		t.Errorf("Scheme = %q %v, want https true", s, ok)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLogHandler(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	logger := slog.New(LogHandler(slog.NewTextHandler(&buf, nil))).With("component", "test")
+	ctx := NewContext(context.Background(), Origin{ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"), Scheme: "https"})
+
+	logger.InfoContext(ctx, "resolved")
+	logger.InfoContext(context.Background(), "unresolved")
+
+	lines := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()), "\n")
+	if len(lines) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("logged %d lines, want 2: %q", len(lines), buf.String())
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(lines[0], "client_ip=203.0.113.7") || !strings.Contains(lines[0], "component=test") {
+		t.Errorf("resolved line = %q, want client_ip and the With attribute", lines[0])
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(lines[1], "client_ip") {
+		t.Errorf("unresolved line = %q, want no client_ip", lines[1])
+	}
+}

internal/household/week.go

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+// Package household owns household-local calendar and clock logic. Every
+// function works in the household's IANA zone, passed explicitly, and never
+// in the process zone (time.Local).
+//
+// Weeks are ISO weeks: Monday to Sunday, numbered by ISO 8601, so the period
+// key of 2026-12-28 is "2026-W53" and of 2027-01-04 is "2027-W01".
+//
+// Calendar arithmetic is done on UTC midnights, which have no DST, so a date
+// plus seven days is always the same weekday a week later.
+package household
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/store"
+)
+
+// Today returns the household-local date at instant now in zone loc.
+func Today(now time.Time, loc *time.Location) store.LocalDate {
+	return store.LocalDateOf(now.In(loc))
+}
+
+// WeekStart returns the ISO Monday of the week containing d. It panics if d is
+// the zero LocalDate.
+func WeekStart(d store.LocalDate) store.LocalDate {
+	t := midnightUTC(d)
+	// Weekday counts from Sunday = 0; shift so Monday = 0 and Sunday = 6.
+	sinceMonday := (int(t.Weekday()) + 6) % 7
+	return store.LocalDateOf(t.AddDate(0, 0, -sinceMonday))
+}
+
+// WeekDays returns the seven dates Monday to Sunday of the week starting on
+// weekStart. It is an error if weekStart is not a Monday.
+func WeekDays(weekStart store.LocalDate) ([7]store.LocalDate, error) {
+	t, err := monday(weekStart)
+	if err != nil {
+		return [7]store.LocalDate{}, err
+	}
+	var days [7]store.LocalDate
+	for i := range days {
+		days[i] = store.LocalDateOf(t.AddDate(0, 0, i))
+	}
+	return days, nil
+}
+
+// WeekLabel returns the display label of the week starting on weekStart, such
+// as "Week 41 · Oct 5 – 11", or "Week 40 · Sep 28 – Oct 4" when the week
+// spans two months. It is an error if weekStart is not a Monday.
+func WeekLabel(weekStart store.LocalDate) (string, error) {
+	start, err := monday(weekStart)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	_, week := start.ISOWeek()
+	end := start.AddDate(0, 0, 6)
+	if end.Month() == start.Month() {
+		return fmt.Sprintf("Week %d · %s – %d", week, start.Format("Jan 2"), end.Day()), nil
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("Week %d · %s – %s", week, start.Format("Jan 2"), end.Format("Jan 2")), nil
+}
+
+// PeriodKey returns the ISO week key of the week containing d, such as
+// "2026-W41". The year is the ISO week-numbering year, which differs from the
+// calendar year around New Year. It panics if d is the zero LocalDate.
+func PeriodKey(d store.LocalDate) string {
+	year, week := midnightUTC(d).ISOWeek()
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%04d-W%02d", year, week)
+}
+
+// LocalTime returns the instant at which household clocks in zone loc read
+// hhmm (24-hour "HH:MM") on date d.
+//
+// DST rule: a wall time that does not exist (spring forward) or occurs twice
+// (fall back) is read with the UTC offset in effect before the transition. A
+// skipped time therefore moves forward by the length of the gap (02:30 on a
+// day clocks jump 02:00→03:00 is 03:30), and a repeated time is its first
+// occurrence. The rule assumes at most one offset change in the 48 hours
+// around the wall time, which holds for every real zone.
+func LocalTime(loc *time.Location, d store.LocalDate, hhmm string) (time.Time, error) {
+	if d.IsZero() {
+		return time.Time{}, errors.New("household: zero date")
+	}
+	clock, err := time.Parse("15:04", hhmm)
+	if err != nil || clock.Format("15:04") != hhmm {
+		return time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("household: invalid time %q: want HH:MM", hhmm)
+	}
+	y, m, day := d.Date()
+	// wall is the wall-clock reading expressed as if it were UTC; the real
+	// instant is wall minus the zone's UTC offset at that instant.
+	wall := time.Date(y, m, day, clock.Hour(), clock.Minute(), 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	before := offset(wall.Add(-24*time.Hour), loc)
+	after := offset(wall.Add(24*time.Hour), loc)
+	early := wall.Add(-before)
+	late := wall.Add(-after)
+	// Use the post-transition offset only when the pre-transition reading is
+	// not a real wall time and the post-transition one is.
+	if offset(early, loc) != before && offset(late, loc) == after {
+		return late.In(loc), nil
+	}
+	return early.In(loc), nil
+}
+
+// offset returns the UTC offset of zone loc at instant t.
+func offset(t time.Time, loc *time.Location) time.Duration {
+	_, secs := t.In(loc).Zone()
+	return time.Duration(secs) * time.Second
+}
+
+// midnightUTC returns d as midnight UTC. It panics if d is the zero LocalDate.
+func midnightUTC(d store.LocalDate) time.Time {
+	if d.IsZero() {
+		panic("household: zero date")
+	}
+	y, m, day := d.Date()
+	return time.Date(y, m, day, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+}
+
+// monday returns weekStart as midnight UTC, or an error if it is not a Monday.
+func monday(weekStart store.LocalDate) (time.Time, error) {
+	if weekStart.IsZero() {
+		return time.Time{}, errors.New("household: zero week start")
+	}
+	t := midnightUTC(weekStart)
+	if t.Weekday() != time.Monday {
+		return time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("household: week start %s is a %s, want Monday", weekStart, t.Weekday())
+	}
+	return t, nil
+}

