Add OIDC login and callback against Authentik

internal/auth discovers the provider at MEALQUEST_OIDC_ISSUER with
coreos/go-oidc/v3 and runs a confidential-client authorization code flow
with golang.org/x/oauth2 (client_secret_basic).

GET /auth/login stores state, nonce and a PKCE S256 verifier in a
10-minute HMAC-signed HttpOnly __Host- cookie and redirects with scopes
"openid profile email groups offline_access". An optional "return" path
must be same-origin; anything else fails the login with 400.

GET /auth/callback clears the single-use cookie, checks state, exchanges
the code with the verifier, verifies the ID token (RS256 only, issuer,
audience, expiry) and nonce, then hands the claims to a SessionStarter.
cmd/server wires a placeholder that refuses every login until the
session layer lands.

Config gains required MEALQUEST_OIDC_ISSUER, MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_ID,
MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE and MEALQUEST_OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS.

Pins go-oidc v3.21.0 and oauth2 v0.36.0, the newest releases that
support Go 1.25 (oauth2 v0.37.0 requires Go 1.26).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

README.md

@@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ export MEALQUEST_PUBLIC_URL=http://localhost:5173
 export MEALQUEST_DATA_DIR="$HOME/.mealquest-dev"
 export MEALQUEST_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT=10s
 export MEALQUEST_SECRET_KEY_FILE="$HOME/.mealquest-dev/secret_key"
+# Authentik OAuth2/OpenID provider for MealQuest (redirect URI:
+# $MEALQUEST_PUBLIC_URL/auth/callback). Save its client secret to the file.
+export MEALQUEST_OIDC_ISSUER=https://auth.example.com/application/o/mealquest/
+export MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_ID=mealquest
+export MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE="$HOME/.mealquest-dev/oidc_client_secret"
+export MEALQUEST_OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS=mealquest-admin
 make dev
 ```
 

cmd/server/main.go

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
 	"syscall"
 	"time"
 
+	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/auth"
 	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/config"
 	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/frontend"
 	"code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest/internal/server"
@@ -51,7 +52,18 @@ func run(cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger) error {
 		}
 	}()
 
-	router, err := server.NewRouter(logger, version, frontend.Assets())
+	authFlow, err := auth.New(ctx, auth.Config{
+		Issuer:       cfg.OIDCIssuer.String(),
+		ClientID:     cfg.OIDCClientID,
+		ClientSecret: cfg.OIDCClientSecret.Reveal(),
+		PublicURL:    cfg.PublicURL,
+		SecretKey:    []byte(cfg.SecretKey.Reveal()),
+	}, sessionsPending{}, logger)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	router, err := server.NewRouter(logger, version, authFlow, frontend.Assets())
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -103,6 +115,14 @@ func openStore(ctx context.Context, dataDir string) (*store.Store, error) {
 	return db, nil
 }
 
+// sessionsPending refuses every login until the session layer (Feature 03
+// task 2) replaces it.
+type sessionsPending struct{}
+
+func (sessionsPending) StartSession(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request, auth.Claims) error {
+	return errors.New("session layer not implemented")
+}
+
 // logListening logs the startup line. Only the public URL's origin is logged
 // so no credential-bearing URL component can reach the log.
 func logListening(logger *slog.Logger, cfg config.Config) {

go.mod

@@ -3,13 +3,16 @@ module code.cubecraftlabs.com/Maniacs_Mansion/Meal-Quest
 go 1.25.0
 
 require (
+	github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.21.0
 	github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.3.1
 	github.com/oklog/ulid/v2 v2.1.2
+	golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0
 	modernc.org/sqlite v1.59.0
 )
 
 require (
 	github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 // indirect
+	github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4 // indirect
 	github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 // indirect
 	github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.24 // indirect
 	github.com/ncruces/go-strftime v1.0.0 // indirect

go.sum

@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
+github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.21.0 h1:wZo4Q9Pum8dYEj0eMUPrqR+kvuGkeUplbLpNCkBqoWM=
+github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.21.0/go.mod h1:DYCf24+ncYi+XkIH97GY1+dqoRlbaSI26KVTCI9SrY4=
 github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 h1:GzkhY7T5VNhEkwH0PVJgjz+fX1rhBrR7pRT3mDkpeCY=
 github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1/go.mod h1:Mu1zIs6XwVuF/gI1OepvI0qD18qycQx+mFykh5fBlto=
 github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.3.1 h1:3j4HZLGZQ3JpMCrPJF/Jl3mYJfWLKBfNJ6quurUGCf8=
 github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.3.1/go.mod h1:R+tYY2hNuVUUjxoPtqUdgBqevM9s9njzkTLutVsOCto=
+github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4 h1:moDMcTHmvE6Groj34emNPLs/qtYXRVcd6S7NHbHz3kA=
+github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4/go.mod h1:x4oUasVrzR7071A4TnHLGSPpNOm2a21K9Kf04k1rs08=
 github.com/google/pprof v0.0.0-20260802141513-ef3492d7dac3 h1:LMLX+LgTNWpfvCBdFebv6EsYotImrt/Ppc5cXIriCSo=
 github.com/google/pprof v0.0.0-20260802141513-ef3492d7dac3/go.mod h1:jl5iWTm0/hd5PjEYEOuwAJ57L/CibdZfrqZ5XA5GrCk=
 github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 h1:NIvaJDMOsjHA8n1jAhLSgzrAzy1Hgr+hNrb57e+94F0=
@@ -19,6 +23,8 @@ github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec h1:W09IVJc94
 github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec/go.mod h1:qqbHyh8v60DhA7CoWK5oRCqLrMHRGoxYCSS9EjAz6Eo=
 golang.org/x/mod v0.38.0 h1:MECBjubtXD7yj4HrhIUcywNaGeNVUdfVnxmPajOk4yk=
 golang.org/x/mod v0.38.0/go.mod h1:V6Xz0pq8TQ3dGqVQ1FVHuelZpAL0uNhSkk9ogYP3c40=
+golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0 h1:peZ/1z27fi9hUOFCAZaHyrpWG5lwe0RJEEEeH0ThlIs=
+golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0/go.mod h1:YDBUJMTkDnJS+A4BP4eZBjCqtokkg1hODuPjwiGPO7Q=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 h1:SZjpbeLmrCk4xhRSZFNZW5gFUeCeFgjekvI/+gfScek=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 h1:o7XGOvZQCADBQQ4Y7VNq2dRWQR7JmOUW8Kxx4ZsNgWs=

internal/auth/auth.go

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+// Package auth signs the household in with Authentik over OpenID Connect.
