Admin auth: harden JWKS cache against outage amplification (P2) and corrupt/unknown-key handling (P3)

- P2: verify_admin_token parses and enforces the JWT header (alg ==
  RS256, kid present) BEFORE consulting the JWKS cache, so a
  structurally invalid token costs no fetch, no lock, no provider load.
- P2: JwksCache gains a short negative-cache backoff window (5s,
  time.monotonic-recorded) after a failed fetch: within it, get()
  re-raises the recorded fault without touching the fetcher — and
  without holding or queueing on the lock — so an outage costs one
  fetch per window instead of one per request. A successful fetch
  clears the backoff; nothing is cached indefinitely (TTL unchanged).
- P3: _matching_key widens the from_jwk handling to
  (PyJWTError, binascii.Error, ValueError, TypeError, KeyError) so a
  JWKS entry matching the kid but carrying corrupt n/e maps to the
  SAME uniform 401 instead of surfacing a 500.
- P3: an unmatched kid now forces ONE TTL-bypassing refetch and
  retries the match once, so rotated keys verify without waiting out
  the TTL; the forced refetch is itself bounded (inside the backoff
  window or the 5s kid-refetch interval the cached document is served
  as-is), so unknown-kid floods cannot force a fetch per request.
- Tests: no-fetch proofs for garbage/non-RS256 tokens, corrupt-entry
  401, outage fail-fast (sequential + concurrent burst), backoff
  lapse/recovery, outage-as-server-fault, and the unknown-kid
  refetch: one forced, throttled, resume-after-interval, rotation
  picked up, failed forced refetch propagates then fails fast.
  Existing tests unchanged (uniform 401 contract intact).
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-23 00:30:04 -04:00
parent 3cdedb37c8
commit 80ac786a54
2 changed files with 494 additions and 30 deletions
+319
View File
@@ -12,9 +12,17 @@ JWKS fetcher — NO network access:
token returns 200 with the verified subject.
- Every 401 carries the SAME detail — nothing in the response
distinguishes which check failed.
- The token's HEADER is validated BEFORE the JWKS cache is touched: a
garbage or non-RS256 token triggers NO fetch at all.
- A JWKS entry that matches the ``kid`` but carries corrupt key
material maps to the same uniform 401.
- The JWKS document is fetched ONCE through the app's
:class:`api.auth.JwksCache` and then reused across requests (the
stub fetcher counts calls); a zero TTL refetches.
- A JWKS OUTAGE fails fast: after one failed fetch the cache re-raises
the fault for the whole backoff window without further fetches, even
under a burst of concurrent requests; an unknown ``kid`` forces one
TTL-bypassing refetch, throttled to at most one per interval.
``ApiConfig.from_env`` requires the three OIDC variables
(``NESTQUEST_OIDC_ISSUER``, ``NESTQUEST_OIDC_AUDIENCE``,
@@ -29,7 +37,9 @@ case signs with a SECOND locally generated key pair.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import base64
import json
import time
from pathlib import Path
@@ -105,6 +115,45 @@ class _StubbedFetch:
return self.document
class _FailingFetch:
"""A JWKS fetcher stub that always fails, counting the attempts."""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.calls = 0
async def __call__(self, url: str) -> dict[str, object]:
self.calls += 1
raise httpx.ConnectError("provider unreachable")
class _FlakyFetch:
"""A fetcher that succeeds ONCE, then fails on every later call."""
def __init__(self, document: dict[str, object]) -> None:
self.document = document
self.calls = 0
async def __call__(self, url: str) -> dict[str, object]:
self.calls += 1
if self.calls == 1:
return self.document
raise httpx.ConnectError("provider unreachable")
class _FailThenServe:
"""A fetcher that fails the FIRST call, then serves the document."""
def __init__(self, document: dict[str, object]) -> None:
self.document = document
self.calls = 0
async def __call__(self, url: str) -> dict[str, object]:
self.calls += 1
if self.calls == 1:
raise httpx.ConnectError("provider unreachable")
return self.document
def _make_token(
signing_key: rsa.RSAPrivateKey = ADMIN_KEY,
*,
@@ -130,6 +179,33 @@ def _make_token(
)
def _token_with_header(
header: dict[str, object], payload: dict[str, object]
) -> str:
"""Build a JWT with an EXACT header (bypassing jwt.encode's rules).
Used to prove header checks (``alg``, ``kid``) happen before the
JWKS cache is consulted; the signature segment is never reached.
