A saved copy of the signed login cookie verified until it expired, so the callback accepted it again with a second valid authorization code. The login now records its state as pending and the callback consumes it, refusing a replay with the same 400 as a state mismatch. The pending-state set moves from gcal into auth as PendingStates, so login and the Google Calendar connect share one mechanism. It is in memory, so a flow started before a restart fails closed after it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
+13
-2
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ type Auth struct {
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provider *oidc.Provider
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client *http.Client
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cookie loginCookie
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pending *PendingStates
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sessions Sessions
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allowed []string
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// endSessionURL is the provider's end_session_endpoint; logout ends
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@@ -157,6 +158,7 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, sessions Sessions, logger *slog.Logger
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client: client,
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allowed: slices.Clone(cfg.AllowedGroups),
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cookie: newLoginCookie(cfg.SecretKey),
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pending: NewPendingStates(loginCookieTTL),
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sessions: sessions,
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endSessionURL: discovered.EndSessionURI,
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logger: logger,
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@@ -250,11 +252,13 @@ func (a *Auth) login(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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Verifier: oauth2.GenerateVerifier(),
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Return: returnTo,
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}
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if err := a.cookie.set(w, state, time.Now()); err != nil {
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now := time.Now()
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if err := a.cookie.set(w, state, now); err != nil {
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a.logger.ErrorContext(r.Context(), "set login cookie", "error", err)
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http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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a.pending.Add(state.State, now)
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http.Redirect(w, r, a.oauth.AuthCodeURL(state.State,
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oidc.Nonce(state.Nonce),
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oauth2.S256ChallengeOption(state.Verifier),
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@@ -262,7 +266,7 @@ func (a *Auth) login(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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}
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// callback completes the flow: it checks state against the login cookie,
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// exchanges the code, verifies the ID token and nonce, then starts a session
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// consumes it, exchanges the code, verifies the ID token and nonce, then starts a session
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// if the account is in an allowed group. Membership is checked on every
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// login, so an account removed from the group is refused at its next one.
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func (a *Auth) callback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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@@ -283,6 +287,13 @@ func (a *Auth) callback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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http.Error(w, "sign-in state mismatch; start again", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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// A copy of the cookie verifies until it expires, so the state is
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// single-use only because it is consumed here.
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if !a.pending.Consume(state.State) {
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a.logger.WarnContext(ctx, "login callback state already used")
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http.Error(w, "sign-in state mismatch; start again", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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if q.Get("error") != "" {
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// error and error_description are provider-supplied text; only the
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// fixed category is logged.
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@@ -497,6 +497,59 @@ func TestCallbackDefaultReturnPath(t *testing.T) {
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}
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}
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// A saved copy of the login cookie still verifies until it expires, so a
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// replay with a second valid code is refused only because the server
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// consumed the state on first use.
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func TestCallbackRefusesReplayedLoginState(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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h := newHarness(t)
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l := h.login(t, LoginPath)
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idToken := h.provider.signRS256(h.provider.claims(l.query.Get("nonce")))
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if resp := h.callback(l, l.query.Get("state"), idToken); resp.StatusCode != http.StatusSeeOther {
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t.Fatalf("first callback status = %d, want 303", resp.StatusCode)
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}
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resp := h.callback(l, l.query.Get("state"), idToken)
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest {
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t.Errorf("replayed callback status = %d, want 400", resp.StatusCode)
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}
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if n := len(h.sessions.started()); n != 1 {
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t.Errorf("%d sessions started, want 1", n)
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}
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assertLoginCookieCleared(t, resp)
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}
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// Pending login states live in memory, so a login started before a restart
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// fails closed after it even though its cookie still verifies.
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func TestCallbackRefusesLoginStartedBeforeRestart(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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h := newHarness(t)
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l := h.login(t, LoginPath)
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restarted, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
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Issuer: h.provider.issuer(),
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ClientID: testClientID,
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ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
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PublicURL: testPublicURL,
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SecretKey: []byte("server-secret-key"),
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AllowedGroups: testAllowedGroups,
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}, h.sessions, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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r := chi.NewRouter()
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restarted.Mount(r)
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h.router = r
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resp := h.callback(l, l.query.Get("state"), h.provider.signRS256(h.provider.claims(l.query.Get("nonce"))))
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest {
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t.Errorf("callback after restart status = %d, want 400", resp.StatusCode)
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}
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if n := len(h.sessions.started()); n != 0 {
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t.Errorf("%d sessions started, want none", n)
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}
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}
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func TestCallbackRejected(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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@@ -153,6 +154,45 @@ func (c FlowCookie) Read(r *http.Request, v flowValue, now time.Time) error {
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return nil
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}
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// PendingStates holds the state of every redirect flow started and not yet
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// completed, until its flow cookie expires. A copy of a flow cookie verifies
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// until it expires, so a flow is single-use only because its callback
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// consumes the state here. The states live in memory — MealQuest runs as one
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// process — so a flow started before a restart fails closed after it.