internal/household/week_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+package household
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/store"
+)
+
+// TestMain runs the package with the process zone set to UTC, so any use of
+// time.Local in place of the household zone shows up as a failure.
+func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
+	time.Local = time.UTC
+	m.Run()
+}
+
+func loadZone(t *testing.T, name string) *time.Location {
+	t.Helper()
+	loc, err := time.LoadLocation(name)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LoadLocation(%q): %v", name, err)
+	}
+	return loc
+}
+
+func date(t *testing.T, s string) store.LocalDate {
+	t.Helper()
+	d, err := store.ParseLocalDate(s)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return d
+}
+
+func utc(t *testing.T, s string) time.Time {
+	t.Helper()
+	ts, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, s)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return ts
+}
+
+func TestTodayUsesHouseholdZone(t *testing.T) {
+	chicago := loadZone(t, "America/Chicago")
+	auckland := loadZone(t, "Pacific/Auckland")
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		now  string
+		loc  *time.Location
+		want string
+	}{
+		// 2026-10-05T04:30Z is Sunday 23:30 in Chicago (CDT, UTC−5) and
+		// Monday 17:30 in Auckland (NZDT, UTC+13).
+		{"2026-10-05T04:30:00Z", chicago, "2026-10-04"},
+		{"2026-10-05T04:30:00Z", auckland, "2026-10-05"},
+		// 2026-10-04T11:30Z is Sunday 06:30 in Chicago and already Monday
+		// 00:30 in Auckland.
+		{"2026-10-04T11:30:00Z", chicago, "2026-10-04"},
+		{"2026-10-04T11:30:00Z", auckland, "2026-10-05"},
+	} {
+		if got := Today(utc(t, tc.now), tc.loc).String(); got != tc.want {
+			t.Errorf("Today(%s, %s) = %s, want %s", tc.now, tc.loc, got, tc.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSundayNightMondayMorningWeekAssignment(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		zone, now     string
+		wantDay       string
+		wantWeekStart string
+		wantPeriodKey string
+		wantWeekday   time.Weekday
+	}{
+		// Sunday 23:59 local belongs to the week that started the previous
+		// Monday; one minute later, Monday 00:00 starts a new week.
+		{"America/Chicago", "2026-10-12T04:59:00Z", "2026-10-11", "2026-10-05", "2026-W41", time.Sunday},
+		{"America/Chicago", "2026-10-12T05:00:00Z", "2026-10-12", "2026-10-12", "2026-W42", time.Monday},
+		{"Pacific/Auckland", "2026-10-11T10:59:00Z", "2026-10-11", "2026-10-05", "2026-W41", time.Sunday},
+		{"Pacific/Auckland", "2026-10-11T11:00:00Z", "2026-10-12", "2026-10-12", "2026-W42", time.Monday},
+	} {
+		loc := loadZone(t, tc.zone)
+		now := utc(t, tc.now)
+		if wd := now.In(loc).Weekday(); wd != tc.wantWeekday {
+			t.Fatalf("%s in %s is %s, want %s", tc.now, tc.zone, wd, tc.wantWeekday)
+		}
+		today := Today(now, loc)
+		if today.String() != tc.wantDay {
+			t.Errorf("Today(%s, %s) = %s, want %s", tc.now, tc.zone, today, tc.wantDay)
+		}
+		if got := WeekStart(today).String(); got != tc.wantWeekStart {
+			t.Errorf("WeekStart(%s) = %s, want %s", today, got, tc.wantWeekStart)
+		}
+		if got := PeriodKey(today); got != tc.wantPeriodKey {
+			t.Errorf("PeriodKey(%s) = %s, want %s", today, got, tc.wantPeriodKey)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWeekStartEveryWeekday(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, d := range []string{
+		"2026-10-05", "2026-10-06", "2026-10-07", "2026-10-08",
+		"2026-10-09", "2026-10-10", "2026-10-11",
+	} {
+		if got := WeekStart(date(t, d)).String(); got != "2026-10-05" {
+			t.Errorf("WeekStart(%s) = %s, want 2026-10-05", d, got)
+		}
+	}
+	if got := WeekStart(date(t, "2026-10-12")).String(); got != "2026-10-12" {
+		t.Errorf("WeekStart(2026-10-12) = %s, want 2026-10-12", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWeekDays(t *testing.T) {
+	days, err := WeekDays(date(t, "2026-09-28"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	want := []string{
+		"2026-09-28", "2026-09-29", "2026-09-30", "2026-10-01",
+		"2026-10-02", "2026-10-03", "2026-10-04",
+	}
+	for i, d := range days {
+		if d.String() != want[i] {
+			t.Errorf("WeekDays[%d] = %s, want %s", i, d, want[i])
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWeekDaysAcrossDSTChange(t *testing.T) {
+	// Chicago falls back on Sunday 2026-11-01 and Auckland springs forward on
+	// Sunday 2026-09-27; neither shifts the dates of those weeks.
+	for _, tc := range []struct{ start, last string }{
+		{"2026-10-26", "2026-11-01"},
+		{"2026-09-21", "2026-09-27"},
+		{"2026-03-02", "2026-03-08"},
+	} {
+		days, err := WeekDays(date(t, tc.start))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if days[0].String() != tc.start || days[6].String() != tc.last {
+			t.Errorf("WeekDays(%s) = %s … %s, want %s … %s", tc.start, days[0], days[6], tc.start, tc.last)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestISOWeekYearBoundary(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct{ day, weekStart, key string }{
+		{"2026-12-27", "2026-12-21", "2026-W52"},
+		{"2026-12-28", "2026-12-28", "2026-W53"},
+		{"2026-12-31", "2026-12-28", "2026-W53"},
+		{"2027-01-01", "2026-12-28", "2026-W53"},
+		{"2027-01-03", "2026-12-28", "2026-W53"},
+		{"2027-01-04", "2027-01-04", "2027-W01"},
+		{"2027-01-10", "2027-01-04", "2027-W01"},
+		{"2026-01-01", "2025-12-29", "2026-W01"},
+		{"2026-10-07", "2026-10-05", "2026-W41"},
+	} {
+		d := date(t, tc.day)
+		if got := WeekStart(d).String(); got != tc.weekStart {
+			t.Errorf("WeekStart(%s) = %s, want %s", tc.day, got, tc.weekStart)
+		}
+		if got := PeriodKey(d); got != tc.key {
+			t.Errorf("PeriodKey(%s) = %s, want %s", tc.day, got, tc.key)
+		}
+	}
+	days, err := WeekDays(date(t, "2026-12-28"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if days[6].String() != "2027-01-03" {
+		t.Errorf("W53 Sunday = %s, want 2027-01-03", days[6])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWeekLabel(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct{ start, want string }{
+		{"2026-10-05", "Week 41 · Oct 5 – 11"},
+		{"2026-09-28", "Week 40 · Sep 28 – Oct 4"},
+		{"2026-12-28", "Week 53 · Dec 28 – Jan 3"},
+		{"2027-01-04", "Week 1 · Jan 4 – 10"},
+	} {
+		got, err := WeekLabel(date(t, tc.start))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if got != tc.want {
+			t.Errorf("WeekLabel(%s) = %q, want %q", tc.start, got, tc.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWeekStartRequired(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, d := range []store.LocalDate{date(t, "2026-10-07"), date(t, "2026-10-11"), {}} {
+		if _, err := WeekDays(d); err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("WeekDays(%s) succeeded, want error", d)
+		}
+		if _, err := WeekLabel(d); err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("WeekLabel(%s) succeeded, want error", d)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestZeroDatePanics(t *testing.T) {
+	for name, fn := range map[string]func(){
+		"WeekStart": func() { WeekStart(store.LocalDate{}) },
+		"PeriodKey": func() { PeriodKey(store.LocalDate{}) },
+	} {
+		func() {
+			defer func() {
+				if recover() == nil {
+					t.Errorf("%s(zero) did not panic", name)
+				}
+			}()
+			fn()
+		}()
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLocalTime(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		zone, day, hhmm string
+		want            string // UTC instant
+		wantWall        string // local wall clock of the result
+	}{
+		// Ordinary days.
+		{"America/Chicago", "2026-10-05", "18:30", "2026-10-05T23:30:00Z", "2026-10-05 18:30 CDT"},
+		{"America/Chicago", "2026-12-28", "00:00", "2026-12-28T06:00:00Z", "2026-12-28 00:00 CST"},
+		{"Pacific/Auckland", "2026-10-05", "18:30", "2026-10-05T05:30:00Z", "2026-10-05 18:30 NZDT"},
+		{"Pacific/Auckland", "2026-07-01", "23:59", "2026-07-01T11:59:00Z", "2026-07-01 23:59 NZST"},
+
+		// Chicago spring forward, Sunday 2026-03-08: 02:00 CST → 03:00 CDT.
+		{"America/Chicago", "2026-03-08", "01:59", "2026-03-08T07:59:00Z", "2026-03-08 01:59 CST"},
+		{"America/Chicago", "2026-03-08", "02:00", "2026-03-08T08:00:00Z", "2026-03-08 03:00 CDT"},
+		{"America/Chicago", "2026-03-08", "02:30", "2026-03-08T08:30:00Z", "2026-03-08 03:30 CDT"},
+		{"America/Chicago", "2026-03-08", "03:00", "2026-03-08T08:00:00Z", "2026-03-08 03:00 CDT"},
+		{"America/Chicago", "2026-03-08", "03:30", "2026-03-08T08:30:00Z", "2026-03-08 03:30 CDT"},
+
+		// Chicago fall back, Sunday 2026-11-01: 02:00 CDT → 01:00 CST, so
+		// 01:00–01:59 happens twice; the first (CDT) occurrence is chosen.
+		{"America/Chicago", "2026-11-01", "00:59", "2026-11-01T05:59:00Z", "2026-11-01 00:59 CDT"},
+		{"America/Chicago", "2026-11-01", "01:00", "2026-11-01T06:00:00Z", "2026-11-01 01:00 CDT"},
+		{"America/Chicago", "2026-11-01", "01:30", "2026-11-01T06:30:00Z", "2026-11-01 01:30 CDT"},
+		{"America/Chicago", "2026-11-01", "02:00", "2026-11-01T08:00:00Z", "2026-11-01 02:00 CST"},
+
+		// Auckland spring forward, Sunday 2026-09-27: 02:00 NZST → 03:00 NZDT.
+		{"Pacific/Auckland", "2026-09-27", "01:59", "2026-09-26T13:59:00Z", "2026-09-27 01:59 NZST"},
+		{"Pacific/Auckland", "2026-09-27", "02:30", "2026-09-26T14:30:00Z", "2026-09-27 03:30 NZDT"},
+		{"Pacific/Auckland", "2026-09-27", "03:00", "2026-09-26T14:00:00Z", "2026-09-27 03:00 NZDT"},
+
+		// Auckland fall back, Sunday 2026-04-05: 03:00 NZDT → 02:00 NZST, so
+		// 02:00–02:59 happens twice; the first (NZDT) occurrence is chosen.
+		{"Pacific/Auckland", "2026-04-05", "01:59", "2026-04-04T12:59:00Z", "2026-04-05 01:59 NZDT"},
+		{"Pacific/Auckland", "2026-04-05", "02:30", "2026-04-04T13:30:00Z", "2026-04-05 02:30 NZDT"},
+		{"Pacific/Auckland", "2026-04-05", "03:00", "2026-04-04T15:00:00Z", "2026-04-05 03:00 NZST"},
+	} {
+		loc := loadZone(t, tc.zone)
+		got, err := LocalTime(loc, date(t, tc.day), tc.hhmm)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("LocalTime(%s, %s, %s): %v", tc.zone, tc.day, tc.hhmm, err)
+		}
+		if !got.Equal(utc(t, tc.want)) {
+			t.Errorf("LocalTime(%s, %s, %s) = %s, want %s", tc.zone, tc.day, tc.hhmm, got.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339), tc.want)
+		}
+		if wall := got.Format("2006-01-02 15:04 MST"); wall != tc.wantWall {
+			t.Errorf("LocalTime(%s, %s, %s) wall = %s, want %s", tc.zone, tc.day, tc.hhmm, wall, tc.wantWall)
+		}
+		if got.Location() != loc {
+			t.Errorf("LocalTime(%s, …) location = %s, want %s", tc.zone, got.Location(), loc)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLocalTimeDeterministic(t *testing.T) {
+	// The same ambiguous or skipped input always resolves to the same instant.
+	chicago := loadZone(t, "America/Chicago")
+	for _, tc := range []struct{ day, hhmm string }{{"2026-03-08", "02:30"}, {"2026-11-01", "01:30"}} {
+		first, err := LocalTime(chicago, date(t, tc.day), tc.hhmm)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		for range 100 {
+			again, err := LocalTime(chicago, date(t, tc.day), tc.hhmm)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			if !again.Equal(first) {
+				t.Fatalf("LocalTime(%s, %s) = %s then %s", tc.day, tc.hhmm, first, again)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLocalTimeRejectsInvalid(t *testing.T) {
+	chicago := loadZone(t, "America/Chicago")
+	d := date(t, "2026-10-05")
+	for _, hhmm := range []string{
+		"", "9:30", "09:3", "24:00", "23:60", "09:30:00", "0930", " 09:30", "09:30 ", "9am", "-1:00",
+	} {
+		if got, err := LocalTime(chicago, d, hhmm); err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("LocalTime(%q) = %s, want error", hhmm, got)
+		} else if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HH:MM") {
+			t.Errorf("LocalTime(%q) error %q does not name the HH:MM form", hhmm, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if _, err := LocalTime(chicago, store.LocalDate{}, "09:30"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("LocalTime(zero date) succeeded")
+	}
+}