+// The service is a confidential client: the authorization code, tokens and
+// client secret stay on the server and never reach JavaScript.
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
+	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+	"golang.org/x/oauth2"
+)
+
+// Routes owned by this package.
+const (
+	LoginPath    = "/auth/login"
+	CallbackPath = "/auth/callback"
+)
+
+// providerTimeout bounds every request to the identity provider.
+const providerTimeout = 10 * time.Second
+
+// scopes requested at login.
+var scopes = []string{oidc.ScopeOpenID, "profile", "email", "groups", oidc.ScopeOfflineAccess}
+
+// Claims are the verified ID token claims handed to the session layer.
+type Claims struct {
+	Subject           string   `json:"sub"`
+	Email             string   `json:"email"`
+	EmailVerified     bool     `json:"email_verified"`
+	Name              string   `json:"name"`
+	PreferredUsername string   `json:"preferred_username"`
+	Groups            []string `json:"groups"`
+}
+
+// SessionStarter is the session layer's entry point. StartSession is called
+// once per successful login with claims from a verified ID token; it must set
+// the session cookie on w. A returned error aborts the login with 500.
+type SessionStarter interface {
+	StartSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, claims Claims) error
+}
+
+// Config is what New needs to reach the identity provider.
+type Config struct {
+	// Issuer is the exact issuer URL; discovery runs against it.
+	Issuer       string
+	ClientID     string
+	ClientSecret string
+	// PublicURL is the service's public URL; its origin prefixes CallbackPath
+	// to form the redirect URI.
+	PublicURL *url.URL
+	// SecretKey is the server key the login cookie's signing key derives from.
+	SecretKey []byte
+}
+
+// Auth serves the login and callback routes.
+type Auth struct {
+	oauth    oauth2.Config
+	verifier *oidc.IDTokenVerifier
+	client   *http.Client
+	cookie   loginCookie
+	sessions SessionStarter
+	logger   *slog.Logger
+}
+
+// New discovers the provider at cfg.Issuer and returns the login flow. It
+// fails if discovery fails or the issuer the provider reports differs.
+func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, sessions SessionStarter, logger *slog.Logger) (*Auth, error) {
+	switch {
+	case cfg.Issuer == "", cfg.ClientID == "", cfg.ClientSecret == "":
+		return nil, errors.New("auth: issuer, client ID and client secret are required")
+	case cfg.PublicURL == nil:
+		return nil, errors.New("auth: public URL is required")
+	case len(cfg.SecretKey) == 0:
+		return nil, errors.New("auth: secret key is required")
+	case sessions == nil:
+		return nil, errors.New("auth: session starter is required")
+	}
+
+	client := &http.Client{Timeout: providerTimeout}
+	provider, err := oidc.NewProvider(oidc.ClientContext(ctx, client), cfg.Issuer)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("auth: OIDC discovery: %w", err)
+	}
+	endpoint := provider.Endpoint()
+	// client_secret_basic, the OIDC default; no auto-detection retries.
+	endpoint.AuthStyle = oauth2.AuthStyleInHeader
+
+	return &Auth{
+		oauth: oauth2.Config{
+			ClientID:     cfg.ClientID,
+			ClientSecret: cfg.ClientSecret,
+			Endpoint:     endpoint,
+			RedirectURL:  cfg.PublicURL.Scheme + "://" + cfg.PublicURL.Host + CallbackPath,
+			Scopes:       scopes,
+		},
+		verifier: provider.Verifier(&oidc.Config{
+			ClientID:             cfg.ClientID,
+			SupportedSigningAlgs: []string{oidc.RS256},
+		}),
+		client:   client,
+		cookie:   newLoginCookie(cfg.SecretKey),
+		sessions: sessions,
+		logger:   logger,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// Mount registers GET LoginPath and GET CallbackPath on r.