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type PendingStates struct {
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ttl time.Duration
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mu sync.Mutex
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states map[string]time.Time
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}
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// NewPendingStates returns an empty set whose states are pending for ttl,
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// the flow cookie's lifetime.
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func NewPendingStates(ttl time.Duration) *PendingStates {
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return &PendingStates{ttl: ttl, states: map[string]time.Time{}}
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}
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// Add records state, started at now, as pending and forgets expired ones.
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func (p *PendingStates) Add(state string, now time.Time) {
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p.mu.Lock()
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defer p.mu.Unlock()
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for k, expires := range p.states {
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if !now.Before(expires) {
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delete(p.states, k)
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}
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}
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p.states[state] = now.Add(p.ttl)
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}
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// Consume removes state from the pending states, reporting whether it was
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// there.
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func (p *PendingStates) Consume(state string) bool {
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p.mu.Lock()
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defer p.mu.Unlock()
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_, ok := p.states[state]
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delete(p.states, state)
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return ok
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}
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// returnPath validates the optional post-login return path. Empty means "/".
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// Only same-origin absolute paths are allowed: no scheme, host, protocol-
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// relative "//" prefix, backslashes or control characters.
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@@ -137,10 +137,9 @@ type Service struct {
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account sync.Mutex
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// pending holds the state of every connect started and not yet
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// completed, with when it expires. Complete consumes a state once, so a
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// replayed cookie finds it gone.
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pendingMu sync.Mutex
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pending map[string]time.Time
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// completed. Complete consumes a state once, so a replayed cookie finds
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// it gone.
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pending *auth.PendingStates
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}
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// NewService returns the service over st, sealing refresh tokens with box.
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@@ -175,7 +174,7 @@ func NewService(st *store.Store, box *secretbox.Box, cfg Config) (*Service, erro
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cookie: auth.NewFlowCookie(connectCookieName, connectCookieKeyLabel, connectCookieTTL, cfg.SecretKey),
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retryDelay: firstRetryDelay,
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now: time.Now,
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pending: map[string]time.Time{},
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pending: auth.NewPendingStates(connectCookieTTL),
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}, nil
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}
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@@ -213,7 +212,7 @@ func (s *Service) Connect(w http.ResponseWriter, session auth.Session) (string,
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if err := s.cookie.Set(w, &state, now); err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("gcal: set connect cookie: %w", err)
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}
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s.addPending(state.State, now)
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s.pending.Add(state.State, now)
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return s.oauth.AuthCodeURL(state.State,
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oauth2.AccessTypeOffline,
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oauth2.ApprovalForce,
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@@ -243,7 +242,7 @@ func (s *Service) Complete(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, session auth.
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}
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// A copy of the cookie verifies until it expires, so the state is
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// single-use only because it is consumed here.
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if !s.consumePending(state.State) {
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if !s.pending.Consume(state.State) {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: already used", ErrBadState)
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}
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if q.Get("error") != "" {
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@@ -276,29 +275,6 @@ func (s *Service) Complete(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, session auth.
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return s.store(ctx, sealed)
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}
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// addPending records state, started at now, as pending until the connect
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// cookie expires, and forgets expired ones.
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func (s *Service) addPending(state string, now time.Time) {
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s.pendingMu.Lock()
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defer s.pendingMu.Unlock()
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for k, expires := range s.pending {
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if !now.Before(expires) {
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delete(s.pending, k)
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}
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}
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s.pending[state] = now.Add(connectCookieTTL)
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}
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// consumePending removes state from the pending states, reporting whether
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// it was there.
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func (s *Service) consumePending(state string) bool {
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s.pendingMu.Lock()
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defer s.pendingMu.Unlock()
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_, ok := s.pending[state]
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delete(s.pending, state)
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return ok
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}
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// checkScopes fails with ErrScopes unless token's granted scopes include
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// every scope in Scopes. Google lets the household untick a permission on
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// the consent screen and reports what was granted in "scope".
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