internal/secretbox/secretbox.go

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+// Package secretbox encrypts secrets at rest with AES-256-GCM. It is the only
+// owner of secret encryption: every _ct column holds a token produced by
+// Box.Encrypt, laid out as nonce ‖ ciphertext.
+//
+// Errors from this package never contain plaintext, ciphertext or key
+// material.
+package secretbox
+
+import (
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+)
+
+// KeySize is the decoded key length in bytes (AES-256).
+const KeySize = 32
+
+var (
+	// ErrKeyEncoding means the key is not valid standard base64.
+	ErrKeyEncoding = errors.New("secretbox: key is not valid standard base64")
+	// ErrKeyLength means the decoded key is not exactly KeySize bytes.
+	ErrKeyLength = errors.New("secretbox: key must decode to exactly 32 bytes")
+	// ErrMalformed means a token is too short to hold a nonce and tag.
+	ErrMalformed = errors.New("secretbox: token is too short")
+	// ErrDecrypt means a token failed authentication: it was corrupted or
+	// sealed under a different key.
+	ErrDecrypt = errors.New("secretbox: token failed authentication")
+)
+
+// Box seals and opens secrets under one key. It is safe for concurrent use.
+type Box struct {
+	aead cipher.AEAD
+}
+
+// New returns a Box for encodedKey, the standard-base64 encoding of a
+// KeySize-byte key.
+func New(encodedKey string) (*Box, error) {
+	key, err := base64.StdEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(encodedKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		// The decoder's error is not wrapped: it describes the key's content.
+		return nil, ErrKeyEncoding
+	}
+	if len(key) != KeySize {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w, got %d", ErrKeyLength, len(key))
+	}
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("secretbox: %w", err)
+	}
+	aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("secretbox: %w", err)
+	}
+	return &Box{aead: aead}, nil
+}
+
+// Encrypt seals plaintext under a fresh random nonce and returns
+// nonce ‖ ciphertext.
+func (b *Box) Encrypt(plaintext []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	nonce := make([]byte, b.aead.NonceSize(), b.aead.NonceSize()+len(plaintext)+b.aead.Overhead())
+	if _, err := rand.Read(nonce); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("secretbox: generate nonce: %w", err)
+	}
+	return b.aead.Seal(nonce, nonce, plaintext, nil), nil
+}
+
+// Decrypt authenticates and opens a token produced by Encrypt.
+func (b *Box) Decrypt(token []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	n := b.aead.NonceSize()
+	if len(token) < n+b.aead.Overhead() {
+		return nil, ErrMalformed
+	}
+	plaintext, err := b.aead.Open(nil, token[:n], token[n:], nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, ErrDecrypt
+	}
+	return plaintext, nil
+}