+func (a *Auth) Mount(r chi.Router) {
+	r.Get(LoginPath, a.login)
+	r.Get(CallbackPath, a.callback)
+}
+
+// login starts the authorization code flow with PKCE (S256). The optional
+// "return" query parameter must be a same-origin path; anything else fails
+// the login with 400.
+func (a *Auth) login(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+
+	returnTo, err := returnPath(r.URL.Query().Get("return"))
+	if err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, "invalid return path", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	state := loginState{
+		State:    rand.Text(),
+		Nonce:    rand.Text(),
+		Verifier: oauth2.GenerateVerifier(),
+		Return:   returnTo,
+	}
+	if err := a.cookie.set(w, state, time.Now()); err != nil {
+		a.logger.ErrorContext(r.Context(), "set login cookie", "error", err)
+		http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	http.Redirect(w, r, a.oauth.AuthCodeURL(state.State,
+		oidc.Nonce(state.Nonce),
+		oauth2.S256ChallengeOption(state.Verifier),
+	), http.StatusFound)
+}
+
+// callback completes the flow: it checks state against the login cookie,
+// exchanges the code, verifies the ID token and nonce, then starts a session.
+func (a *Auth) callback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+	ctx := r.Context()
+	// The login cookie is single-use.
+	a.cookie.clear(w)
+
+	state, err := a.cookie.read(r, time.Now())
+	if err != nil {
+		a.logger.WarnContext(ctx, "login callback without a valid login cookie", "error", err)
+		http.Error(w, "sign-in expired; start again", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	q := r.URL.Query()
+	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(q.Get("state")), []byte(state.State)) != 1 {
+		a.logger.WarnContext(ctx, "login callback state mismatch")
+		http.Error(w, "sign-in state mismatch; start again", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	if e := q.Get("error"); e != "" {
+		a.logger.WarnContext(ctx, "identity provider refused sign-in", "error", e, "description", q.Get("error_description"))
+		http.Error(w, "sign-in was refused", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		return
+	}
+	code := q.Get("code")
+	if code == "" {
+		http.Error(w, "missing authorization code", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+
+	claims, err := a.verify(ctx, code, state)
+	if err != nil {
+		a.logger.WarnContext(ctx, "sign-in failed", "error", err)
+		http.Error(w, "sign-in failed", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		return
+	}
+	if err := a.sessions.StartSession(w, r, claims); err != nil {
+		a.logger.ErrorContext(ctx, "start session", "error", err)
+		http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	http.Redirect(w, r, state.Return, http.StatusSeeOther)
+}
+
+// verify exchanges code for tokens and returns the verified ID token claims.
+// The verifier enforces RS256, issuer, audience and expiry; nonce is checked
+// here.
+func (a *Auth) verify(ctx context.Context, code string, state loginState) (Claims, error) {
+	token, err := a.oauth.Exchange(context.WithValue(ctx, oauth2.HTTPClient, a.client), code,
+		oauth2.VerifierOption(state.Verifier))
+	if err != nil {
+		return Claims{}, fmt.Errorf("exchange code: %w", err)
+	}
+	raw, ok := token.Extra("id_token").(string)
+	if !ok || raw == "" {
+		return Claims{}, errors.New("token response has no id_token")
+	}
+	idToken, err := a.verifier.Verify(ctx, raw)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Claims{}, fmt.Errorf("verify ID token: %w", err)
+	}
+	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(idToken.Nonce), []byte(state.Nonce)) != 1 {
+		return Claims{}, errors.New("ID token nonce mismatch")
+	}
+	var claims Claims
+	if err := idToken.Claims(&claims); err != nil {
+		return Claims{}, fmt.Errorf("decode ID token claims: %w", err)
+	}
+	if claims.Subject == "" {
+		return Claims{}, errors.New("ID token has no subject")
+	}
+	return claims, nil
+}

internal/auth/auth_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,637 @@
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"math/big"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+)
+
+const (
+	testClientID     = "mealquest"
+	testClientSecret = "client-s3cret"
+	testKID          = "test-key"
+)
+
+var testPublicURL = &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "meals.example.com"}
+
+// fakeProvider is an OIDC provider serving discovery, JWKS and a token
+// endpoint. Each issued code maps to the ID token the token endpoint returns.