"""
def part(obj: dict[str, object]) -> str:
raw = json.dumps(obj).encode("utf-8")
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
return f"{part(header)}.{part(payload)}.c2lnbmF0dXJl"
def _verified_payload() -> dict[str, object]:
"""Claims that would verify — the header checks fire before them."""
now = int(time.time())
return {
"iss": ISSUER,
"aud": AUDIENCE,
"sub": SUBJECT,
"exp": now + 300,
"nbf": now - 1,
}
class _AdminRunner:
"""Run the app's lifespan around an httpx AsyncClient.
@@ -148,6 +224,8 @@ class _AdminRunner:
jwks_document: dict[str, object],
*,
ttl_seconds: float | None = None,
backoff_seconds: float | None = None,
kid_refetch_seconds: float | None = None,
) -> None:
self.app = create_app(
ApiConfig(
@@ -162,6 +240,10 @@ class _AdminRunner:
cache_kwargs: dict[str, float] = {}
if ttl_seconds is not None:
cache_kwargs["ttl_seconds"] = ttl_seconds
if backoff_seconds is not None:
cache_kwargs["backoff_seconds"] = backoff_seconds
if kid_refetch_seconds is not None:
cache_kwargs["kid_refetch_seconds"] = kid_refetch_seconds
self.app.state.jwks_cache = JwksCache(
JWKS_URL, fetcher=self.fetch, **cache_kwargs
)
@@ -359,6 +441,70 @@ async def test_bad_signature_is_unauthorized(
assert response.status_code == 401
async def test_corrupt_jwks_entry_matching_kid_is_unauthorized(
temp_db_path: str,
) -> None:
"""A JWKS entry matching the kid but with corrupt key data → 401.
``RSAAlgorithm.from_jwk`` raises ValueError/TypeError (NOT a
PyJWTError) on such an entry; it must map to the SAME uniform 401,
not surface as a server error.
"""
corrupt_jwks: dict[str, object] = {
"keys": [
{"kty": "RSA", "kid": KID, "n": "AQ", "e": "AQAB"},
]
}
runner = _AdminRunner(temp_db_path, corrupt_jwks)
async with runner as client:
response = await client.get(
"/api/v1/admin/ping",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {_make_token()}"},
)
assert response.status_code == 401
assert response.json()["detail"] == REJECTION_DETAIL
# --- the header is checked BEFORE the JWKS cache -----------------------------
async def test_garbage_token_triggers_no_jwks_fetch(
temp_db_path: str,
) -> None:
"""A token that is not a JWT costs NO fetch, lock or provider load."""
runner = _AdminRunner(temp_db_path, _jwks_for(ADMIN_KEY, KID))
async with runner as client:
response = await client.get(
"/api/v1/admin/ping",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer not-a-jwt"},
)
assert response.status_code == 401
assert response.json()["detail"] == REJECTION_DETAIL
assert runner.fetch.calls == 0
async def test_non_rs256_token_triggers_no_jwks_fetch(
temp_db_path: str,
) -> None:
"""A structurally valid JWT with a non-RS256 alg is 401 pre-cache.
The header carries a kid pointing at the published key, so ONLY the
early alg check can reject it — the fetcher must never be called.
"""
runner = _AdminRunner(temp_db_path, _jwks_for(ADMIN_KEY, KID))
token = _token_with_header(
{"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT", "kid": KID}, _verified_payload()
)
async with runner as client:
response = await client.get(
"/api/v1/admin/ping",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
)
assert response.status_code == 401
assert response.json()["detail"] == REJECTION_DETAIL
assert runner.fetch.calls == 0
# --- the uniform 401 contract -----------------------------------------------
@@ -431,6 +577,179 @@ async def test_expired_ttl_refetches_the_jwks(temp_db_path: str) -> None:
assert runner.fetch.calls == 2
# --- the JWKS cache under an outage: fail fast, don't amplify ---------------
async def test_jwks_outage_fails_fast_during_backoff() -> None:
"""After one failed fetch, later requests fail fast for the window."""
fetch = _FailingFetch()
cache = JwksCache(JWKS_URL, fetcher=fetch)
for _ in range(4):
with pytest.raises(httpx.ConnectError):
await cache.get()
assert fetch.calls == 1
async def test_jwks_outage_burst_calls_the_fetcher_once() -> None:
"""A burst of concurrent requests costs ONE fetch, not one each.
The first caller fetches and fails; every other caller — queued on
the lock or arriving inside the backoff window — fails fast on the
recorded fault without touching the fetcher.
"""
fetch = _FailingFetch()
cache = JwksCache(JWKS_URL, fetcher=fetch)
results = await asyncio.gather(
*(cache.get() for _ in range(6)), return_exceptions=True
)
assert fetch.calls == 1
assert all(
isinstance(result, httpx.ConnectError) for result in results
)
async def test_jwks_backoff_lapses_and_recovers() -> None:
"""A backoff window is not a lockout: retries resume after it.