internal/secretbox/secretbox_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+package secretbox
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// newKey returns a fresh random key and its standard-base64 encoding.
+func newKey(t *testing.T) ([]byte, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	key := make([]byte, KeySize)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(key); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return key, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(key)
+}
+
+func newBox(t *testing.T) (*Box, []byte, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	key, encoded := newKey(t)
+	box, err := New(encoded)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return box, key, encoded
+}
+
+// assertNoLeak fails if err's message contains any of the secrets, either
+// raw or base64-encoded.
+func assertNoLeak(t *testing.T, err error, secrets ...[]byte) {
+	t.Helper()
+	msg := err.Error()
+	for _, s := range secrets {
+		if len(s) == 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+		for _, form := range []string{string(s), base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(s), base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(s)} {
+			if strings.Contains(msg, form) {
+				t.Errorf("error %q leaks secret material %q", msg, form)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	box, _, _ := newBox(t)
+	for _, plaintext := range [][]byte{
+		[]byte("ya29.oauth-refresh-token"),
+		{},
+		bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x00, 0xff}, 4096),
+	} {
+		token, err := box.Encrypt(plaintext)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if len(plaintext) > 0 && bytes.Contains(token, plaintext) {
+			t.Errorf("token contains the plaintext")
+		}
+		got, err := box.Decrypt(token)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(got, plaintext) {
+			t.Errorf("Decrypt = %q, want %q", got, plaintext)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTokenLayout(t *testing.T) {
+	box, _, _ := newBox(t)
+	plaintext := []byte("secret")
+	token, err := box.Encrypt(plaintext)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// nonce (12) ‖ ciphertext (len(plaintext)) ‖ GCM tag (16).
+	if want := 12 + len(plaintext) + 16; len(token) != want {
+		t.Errorf("token length = %d, want %d", len(token), want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEncryptUsesFreshNonce(t *testing.T) {
+	box, _, _ := newBox(t)
+	plaintext := []byte("same plaintext")
+	a, err := box.Encrypt(plaintext)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	b, err := box.Encrypt(plaintext)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if bytes.Equal(a, b) {
+		t.Fatal("two encryptions of the same plaintext are identical")
+	}
+	if bytes.Equal(a[:12], b[:12]) {
+		t.Error("two encryptions reused the same nonce")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDecryptRejectsFlippedByte(t *testing.T) {
+	box, key, encoded := newBox(t)
+	plaintext := []byte("do-not-leak-me")
+	token, err := box.Encrypt(plaintext)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Flip one bit in every position: nonce, ciphertext and tag.
+	for i := range token {
+		tampered := bytes.Clone(token)
+		tampered[i] ^= 0x01
+		got, err := box.Decrypt(tampered)
+		if !errors.Is(err, ErrDecrypt) {
+			t.Fatalf("byte %d flipped: Decrypt = %q, %v; want ErrDecrypt", i, got, err)
+		}
+		if got != nil {
+			t.Errorf("byte %d flipped: Decrypt returned plaintext alongside the error", i)
+		}
+		assertNoLeak(t, err, plaintext, key, []byte(encoded), tampered)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDecryptRejectsWrongKey(t *testing.T) {
+	box, key, encoded := newBox(t)
+	other, otherKey, otherEncoded := newBox(t)
+	plaintext := []byte("do-not-leak-me")
+	token, err := box.Encrypt(plaintext)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	got, err := other.Decrypt(token)
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrDecrypt) {
+		t.Fatalf("Decrypt with wrong key = %q, %v; want ErrDecrypt", got, err)
+	}
+	assertNoLeak(t, err, plaintext, key, []byte(encoded), otherKey, []byte(otherEncoded), token)
+}
+
+func TestDecryptRejectsShortToken(t *testing.T) {
+	box, _, _ := newBox(t)
+	for _, n := range []int{0, 1, 12, 12 + 15} {
+		token := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xab}, n)
+		if _, err := box.Decrypt(token); !errors.Is(err, ErrMalformed) {
+			t.Errorf("Decrypt(%d bytes) error = %v, want ErrMalformed", n, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNewRejectsBadKey(t *testing.T) {
+	key, _ := newKey(t)
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		encoded string
+		want    error
+	}{
+		{"empty", "", ErrKeyLength},
+		{"not base64", "not*base64!" + strings.Repeat("A", 33), ErrKeyEncoding},
+		{"url-safe alphabet", strings.Repeat("_-", 22), ErrKeyEncoding},
+		{"unpadded", base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(key), ErrKeyEncoding},
+		{"raw key bytes", string(key), ErrKeyEncoding},
+		{"too short", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(key[:31]), ErrKeyLength},
+		{"too long", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(append(bytes.Clone(key), 0x00)), ErrKeyLength},
+		{"AES-128 length", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(key[:16]), ErrKeyLength},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			box, err := New(tt.encoded)
+			if !errors.Is(err, tt.want) {
+				t.Fatalf("New error = %v, want %v", err, tt.want)
+			}
+			if box != nil {
+				t.Error("New returned a Box alongside the error")
+			}
+			assertNoLeak(t, err, key, []byte(tt.encoded))
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNewAcceptsBase64Key(t *testing.T) {
+	key, encoded := newKey(t)
+	box, err := New(encoded)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// A Box built from the same key opens tokens sealed by the first.
+	token, err := box.Encrypt([]byte("x"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	again, err := New(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(key))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := again.Decrypt(token); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("same key failed to decrypt: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/server/csrf.go