+type fakeProvider struct {
+	t   *testing.T
+	srv *httptest.Server
+	key *rsa.PrivateKey
+
+	mu    sync.Mutex
+	codes map[string]issuedCode
+}
+
+type issuedCode struct {
+	challenge string
+	idToken   string
+}
+
+func newFakeProvider(t *testing.T) *fakeProvider {
+	t.Helper()
+	key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	p := &fakeProvider{t: t, key: key, codes: map[string]issuedCode{}}
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /.well-known/openid-configuration", p.discovery)
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /jwks", p.jwks)
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /token", p.token)
+	p.srv = httptest.NewServer(mux)
+	t.Cleanup(p.srv.Close)
+	return p
+}
+
+func (p *fakeProvider) issuer() string { return p.srv.URL }
+
+func (p *fakeProvider) discovery(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+	writeJSON(w, map[string]any{
+		"issuer":                                p.issuer(),
+		"authorization_endpoint":                p.issuer() + "/authorize",
+		"token_endpoint":                        p.issuer() + "/token",
+		"jwks_uri":                              p.issuer() + "/jwks",
+		"response_types_supported":              []string{"code"},
+		"subject_types_supported":               []string{"public"},
+		"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": []string{"RS256", "HS256"},
+	})
+}
+
+func (p *fakeProvider) jwks(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+	writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"keys": []map[string]string{{
+		"kty": "RSA",
+		"kid": testKID,
+		"use": "sig",
+		"alg": "RS256",
+		"n":   b64(p.key.N.Bytes()),
+		"e":   b64(big.NewInt(int64(p.key.E)).Bytes()),
+	}}})
+}
+
+// token checks client authentication, the code and the PKCE verifier before
+// returning the code's ID token.
+func (p *fakeProvider) token(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	id, secret, ok := r.BasicAuth()
+	if !ok || id != testClientID || secret != testClientSecret {
+		http.Error(w, `{"error":"invalid_client"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		return
+	}
+	if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, `{"error":"invalid_request"}`, http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	issued, ok := p.codes[r.PostForm.Get("code")]
+	delete(p.codes, r.PostForm.Get("code"))
+	p.mu.Unlock()
+	if r.PostForm.Get("grant_type") != "authorization_code" || !ok ||
+		challengeS256(r.PostForm.Get("code_verifier")) != issued.challenge {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
+		io.WriteString(w, `{"error":"invalid_grant"}`)
+		return
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, map[string]any{
+		"access_token": "access-token",
+		"token_type":   "Bearer",
+		"expires_in":   3600,
+		"id_token":     issued.idToken,
+	})
+}
+
+// authorize stands in for the user signing in at the provider: it records a
+// code bound to the PKCE challenge and returns it.
+func (p *fakeProvider) authorize(challenge, idToken string) string {
+	code := rand.Text()
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	p.codes[code] = issuedCode{challenge: challenge, idToken: idToken}
+	p.mu.Unlock()
+	return code
+}
+
+// claims returns valid ID token claims for nonce.
+func (p *fakeProvider) claims(nonce string) map[string]any {
+	now := time.Now()
+	return map[string]any{
+		"iss":                p.issuer(),
+		"sub":                "user-123",
+		"aud":                testClientID,
+		"iat":                now.Unix(),
+		"exp":                now.Add(5 * time.Minute).Unix(),
+		"nonce":              nonce,
+		"email":              "cook@example.com",
+		"email_verified":     true,
+		"name":               "Home Cook",
+		"preferred_username": "cook",
+		"groups":             []string{"mealquest-admin"},
+	}
+}
+
+func (p *fakeProvider) signRS256(claims map[string]any) string {
+	return signRS256(p.t, p.key, claims)
+}
+
+func signRS256(t *testing.T, key *rsa.PrivateKey, claims map[string]any) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	signing := jwtSigningInput(t, "RS256", claims)
+	digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(signing))
+	sig, err := rsa.SignPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, key, crypto.SHA256, digest[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return signing + "." + b64(sig)
+}
+
+// signHS256 signs with the client secret, as in an algorithm-confusion attack.
+func (p *fakeProvider) signHS256(claims map[string]any) string {
+	signing := jwtSigningInput(p.t, "HS256", claims)
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(testClientSecret))
+	mac.Write([]byte(signing))
+	return signing + "." + b64(mac.Sum(nil))
+}
+
+func jwtSigningInput(t *testing.T, alg string, claims map[string]any) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	header, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"alg": alg, "typ": "JWT", "kid": testKID})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	body, err := json.Marshal(claims)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return b64(header) + "." + b64(body)
+}
+
+func challengeS256(verifier string) string {
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(verifier))
+	return b64(sum[:])
+}
+
+func b64(b []byte) string { return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b) }
+
+func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, v any) {
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
+}
+
+// memorySessions is an in-memory SessionStarter that records the claims it
+// was handed.
+type memorySessions struct {
+	mu     sync.Mutex
+	claims []Claims
+	err    error
+}
+
+func (m *memorySessions) StartSession(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request, claims Claims) error {
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	if m.err != nil {
+		return m.err
+	}
+	m.claims = append(m.claims, claims)
+	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{Name: "test_session", Value: claims.Subject})
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (m *memorySessions) started() []Claims {
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	return slices.Clone(m.claims)
+}
+
+type harness struct {
+	provider *fakeProvider
+	sessions *memorySessions
+	router   http.Handler
+}
+
+func newHarness(t *testing.T) *harness {
+	t.Helper()
+	p := newFakeProvider(t)
+	sessions := &memorySessions{}
+	a, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
+		Issuer:       p.issuer(),
+		ClientID:     testClientID,
+		ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
+		PublicURL:    testPublicURL,
+		SecretKey:    []byte("server-secret-key"),
+	}, sessions, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	r := chi.NewRouter()
+	a.Mount(r)
+	return &harness{provider: p, sessions: sessions, router: r}
+}
+
+func (h *harness) get(target string, cookies ...*http.Cookie) *http.Response {
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, target, nil)
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		req.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	return rec.Result()
+}
+
+// login is a started login: the authorize URL's query and the login cookie.