With a zero-length window the very next request retries (and the
successful document is then served from the cache), proving a
failed state is never cached for good.
"""
document = _jwks_for(ADMIN_KEY, KID)
fetch = _FailThenServe(document)
cache = JwksCache(JWKS_URL, fetcher=fetch, backoff_seconds=0.0)
with pytest.raises(httpx.ConnectError):
await cache.get()
assert await cache.get() == document
assert await cache.get() == document
assert fetch.calls == 2
async def test_jwks_outage_is_a_server_fault_not_a_401(
temp_db_path: str,
) -> None:
"""A provider outage propagates as a fault, never as a 401."""
runner = _AdminRunner(temp_db_path, _jwks_for(ADMIN_KEY, KID))
runner.app.state.jwks_cache = JwksCache(JWKS_URL, fetcher=_FailingFetch())
async with runner as client:
with pytest.raises(httpx.ConnectError):
await client.get(
"/api/v1/admin/ping",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {_make_token()}"},
)
# --- the unknown-kid refetch: one forced, bounded attempt --------------------
async def test_unknown_kid_refetch_picks_up_a_rotated_key(
temp_db_path: str,
) -> None:
"""An unmatched kid forces ONE refetch, and the retry can verify.
The JWKS first publishes a DIFFERENT kid: the token is 401 after
exactly two fetches (normal + forced). When the rotated key lands
in the provider's document, the NEXT token forces another refetch
that picks it up — the same token verifies WITHOUT waiting out the
TTL.
"""
runner = _AdminRunner(
temp_db_path, _jwks_for(ADMIN_KEY, "other-key"), kid_refetch_seconds=0.0
)
token = _make_token()
async with runner as client:
response = await client.get(
"/api/v1/admin/ping",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
)
assert response.status_code == 401
assert response.json()["detail"] == REJECTION_DETAIL
assert runner.fetch.calls == 2
# The rotation lands at the provider (same stub fetcher).
runner.fetch.document = _jwks_for(ADMIN_KEY, KID)
response = await client.get(
"/api/v1/admin/ping",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert runner.fetch.calls == 3
async def test_unknown_kid_refetch_is_throttled(temp_db_path: str) -> None:
"""Back-to-back unknown-kid tokens force at most one refetch.
The interval bounds forced refetches: the second unknown-kid token
inside it is served from the cached document (still unmatched →
401) with no further fetch.
"""
runner = _AdminRunner(temp_db_path, _jwks_for(ADMIN_KEY, "other-key"))
token = _make_token()
async with runner as client:
for _ in range(2):
response = await client.get(
"/api/v1/admin/ping",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
)
assert response.status_code == 401
assert runner.fetch.calls == 2
async def test_unknown_kid_refetch_resumes_after_the_interval(
temp_db_path: str,
) -> None:
"""A lapsed interval allows the next forced refetch again.
With a zero-length interval every request may force its refetch:
the first costs one normal fetch plus one forced (two), and the
second — its cached document still fresh — costs just the forced
one (three in total), proving the throttle is a bounded interval
rather than a permanent lockout.
"""
runner = _AdminRunner(
temp_db_path, _jwks_for(ADMIN_KEY, "other-key"), kid_refetch_seconds=0.0
)
token = _make_token()
async with runner as client:
for _ in range(2):
response = await client.get(
"/api/v1/admin/ping",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
)
assert response.status_code == 401
assert runner.fetch.calls == 3
async def test_failed_forced_refetch_propagates_then_fails_fast(
temp_db_path: str,
) -> None:
"""A failed forced refetch is a fault, and its backoff bounds the rest.
First request: cache fills (1 fetch), the kid is unmatched, the
forced refetch FAILS (2 fetches) and propagates as the server
fault. Second request inside the backoff window: the cached
document is served, the match fails, and the token is 401 — with
NO third fetch.
"""
runner = _AdminRunner(temp_db_path, _jwks_for(ADMIN_KEY, KID))
runner.app.state.jwks_cache = JwksCache(
JWKS_URL, fetcher=_FlakyFetch(_jwks_for(ADMIN_KEY, "other-key"))
)
token = _make_token()
async with runner as client:
with pytest.raises(httpx.ConnectError):
await client.get(
"/api/v1/admin/ping",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
)
response = await client.get(
"/api/v1/admin/ping",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
)
assert response.status_code == 401
assert response.json()["detail"] == REJECTION_DETAIL
# --- ApiConfig.from_env: the OIDC settings -----------------------------------