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/auth"
+)
+
+// CSRFHeader carries the session's CSRF token, which the client reads from
+// GET /api/v1/me.
+const CSRFHeader = "X-MealQuest-CSRF"
+
+// requireCSRF passes GET requests to next; every other
+// request must carry CSRFHeader equal to its session's CSRF token or get 403
+// csrf. It runs behind requireSession, which puts the session in the context.
+func requireCSRF(logger *slog.Logger) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	forbidden := apiErrorHandler(logger, http.StatusForbidden, "csrf", "missing or invalid CSRF token")
+	internal := apiErrorHandler(logger, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal", "internal error")
+	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+		return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			switch r.Method {
+			case http.MethodGet:
+				next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+				return
+			}
+			s, ok := auth.SessionFrom(r.Context())
+			if !ok || s.CSRFToken == "" {
+				// An empty token would match a missing header.
+				logger.ErrorContext(r.Context(), "csrf check without a session token", "session", ok)
+				internal(w, r)
+				return
+			}
+			if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(r.Header.Get(CSRFHeader)), []byte(s.CSRFToken)) != 1 {
+				forbidden(w, r)
+				return
+			}
+			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/server/csrf_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/auth"
+)
+
+const (
+	csrfJSON             = `{"error":{"code":"csrf","message":"missing or invalid CSRF token","retryable":false}}`
+	methodNotAllowedJSON = `{"error":{"code":"method_not_allowed","message":"method not allowed","retryable":false}}`
+)
+
+func TestCSRFThroughRouter(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	router := newTestRouter(t, "dev")
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name, method, path string
+		header             []string // nil sends no CSRF header
+		wantStatus         int
+		wantBody           string
+	}{
+		{"POST without header", http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/me", nil, http.StatusForbidden, csrfJSON},
+		{"POST with wrong header", http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/me", []string{"wrong-token"}, http.StatusForbidden, csrfJSON},
+		{"POST with empty header", http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/me", []string{""}, http.StatusForbidden, csrfJSON},
+		{"POST with token prefix", http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/me", []string{"csrf-token"}, http.StatusForbidden, csrfJSON},
+		{"PATCH without header", http.MethodPatch, "/api/v1/settings/household", nil, http.StatusForbidden, csrfJSON},
+		{"DELETE with wrong header", http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/me", []string{"wrong-token"}, http.StatusForbidden, csrfJSON},
+		// The right token passes the check and reaches the router, which has
+		// no POST /api/v1/me.
+		{"POST with right header", http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/me", []string{testSession.CSRFToken}, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, methodNotAllowedJSON},
+		{"PATCH with right header", http.MethodPatch, "/api/v1/settings/household", []string{testSession.CSRFToken}, http.StatusNotFound, notFoundJSON},
+		{"GET without header", http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/me", nil, http.StatusOK, ""},
+		// Only GET is exempt; HEAD and OPTIONS need the header too.
+		{"HEAD without header", http.MethodHead, "/api/v1/me", nil, http.StatusForbidden, csrfJSON},
+		{"OPTIONS without header", http.MethodOptions, "/api/v1/me", nil, http.StatusForbidden, csrfJSON},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			req := httptest.NewRequest(tc.method, tc.path, nil)
+			req.AddCookie(validSessionCookie)
+			if tc.header != nil {
+				req.Header.Set(CSRFHeader, tc.header[0])
+			}
+			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+			if rec.Code != tc.wantStatus {
+				t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d (body %s)", rec.Code, tc.wantStatus, rec.Body.String())
+			}
+			if tc.wantBody != "" && rec.Body.String() != tc.wantBody {
+				t.Errorf("body = %s, want %s", rec.Body.String(), tc.wantBody)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCSRFUnauthenticatedGets401(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/me", nil)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	newTestRouter(t, "dev").ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized || rec.Body.String() != unauthenticatedJSON {
+		t.Errorf("response = %d %s, want 401 %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String(), unauthenticatedJSON)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequireCSRF(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name       string
+		method     string
+		session    *auth.Session
+		header     string
+		wantStatus int
+	}{
+		{"right header reaches handler", http.MethodPost, &testSession, testSession.CSRFToken, http.StatusNoContent},
+		{"wrong header", http.MethodPut, &testSession, "nope", http.StatusForbidden},
+		{"GET needs no header", http.MethodGet, &testSession, "", http.StatusNoContent},
+		{"HEAD needs the header", http.MethodHead, &testSession, "", http.StatusForbidden},
+		{"OPTIONS needs the header", http.MethodOptions, &testSession, "", http.StatusForbidden},
+		{"no session in context", http.MethodPost, nil, "", http.StatusInternalServerError},
+		{"session without token", http.MethodPost, &auth.Session{Subject: "user-123"}, "", http.StatusInternalServerError},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			called := false
+			h := requireCSRF(logger)(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+				called = true
+				w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+			}))
+			ctx := context.Background()
+			if tc.session != nil {
+				ctx = auth.WithSession(ctx, *tc.session)
+			}
+			req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, tc.method, "/api/v1/anything", nil)
+			if tc.header != "" {
+				req.Header.Set(CSRFHeader, tc.header)
+			}
+			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+			if rec.Code != tc.wantStatus {
+				t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, tc.wantStatus)
+			}
+			if called != (tc.wantStatus == http.StatusNoContent) {
+				t.Errorf("handler called = %v with status %d", called, rec.Code)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMe(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/me", nil)
+	req.AddCookie(validSessionCookie)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	newTestRouter(t, "dev").ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200 (body %s)", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	if ct := rec.Header().Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/json" {
+		t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want application/json", ct)
+	}
+	if cc := rec.Header().Get("Cache-Control"); cc != "no-store" {
+		t.Errorf("Cache-Control = %q, want no-store", cc)
+	}
+	var got map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &got); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode %s: %v", rec.Body.String(), err)
+	}
+	want := map[string]any{
+		"name":      "Home Cook",
+		"email":     "cook@example.com",
+		"household": map[string]any{"label": "Our kitchen"},
+		"csrfToken": "csrf-token-123",
+	}
+	gotJSON, _ := json.Marshal(got)
+	wantJSON, _ := json.Marshal(want)
+	if string(gotJSON) != string(wantJSON) {
+		t.Errorf("body = %s, want %s", gotJSON, wantJSON)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMeNeedsSession(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	newTestRouter(t, "dev").ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/me", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized || rec.Body.String() != unauthenticatedJSON {
+		t.Errorf("response = %d %s, want 401 %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String(), unauthenticatedJSON)
+	}
+}