+type login struct {
+	query  url.Values
+	cookie *http.Cookie
+}
+
+func (h *harness) login(t *testing.T, target string) login {
+	t.Helper()
+	resp := h.get(target)
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusFound {
+		t.Fatalf("GET %s status = %d, want 302", target, resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	loc, err := url.Parse(resp.Header.Get("Location"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if got, want := loc.Scheme+"://"+loc.Host+loc.Path, h.provider.issuer()+"/authorize"; got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("redirect to %s, want %s", got, want)
+	}
+	var cookie *http.Cookie
+	for _, c := range resp.Cookies() {
+		if c.Name == loginCookieName {
+			cookie = c
+		}
+	}
+	if cookie == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("login set no %s cookie", loginCookieName)
+	}
+	return login{query: loc.Query(), cookie: cookie}
+}
+
+// callback completes l at the provider with idToken and calls the callback.
+func (h *harness) callback(l login, state, idToken string) *http.Response {
+	code := h.provider.authorize(l.query.Get("code_challenge"), idToken)
+	q := url.Values{"code": {code}, "state": {state}}
+	return h.get(CallbackPath+"?"+q.Encode(), l.cookie)
+}
+
+func TestLoginRedirect(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	l := h.login(t, LoginPath+"?return=/plan")
+
+	want := map[string]string{
+		"client_id":             testClientID,
+		"response_type":         "code",
+		"scope":                 "openid profile email groups offline_access",
+		"redirect_uri":          "https://meals.example.com/auth/callback",
+		"code_challenge_method": "S256",
+	}
+	for k, v := range want {
+		if got := l.query.Get(k); got != v {
+			t.Errorf("authorize %s = %q, want %q", k, got, v)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, k := range []string{"state", "nonce", "code_challenge"} {
+		if l.query.Get(k) == "" {
+			t.Errorf("authorize URL has no %s", k)
+		}
+	}
+
+	c := l.cookie
+	if !c.HttpOnly || !c.Secure || c.SameSite != http.SameSiteLaxMode || c.Path != "/" {
+		t.Errorf("login cookie HttpOnly=%v Secure=%v SameSite=%v Path=%q, want HttpOnly, Secure, Lax, /",
+			c.HttpOnly, c.Secure, c.SameSite, c.Path)
+	}
+	if c.MaxAge <= 0 || c.MaxAge > 600 {
+		t.Errorf("login cookie MaxAge = %d, want 1-600 seconds", c.MaxAge)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoginStateIsFreshEachTime(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	a, b := h.login(t, LoginPath), h.login(t, LoginPath)
+	for _, k := range []string{"state", "nonce", "code_challenge"} {
+		if a.query.Get(k) == b.query.Get(k) {
+			t.Errorf("%s repeated across logins", k)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCallbackSuccess(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	l := h.login(t, LoginPath+"?return="+url.QueryEscape("/plan?week=2026-W40"))
+
+	resp := h.callback(l, l.query.Get("state"), h.provider.signRS256(h.provider.claims(l.query.Get("nonce"))))
+
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusSeeOther {
+		t.Fatalf("callback status = %d, want 303", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	if got := resp.Header.Get("Location"); got != "/plan?week=2026-W40" {
+		t.Errorf("callback redirect = %q, want the return path", got)
+	}
+	started := h.sessions.started()
+	want := Claims{
+		Subject:           "user-123",
+		Email:             "cook@example.com",
+		EmailVerified:     true,
+		Name:              "Home Cook",
+		PreferredUsername: "cook",
+		Groups:            []string{"mealquest-admin"},
+	}
+	if len(started) != 1 || started[0].Subject != want.Subject || started[0].Email != want.Email ||
+		started[0].Name != want.Name || started[0].PreferredUsername != want.PreferredUsername ||
+		!started[0].EmailVerified || !slices.Equal(started[0].Groups, want.Groups) {
+		t.Errorf("session started with %+v, want [%+v]", started, want)
+	}
+	assertLoginCookieCleared(t, resp)
+}
+
+func TestCallbackDefaultReturnPath(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	l := h.login(t, LoginPath)
+	resp := h.callback(l, l.query.Get("state"), h.provider.signRS256(h.provider.claims(l.query.Get("nonce"))))
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusSeeOther || resp.Header.Get("Location") != "/" {
+		t.Errorf("callback = %d to %q, want 303 to /", resp.StatusCode, resp.Header.Get("Location"))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCallbackRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		// state returns the state sent to the callback.
+		state func(l login) string
+		// token returns the ID token the provider issues.