internal/server/login_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"testing"
+	"testing/fstest"
+	"time"
+
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/auth"
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/forwarded"
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/store"
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/migrations"
+)
+
+// newDiscoveryProvider serves the OIDC discovery document auth.New needs;
+// login only redirects to its authorization endpoint.
+func newDiscoveryProvider(t *testing.T) *httptest.Server {
+	t.Helper()
+	var srv *httptest.Server
+	srv = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.URL.Path != "/.well-known/openid-configuration" {
+			http.NotFound(w, r)
+			return
+		}
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
+			"issuer":                                srv.URL,
+			"authorization_endpoint":                srv.URL + "/authorize",
+			"token_endpoint":                        srv.URL + "/token",
+			"jwks_uri":                              srv.URL + "/jwks",
+			"userinfo_endpoint":                     srv.URL + "/userinfo",
+			"end_session_endpoint":                  srv.URL + "/end-session/",
+			"response_types_supported":              []string{"code"},
+			"subject_types_supported":               []string{"public"},
+			"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": []string{"RS256"},
+		})
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+	return srv
+}
+
+// newLoginRouter wires the production router as cmd/server does: the real
+// auth flow and session manager, trusting Traefik only.
+func newLoginRouter(t *testing.T, issuer string) http.Handler {
+	t.Helper()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	db, err := store.Open(ctx, t.TempDir())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
+			t.Error(err)
+		}
+	})
+	if err := store.Migrate(ctx, db.Writer, migrations.FS); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	sessions, err := auth.NewSessionManager(db, 720*time.Hour, 4320*time.Hour)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	logger := slog.New(forwarded.LogHandler(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)))
+	flow, err := auth.New(ctx, auth.Config{
+		Issuer:        issuer,
+		ClientID:      "mealquest",
+		ClientSecret:  "client-s3cret",
+		PublicURL:     &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "meals.example.com"},
+		SecretKey:     []byte("server-secret-key"),
+		AllowedGroups: []string{"mealquest-admin"},
+	}, sessions, logger)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	trusted, err := forwarded.ParseTrusted(traefik)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	r, err := NewRouter(logger, "dev", trusted, flow, sessions,
+		fstest.MapFS{"index.html": {Data: []byte(fixtureIndex)}})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return r
+}
+
+// TestLoginThroughRouter starts a login through the production router. The
+// redirect URI and the Secure login cookie come from MEALQUEST_PUBLIC_URL
+// whatever the direct peer: forwarded headers from an untrusted peer are
+// ignored but never fail sign-in.
+func TestLoginThroughRouter(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	provider := newDiscoveryProvider(t)
+	router := newLoginRouter(t, provider.URL)
+	// Traefik reaches the service over plain http on its internal address;
+	// the host headers must not leak into the redirect URI.
+	headers := map[string]string{
+		forwarded.HeaderFor:   "203.0.113.7",
+		forwarded.HeaderProto: "https",
+		"X-Forwarded-Host":    "evil.example.com",
+	}
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		peer string
+	}{
+		{"trusted proxy", traefik + ":41000"},
+		{"untrusted peer", "172.17.0.1:5000"},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			router.ServeHTTP(rec, originRequest("http://mealquest:8080"+auth.LoginPath, tt.peer, headers))
+			resp := rec.Result()
+			if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusFound {
+				t.Fatalf("login status = %d, want 302", resp.StatusCode)
+			}
+			loc, err := url.Parse(resp.Header.Get("Location"))
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			if got, want := loc.Scheme+"://"+loc.Host+loc.Path, provider.URL+"/authorize"; got != want {
+				t.Errorf("redirect to %s, want %s", got, want)
+			}
+			if got, want := loc.Query().Get("redirect_uri"), "https://meals.example.com/auth/callback"; got != want {
+				t.Errorf("redirect_uri = %q, want %q from the public URL", got, want)
+			}
+			cookies := resp.Cookies()
+			if len(cookies) != 1 || cookies[0].Name != "__Host-mealquest_login" || !cookies[0].Secure || !cookies[0].HttpOnly {
+				t.Errorf("login cookies = %v, want one Secure, HttpOnly __Host-mealquest_login", cookies)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/server/me.go

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/auth"
+)
+
+// householdLabel is the single shared household identity.
+const householdLabel = "Our kitchen"
+
+type meResponse struct {
+	Name      string        `json:"name"`
+	Email     string        `json:"email"`
+	Household householdInfo `json:"household"`
+	CSRFToken string        `json:"csrfToken"`
+}
+
+type householdInfo struct {
+	Label string `json:"label"`
+}
+
+// me answers GET /api/v1/me with the signed-in member, the household and the
+// session's CSRF token for CSRFHeader.
+func me(logger *slog.Logger) http.HandlerFunc {
+	internal := apiErrorHandler(logger, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal", "internal error")
+	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		s, ok := auth.SessionFrom(r.Context())
+		if !ok {
+			logger.ErrorContext(r.Context(), "GET /api/v1/me without a session")
+			internal(w, r)
+			return
+		}
+		body, err := json.Marshal(meResponse{
+			Name:      s.Name,
+			Email:     s.Email,
+			Household: householdInfo{Label: householdLabel},
+			CSRFToken: s.CSRFToken,
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			panic(err) // string fields cannot fail to marshal
+		}
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		if _, err := w.Write(body); err != nil {
+			logger.WarnContext(r.Context(), "write me response", "error", err)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/server/origin.go

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/forwarded"
+)
+
+// resolveOrigin resolves every request's client address and scheme with
+// forwarded.Resolve and puts them in the context (read them with
+// forwarded.ClientIP and forwarded.Scheme). Forwarded headers are honoured
+// only from a peer in trusted. A malformed forwarded header from a trusted
+// peer gets 400 bad_request.
+func resolveOrigin(logger *slog.Logger, trusted forwarded.Trusted) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	badRequest := apiErrorHandler(logger, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "invalid forwarded headers")
+	internal := apiErrorHandler(logger, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal", "internal error")
+	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+		return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			o, err := forwarded.Resolve(r, trusted)
+			switch {
+			case errors.Is(err, forwarded.ErrInvalidHeader):
+				logger.WarnContext(r.Context(), "rejected forwarded headers", "peer", r.RemoteAddr, "error", err)
+				badRequest(w, r)
+			case err != nil:
+				logger.ErrorContext(r.Context(), "resolve request origin", "error", err)
+				internal(w, r)
+			default:
+				next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(forwarded.NewContext(r.Context(), o)))
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/server/origin_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+	"testing/fstest"
+
+	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/forwarded"
+)
+
+// traefik is the production proxy's address.
+const traefik = "10.60.1.33"
+
+// probeAuth mounts GET /auth/probe, which reports the request's resolved
+// origin, in place of the real auth flow.
+type probeAuth struct{}
+
+func (probeAuth) Mount(r chi.Router) {
+	r.Get("/auth/probe", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		ip, ipOK := forwarded.ClientIP(r.Context())
+		scheme, schemeOK := forwarded.Scheme(r.Context())
+		if !ipOK || !schemeOK {
+			http.Error(w, "origin not resolved", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+			return
+		}
+		fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s %s", ip, scheme)
+	})
+}
+
+// newOriginRouter builds the production router trusting Traefik, logging
+// through forwarded.LogHandler as cmd/server does.
+func newOriginRouter(t *testing.T, logs io.Writer) http.Handler {
+	t.Helper()
+	trusted, err := forwarded.ParseTrusted(traefik)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	logger := slog.New(forwarded.LogHandler(slog.NewJSONHandler(logs, nil)))
+	r, err := NewRouter(logger, "dev", trusted, probeAuth{}, stubSessions{},
+		fstest.MapFS{"index.html": {Data: []byte(fixtureIndex)}})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return r
+}
+
+func originRequest(target, peer string, headers map[string]string) *http.Request {
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, target, nil)
+	req.RemoteAddr = peer
+	for k, v := range headers {
+		req.Header.Set(k, v)
+	}
+	return req
+}
+
+func TestRouterResolvesOrigin(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	spoofed := map[string]string{forwarded.HeaderFor: "203.0.113.7", forwarded.HeaderProto: "https"}
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		peer string
+		want string
+	}{
+		{"trusted proxy's forwarded headers are honoured", traefik + ":41000", "203.0.113.7 https"},
+		{"untrusted peer spoofing them is ignored", "198.51.100.9:5000", "198.51.100.9 http"},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			newOriginRouter(t, io.Discard).ServeHTTP(rec, originRequest("/auth/probe", tt.peer, spoofed))
+			if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || rec.Body.String() != tt.want {
+				t.Errorf("probe = %d %q, want 200 %q", rec.Code, rec.Body.String(), tt.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRouterLogsResolvedClientIP(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	spoofed := map[string]string{forwarded.HeaderFor: "203.0.113.7", forwarded.HeaderProto: "https"}
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		peer string
+		want string
+	}{
+		{"trusted proxy", traefik + ":41000", "203.0.113.7"},
+		{"untrusted peer spoofing", "198.51.100.9:5000", "198.51.100.9"},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			var logs bytes.Buffer
+			// A failed session lookup is logged with the request's context.
+			req := originRequest("/api/v1/me", tt.peer, spoofed)
+			req.AddCookie(brokenSessionCookie)
+			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			newOriginRouter(t, &logs).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+			if rec.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
+				t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 500", rec.Code)
+			}
+			var line map[string]any
+			if err := json.Unmarshal(logs.Bytes(), &line); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("log %q: %v", logs.String(), err)
+			}
+			if line["msg"] != "look up session" || line[forwarded.LogAttr] != tt.want {
+				t.Errorf("log = %v, want the session error with %s=%s", line, forwarded.LogAttr, tt.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRouterRejectsMalformedForwardedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	const badRequestJSON = `{"error":{"code":"bad_request","message":"invalid forwarded headers","retryable":false}}`
+	for _, headers := range []map[string]string{
+		{forwarded.HeaderFor: "not-an-ip"},
+		{forwarded.HeaderProto: "ftp"},
+	} {
+		var logs bytes.Buffer
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		newOriginRouter(t, &logs).ServeHTTP(rec, originRequest("/health", traefik+":41000", headers))
+		if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || rec.Body.String() != badRequestJSON {
+			t.Errorf("%v: response = %d %s, want 400 %s", headers, rec.Code, rec.Body.String(), badRequestJSON)
+		}
+		if !bytes.Contains(logs.Bytes(), []byte("rejected forwarded headers")) {
+			t.Errorf("%v: logs = %q, want the rejection logged", headers, logs.String())
+		}
+
+		// The same headers from an untrusted peer are not examined at all.
+		rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
+		newOriginRouter(t, io.Discard).ServeHTTP(rec, originRequest("/health", "198.51.100.9:5000", headers))
+		if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Errorf("%v from an untrusted peer: status = %d, want 200", headers, rec.Code)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/server/server.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
 
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/forwarded"
 	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/frontend"
 )
 
@@ -21,10 +22,13 @@ type RouteMounter interface {
 	Mount(r chi.Router)
 }
 
-// NewRouter returns the HTTP handler for the service. version is reported by
-// GET /health; auth mounts the /auth routes; assets is the web build served
-// for every other GET.
-func NewRouter(logger *slog.Logger, version string, auth RouteMounter, assets fs.FS) (http.Handler, error) {
+// NewRouter returns the HTTP handler for the service. Every request first
+// has its client address and scheme resolved, honouring forwarded headers
+// only from a peer in trusted (see resolveOrigin). version is reported by
+// GET /health; auth mounts the /auth routes; sessions guards /api/v1 and
+// /media; assets is the web build served for every other GET. /health, /auth
+// and the web build are public. Requests to /api/v1 other than GET also need the session's CSRF token in CSRFHeader.
+func NewRouter(logger *slog.Logger, version string, trusted forwarded.Trusted, auth RouteMounter, sessions SessionLookup, assets fs.FS) (http.Handler, error) {
 	notFound := apiErrorHandler(logger, http.StatusNotFound, "not_found", "not found")
 	methodNotAllowed := apiErrorHandler(logger, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "method_not_allowed", "method not allowed")
 
@@ -34,18 +38,31 @@ func NewRouter(logger *slog.Logger, version string, auth RouteMounter, assets fs
 	}
 
 	r := chi.NewRouter()
+	r.Use(resolveOrigin(logger, trusted))
 	r.MethodNotAllowed(methodNotAllowed)
 	r.NotFound(notFound)
 
 	r.Get("/health", health(logger, version))
 	auth.Mount(r)
+	// The session middleware wraps the whole /api/v1 and /media subrouters
+	// rather than being added with Use: chi skips a subrouter's middleware
+	// when it has no routes, which would leave it unguarded.
+	signedIn := requireSession(logger, sessions)
+	csrf := requireCSRF(logger)
+	apiV1, media := chi.NewRouter(), chi.NewRouter()
+	for _, sub := range []*chi.Mux{apiV1, media} {
+		sub.MethodNotAllowed(methodNotAllowed)
+		sub.NotFound(notFound)
+	}
+	apiV1.Get("/me", me(logger))
 	r.Route("/api", func(r chi.Router) {
 		r.MethodNotAllowed(methodNotAllowed)
 		r.NotFound(notFound)
+		r.Mount("/v1", signedIn(csrf(apiV1)))
 	})
-	// Catch-all for the PWA. Unknown /auth paths and /media (no routes yet)
-	// reach the frontend handler, which passes them to notFound rather than
-	// the SPA fallback.
+	r.Mount("/media", signedIn(media))
+	// Catch-all for the PWA. Unknown /auth paths reach the frontend handler,
+	// which passes them to notFound rather than the SPA fallback.
 	r.Method(http.MethodGet, "/*", web)
 	r.Method(http.MethodHead, "/*", web)
 	return r, nil

internal/server/server_test.go

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ func newTestRouter(t *testing.T, version string) http.Handler {
 		"index.html":             {Data: []byte(fixtureIndex)},
 		"assets/index-AbC123.js": {Data: []byte(fixtureAsset)},
 	}
-	r, err := NewRouter(logger, version, stubAuth{}, assets)
+	r, err := NewRouter(logger, version, nil, stubAuth{}, stubSessions{}, assets)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
@@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ func TestReservedPathsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
 	}{
 		{http.MethodGet, "/api"},
 		{http.MethodGet, "/api/unknown"},
+		{http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/unknown"},
+		{http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/unknown"},
 		{http.MethodPost, "/api/unknown"},
 		{http.MethodGet, "/auth/unknown"},
 		{http.MethodGet, "/media/photo.jpg"},
@@ -137,8 +139,13 @@ func TestReservedPathsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Run(tt.method+" "+tt.path, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 
+			// Signed in with the CSRF token, so /api/v1 and /media reach
+			// their routers.
+			req := httptest.NewRequest(tt.method, tt.path, nil)
+			req.AddCookie(validSessionCookie)
+			req.Header.Set(CSRFHeader, testSession.CSRFToken)
 			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
-			router.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(tt.method, tt.path, nil))
+			router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
 
 			if rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
 				t.Errorf("status = %d, want 404", rec.Code)