+		token      func(p *fakeProvider, l login) string
+		wantStatus int
+	}{
+		{
+			name:       "mismatched state",
+			state:      func(login) string { return "attacker-state" },
+			wantStatus: http.StatusBadRequest,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "wrong nonce",
+			token: func(p *fakeProvider, _ login) string {
+				return p.signRS256(p.claims("other-nonce"))
+			},
+			wantStatus: http.StatusUnauthorized,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "missing nonce",
+			token: func(p *fakeProvider, _ login) string {
+				c := p.claims("")
+				delete(c, "nonce")
+				return p.signRS256(c)
+			},
+			wantStatus: http.StatusUnauthorized,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "HS256-signed token",
+			token: func(p *fakeProvider, l login) string {
+				return p.signHS256(p.claims(l.query.Get("nonce")))
+			},
+			wantStatus: http.StatusUnauthorized,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "expired token",
+			token: func(p *fakeProvider, l login) string {
+				c := p.claims(l.query.Get("nonce"))
+				c["iat"] = time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour).Unix()
+				c["exp"] = time.Now().Add(-time.Hour).Unix()
+				return p.signRS256(c)
+			},
+			wantStatus: http.StatusUnauthorized,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "wrong issuer",
+			token: func(p *fakeProvider, l login) string {
+				c := p.claims(l.query.Get("nonce"))
+				c["iss"] = "https://evil.example.com"
+				return p.signRS256(c)
+			},
+			wantStatus: http.StatusUnauthorized,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "wrong audience",
+			token: func(p *fakeProvider, l login) string {
+				c := p.claims(l.query.Get("nonce"))
+				c["aud"] = "another-client"
+				return p.signRS256(c)
+			},
+			wantStatus: http.StatusUnauthorized,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "signed by an unknown key",
+			token: func(p *fakeProvider, l login) string {
+				key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+				if err != nil {
+					p.t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				return signRS256(p.t, key, p.claims(l.query.Get("nonce")))
+			},
+			wantStatus: http.StatusUnauthorized,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			h := newHarness(t)
+			l := h.login(t, LoginPath)
+			state := l.query.Get("state")
+			if tc.state != nil {
+				state = tc.state(l)
+			}
+			token := h.provider.signRS256(h.provider.claims(l.query.Get("nonce")))
+			if tc.token != nil {
+				token = tc.token(h.provider, l)
+			}
+
+			resp := h.callback(l, state, token)
+
+			if resp.StatusCode != tc.wantStatus {
+				t.Errorf("callback status = %d, want %d", resp.StatusCode, tc.wantStatus)
+			}
+			if n := len(h.sessions.started()); n != 0 {
+				t.Errorf("%d sessions started, want none", n)
+			}
+			assertLoginCookieCleared(t, resp)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCallbackWithoutLoginCookie(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	l := h.login(t, LoginPath)
+	l.cookie = &http.Cookie{Name: "unrelated", Value: "x"}
+	resp := h.callback(l, l.query.Get("state"), h.provider.signRS256(h.provider.claims(l.query.Get("nonce"))))
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Errorf("callback status = %d, want 400", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	if n := len(h.sessions.started()); n != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("%d sessions started, want none", n)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCallbackTamperedLoginCookie(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	l := h.login(t, LoginPath)
+	payload, sig, _ := strings.Cut(l.cookie.Value, ".")
+	data, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(payload)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var s loginState
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &s); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s.Return = "/somewhere-else"
+	data, err = json.Marshal(s)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	l.cookie = &http.Cookie{Name: loginCookieName, Value: b64(data) + "." + sig}
+
+	resp := h.callback(l, l.query.Get("state"), h.provider.signRS256(h.provider.claims(l.query.Get("nonce"))))
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Errorf("callback status = %d, want 400", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCallbackProviderError(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	l := h.login(t, LoginPath)
+	q := url.Values{"error": {"access_denied"}, "state": {l.query.Get("state")}}
+	resp := h.get(CallbackPath+"?"+q.Encode(), l.cookie)
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Errorf("callback status = %d, want 401", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCallbackSessionError(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	h.sessions.err = errors.New("database down")
+	l := h.login(t, LoginPath)
+	resp := h.callback(l, l.query.Get("state"), h.provider.signRS256(h.provider.claims(l.query.Get("nonce"))))
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusInternalServerError {
+		t.Errorf("callback status = %d, want 500", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoginCookieExpires(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	c := newLoginCookie([]byte("server-secret-key"))
+	now := time.Now()
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	if err := c.set(rec, loginState{State: "s", Nonce: "n", Verifier: "v", Return: "/"}, now); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, CallbackPath, nil)
+	req.AddCookie(rec.Result().Cookies()[0])
+
+	if _, err := c.read(req, now.Add(loginCookieTTL-time.Second)); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("read before expiry: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := c.read(req, now.Add(loginCookieTTL)); err == nil {
+		t.Error("read at expiry succeeded")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoginRejectsOffOriginReturn(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	for _, ret := range []string{
+		"https://evil.example.com/",
+		"http://meals.example.com/plan",
+		"//evil.example.com/",
+		"/\\evil.example.com",
+		"\\\\evil.example.com",
+		"javascript:alert(1)",
+		"plan",
+		"/plan\r\nSet-Cookie: x=y",
+	} {
+		resp := h.get(LoginPath + "?return=" + url.QueryEscape(ret))
+		if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest {
+			t.Errorf("return=%q: status = %d, want 400", ret, resp.StatusCode)
+		}
+		if loc := resp.Header.Get("Location"); loc != "" {
+			t.Errorf("return=%q: redirected to %q", ret, loc)
+		}
+		if len(resp.Cookies()) != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("return=%q: set cookies %v", ret, resp.Cookies())
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNewFailsWhenDiscoveryFails(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.NotFoundHandler())
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+	_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
+		Issuer:       srv.URL,
+		ClientID:     testClientID,
+		ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
+		PublicURL:    testPublicURL,
+		SecretKey:    []byte("k"),
+	}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("New succeeded without a discovery document")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNewFailsOnIssuerMismatch(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	p := newFakeProvider(t)
+	// Discovery trims the trailing slash, so this fetches the provider's
+	// document, which reports the issuer without it.