internal/server/session.go

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/auth"
+)
+
+// SessionLookup finds the live session a request carries; it returns
+// auth.ErrNoSession when there is none. *auth.SessionManager implements it.
+type SessionLookup interface {
+	SessionFor(r *http.Request) (auth.Session, error)
+}
+
+// requireSession is the RequireSession middleware. It passes requests with a
+// live session to next with the session in the context (read it with
+// auth.SessionFrom or auth.ActorFrom); others get 401 unauthenticated.
+func requireSession(logger *slog.Logger, sessions SessionLookup) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	unauthenticated := apiErrorHandler(logger, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthenticated", "sign in required")
+	internal := apiErrorHandler(logger, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal", "internal error")
+	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+		return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			s, err := sessions.SessionFor(r)
+			switch {
+			case errors.Is(err, auth.ErrNoSession):
+				unauthenticated(w, r)
+			case err != nil:
+				logger.ErrorContext(r.Context(), "look up session", "error", err)
+				internal(w, r)
+			default:
+				next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(auth.WithSession(r.Context(), s)))
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/server/session_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"slices"
+	"testing"
+
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/auth"
+)
+
+const (
+	unauthenticatedJSON = `{"error":{"code":"unauthenticated","message":"sign in required","retryable":false}}`
+	internalJSON        = `{"error":{"code":"internal","message":"internal error","retryable":false}}`
+)
+
+var (
+	validSessionCookie  = &http.Cookie{Name: auth.SessionCookieName, Value: "valid"}
+	brokenSessionCookie = &http.Cookie{Name: auth.SessionCookieName, Value: "broken"}
+	testSession         = auth.Session{
+		Subject:   "user-123",
+		Email:     "cook@example.com",
+		Name:      "Home Cook",
+		Groups:    []string{"mealquest-admin"},
+		CSRFToken: "csrf-token-123",
+	}
+)
+
+// stubSessions knows one valid session cookie; the broken cookie fails the
+// lookup as a database error would.
+type stubSessions struct{}
+
+func (stubSessions) SessionFor(r *http.Request) (auth.Session, error) {
+	c, err := r.Cookie(auth.SessionCookieName)
+	switch {
+	case err != nil:
+		return auth.Session{}, auth.ErrNoSession
+	case c.Value == validSessionCookie.Value:
+		return testSession, nil
+	case c.Value == brokenSessionCookie.Value:
+		return auth.Session{}, errors.New("database down")
+	default:
+		return auth.Session{}, auth.ErrNoSession
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProtectedPathsRequireSession(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	router := newTestRouter(t, "dev")
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		method, path string
+		cookie       *http.Cookie
+	}{
+		{http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/settings/household", nil},
+		{http.MethodPatch, "/api/v1/settings/household", nil},
+		{http.MethodGet, "/api/v1", nil},
+		{http.MethodGet, "/media/photo.jpg", nil},
+		{http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/settings/household", &http.Cookie{Name: auth.SessionCookieName, Value: "unknown"}},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.method+" "+tc.path, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			req := httptest.NewRequest(tc.method, tc.path, nil)
+			if tc.cookie != nil {
+				req.AddCookie(tc.cookie)
+			}
+			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+			if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+				t.Errorf("status = %d, want 401", rec.Code)
+			}
+			if ct := rec.Header().Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/json" {
+				t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want application/json", ct)
+			}
+			if got := rec.Body.String(); got != unauthenticatedJSON {
+				t.Errorf("body = %s, want %s", got, unauthenticatedJSON)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPublicPathsNeedNoSession(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	router := newTestRouter(t, "dev")
+	for _, path := range []string{"/health", "/auth/login", "/", "/assets/index-AbC123.js", "/quests/42"} {
+		t.Run(path, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			router.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, path, nil))
+			if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+				t.Errorf("GET %s without a cookie = %d, want 200", path, rec.Code)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSessionLookupFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/settings/household", nil)
+	req.AddCookie(brokenSessionCookie)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	newTestRouter(t, "dev").ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError || rec.Body.String() != internalJSON {
+		t.Errorf("response = %d %s, want 500 %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String(), internalJSON)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequireSessionAttachesActor(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var got auth.Actor
+	var ok bool
+	next := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		got, ok = auth.ActorFrom(r.Context())
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+	})
+	h := requireSession(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), stubSessions{})(next)
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/settings/household", nil)
+	req.AddCookie(validSessionCookie)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want the handler's 204", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if !ok || got.Subject != "user-123" || got.Email != "cook@example.com" || got.Name != "Home Cook" ||
+		!slices.Equal(got.Groups, []string{"mealquest-admin"}) {
+		t.Errorf("actor = %+v (ok=%v), want the session's household member", got, ok)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequireSessionStopsUnauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	called := false
+	next := http.HandlerFunc(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) { called = true })
+	h := requireSession(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), stubSessions{})(next)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/settings/household", nil))
+
+	if called || rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Errorf("handler called = %v, status = %d; want not called and 401", called, rec.Code)
+	}
+}

internal/store/time.go

@@ -86,6 +86,17 @@ func ParseLocalDate(s string) (LocalDate, error) {
 	return LocalDate{t.Year(), t.Month(), t.Day()}, nil
 }
 
+// LocalDateOf returns the calendar date of t in t's own location.
+func LocalDateOf(t time.Time) LocalDate {
+	y, m, d := t.Date()
+	return LocalDate{y, m, d}
+}
+
+// Date returns the year, month and day of d.
+func (d LocalDate) Date() (year int, month time.Month, day int) {
+	return d.year, d.month, d.day
+}
+
 // String returns the YYYY-MM-DD form.
 func (d LocalDate) String() string {
 	return fmt.Sprintf("%04d-%02d-%02d", d.year, int(d.month), d.day)
@@ -96,11 +107,15 @@ func (d LocalDate) IsZero() bool {
 	return d == LocalDate{}
 }
 
-// Value implements driver.Valuer. The zero LocalDate is an error.
+// Value implements driver.Valuer. The zero LocalDate is an error, as is a
+// year outside 0000–9999, which the four-digit stored form cannot represent.
 func (d LocalDate) Value() (driver.Value, error) {
 	if d.IsZero() {
 		return nil, errors.New("store: zero LocalDate")
 	}
+	if d.year < 0 || d.year > 9999 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: LocalDate year %d outside 0000-9999", d.year)
+	}
 	return d.String(), nil
 }
 

internal/store/time_test.go

@@ -102,6 +102,25 @@ func TestLocalDateRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestLocalDateOf(t *testing.T) {
+	auckland, err := time.LoadLocation("Pacific/Auckland")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// 2026-10-03T20:00Z is already 2026-10-04 in Auckland (UTC+13).
+	instant := time.Date(2026, time.October, 3, 20, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	if got := LocalDateOf(instant).String(); got != "2026-10-03" {
+		t.Errorf("LocalDateOf(UTC) = %s, want 2026-10-03", got)
+	}
+	d := LocalDateOf(instant.In(auckland))
+	if got := d.String(); got != "2026-10-04" {
+		t.Errorf("LocalDateOf(Auckland) = %s, want 2026-10-04", got)
+	}
+	if y, m, day := d.Date(); y != 2026 || m != time.October || day != 4 {
+		t.Errorf("Date() = %d-%d-%d, want 2026-10-4", y, m, day)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestLocalDateRejectsInvalid(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, str := range []string{
 		"", "2026-02-30", "2026-02-29", "2026-13-01", "2026-00-10", "2026-10-00",
@@ -119,6 +138,12 @@ func TestLocalDateRejectsInvalid(t *testing.T) {
 	if _, err := (LocalDate{}).Value(); err == nil {
 		t.Error("zero LocalDate Value succeeded")
 	}
+	for _, y := range []int{-1, 10000} {
+		d := LocalDateOf(time.Date(y, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC))
+		if _, err := d.Value(); err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("LocalDate year %d Value succeeded", y)
+		}
+	}
 	var d LocalDate
 	if err := d.Scan(nil); err == nil {
 		t.Error("Scan(nil) succeeded")