+	_, err := New(context.Background(), Config{
+		Issuer:       p.issuer() + "/",
+		ClientID:     testClientID,
+		ClientSecret: testClientSecret,
+		PublicURL:    testPublicURL,
+		SecretKey:    []byte("k"),
+	}, &memorySessions{}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("New accepted a provider reporting a different issuer")
+	}
+}
+
+func assertLoginCookieCleared(t *testing.T, resp *http.Response) {
+	t.Helper()
+	for _, c := range resp.Cookies() {
+		if c.Name == loginCookieName && c.MaxAge < 0 {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	t.Errorf("callback did not clear the %s cookie", loginCookieName)
+}

internal/auth/cookie.go

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+const (
+	loginCookieName = "__Host-mealquest_login"
+	loginCookieTTL  = 10 * time.Minute
+	// loginCookieKeyLabel separates the login cookie's signing key from other
+	// keys derived from the same server secret.
+	loginCookieKeyLabel = "mealquest auth login cookie v1"
+)
+
+// loginState travels from login to callback in the signed login cookie.
+type loginState struct {
+	State    string `json:"s"`
+	Nonce    string `json:"n"`
+	Verifier string `json:"v"`
+	Return   string `json:"r"`
+	Expires  int64  `json:"e"` // Unix seconds
+}
+
+// loginCookie signs and verifies the login cookie with HMAC-SHA256.
+type loginCookie struct {
+	key []byte
+}
+
+func newLoginCookie(secretKey []byte) loginCookie {
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, secretKey)
+	mac.Write([]byte(loginCookieKeyLabel))
+	return loginCookie{key: mac.Sum(nil)}
+}
+
+func (c loginCookie) sign(payload string) string {
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, c.key)
+	mac.Write([]byte(payload))
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
+}
+
+func (c loginCookie) set(w http.ResponseWriter, s loginState, now time.Time) error {
+	s.Expires = now.Add(loginCookieTTL).Unix()
+	data, err := json.Marshal(s)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(data)
+	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
+		Name:     loginCookieName,
+		Value:    payload + "." + c.sign(payload),
+		Path:     "/",
+		MaxAge:   int(loginCookieTTL / time.Second),
+		Secure:   true,
+		HttpOnly: true,
+		// Lax so the cookie rides the provider's top-level redirect back.
+		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
+	})
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c loginCookie) clear(w http.ResponseWriter) {
+	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
+		Name:     loginCookieName,
+		Path:     "/",
+		MaxAge:   -1,
+		Secure:   true,
+		HttpOnly: true,
+		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
+	})
+}
+
+func (c loginCookie) read(r *http.Request, now time.Time) (loginState, error) {
+	cookie, err := r.Cookie(loginCookieName)
+	if err != nil {
+		return loginState{}, errors.New("login cookie missing")
+	}
+	payload, sig, ok := strings.Cut(cookie.Value, ".")
+	if !ok || !hmac.Equal([]byte(sig), []byte(c.sign(payload))) {
+		return loginState{}, errors.New("login cookie signature invalid")
+	}
+	data, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(payload)
+	if err != nil {
+		return loginState{}, fmt.Errorf("login cookie encoding: %w", err)
+	}
+	var s loginState
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &s); err != nil {
+		return loginState{}, fmt.Errorf("login cookie payload: %w", err)
+	}
+	if now.Unix() >= s.Expires {
+		return loginState{}, errors.New("login cookie expired")
+	}
+	return s, nil
+}
+
+// returnPath validates the optional post-login return path. Empty means "/".
+// Only same-origin absolute paths are allowed: no scheme, host, protocol-
+// relative "//" prefix, backslashes or control characters.
+func returnPath(raw string) (string, error) {
+	if raw == "" {
+		return "/", nil
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(raw, "/") || strings.HasPrefix(raw, "//") || strings.ContainsRune(raw, '\\') {
+		return "", errors.New("return path must be a same-origin path")
+	}
+	for _, c := range raw {
+		if c < 0x20 || c == 0x7f {
+			return "", errors.New("return path contains a control character")
+		}
+	}
+	u, err := url.Parse(raw)
+	if err != nil || u.Scheme != "" || u.Host != "" || u.User != nil {
+		return "", errors.New("return path must be a same-origin path")
+	}
+	return raw, nil
+}

internal/config/config.go

@@ -20,6 +20,11 @@ const (
 	EnvDataDir         = "MEALQUEST_DATA_DIR"
 	EnvShutdownTimeout = "MEALQUEST_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT"
 	EnvSecretKeyFile   = "MEALQUEST_SECRET_KEY_FILE"
+
+	EnvOIDCIssuer           = "MEALQUEST_OIDC_ISSUER"
+	EnvOIDCClientID         = "MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_ID"
+	EnvOIDCClientSecretFile = "MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE"
+	EnvOIDCAllowedGroups    = "MEALQUEST_OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS"
 )
 
 // Config is the validated service configuration.
@@ -29,6 +34,13 @@ type Config struct {
 	DataDir         string
 	ShutdownTimeout time.Duration
 	SecretKey       Secret
+
+	// OIDCIssuer is the Authentik issuer URL used for discovery.
+	OIDCIssuer       *url.URL
+	OIDCClientID     string
+	OIDCClientSecret Secret
+	// OIDCAllowedGroups lists the groups whose members may sign in.
+	OIDCAllowedGroups []string
 }
 
 // PublicOrigin returns the scheme and host of PublicURL, the only parts of it
@@ -51,6 +63,11 @@ func load(lookup func(string) (string, bool)) (Config, error) {
 		DataDir:         r.dir(EnvDataDir),
 		ShutdownTimeout: r.duration(EnvShutdownTimeout),
 		SecretKey:       r.secretFile(EnvSecretKeyFile),
+
+		OIDCIssuer:        r.httpURL(EnvOIDCIssuer),
+		OIDCClientID:      r.str(EnvOIDCClientID),
+		OIDCClientSecret:  r.secretFile(EnvOIDCClientSecretFile),
+		OIDCAllowedGroups: r.list(EnvOIDCAllowedGroups),
 	}
 	if len(r.problems) > 0 {
 		return Config{}, &Error{Problems: r.problems}
@@ -114,6 +131,29 @@ func (r *reader) required(name string) (string, bool) {
 	return v, true
 }
 
+func (r *reader) str(name string) string {
+	v, _ := r.required(name)
+	return v
+}
+
+// list parses a comma-separated list. Every entry must be non-empty after
+// trimming spaces.
+func (r *reader) list(name string) []string {
+	v, ok := r.required(name)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+	items := strings.Split(v, ",")
+	for i, item := range items {
+		items[i] = strings.TrimSpace(item)
+		if items[i] == "" {
+			r.fail(name, "empty entry in comma-separated list %q", v)
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+	return items
+}
+
 func (r *reader) listenAddr(name string) string {
 	v, ok := r.required(name)
 	if !ok {

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"net/url"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"reflect"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
@@ -21,6 +22,10 @@ func TestLoad(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	unreadablePath := filepath.Join(dir, "missing_secret")
+	clientSecretPath := filepath.Join(dir, "oidc_client_secret")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(clientSecretPath, []byte("client-s3cret\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
 	emptyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "empty_secret")
 	if err := os.WriteFile(emptyPath, []byte("\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
@@ -33,6 +38,11 @@ func TestLoad(t *testing.T) {
 			EnvDataDir:         dir,
 			EnvShutdownTimeout: "15s",
 			EnvSecretKeyFile:   secretPath,
+
+			EnvOIDCIssuer:           "https://auth.example.com/application/o/mealquest/",
+			EnvOIDCClientID:         "mealquest",
+			EnvOIDCClientSecretFile: clientSecretPath,
+			EnvOIDCAllowedGroups:    "mealquest-admin",
 		}
 	}
 	with := func(changes map[string]string, unset ...string) map[string]string {
@@ -70,6 +80,7 @@ func TestLoad(t *testing.T) {
 			env:  map[string]string{},
 			badVars: []string{
 				EnvHTTPAddr, EnvPublicURL, EnvDataDir, EnvShutdownTimeout, EnvSecretKeyFile,
+				EnvOIDCIssuer, EnvOIDCClientID, EnvOIDCClientSecretFile, EnvOIDCAllowedGroups,
 			},
 		},
 		{
@@ -169,6 +180,45 @@ func TestLoad(t *testing.T) {
 			env:     with(map[string]string{"MEALQUEST_SECRET_KEY": "inline"}),
 			badVars: []string{"MEALQUEST_SECRET_KEY"},
 		},
+		{
+			name:    "inline OIDC client secret rejected",
+			env:     with(map[string]string{"MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET": "inline"}),
+			badVars: []string{"MEALQUEST_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "unreadable OIDC client secret file",
+			env:     with(map[string]string{EnvOIDCClientSecretFile: unreadablePath}),
+			badVars: []string{EnvOIDCClientSecretFile},
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "relative OIDC issuer",
+			env:     with(map[string]string{EnvOIDCIssuer: "auth.example.com"}),
+			badVars: []string{EnvOIDCIssuer},
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "non-http OIDC issuer",
+			env:     with(map[string]string{EnvOIDCIssuer: "ftp://auth.example.com"}),
+			badVars: []string{EnvOIDCIssuer},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "several allowed groups",
+			env:  with(map[string]string{EnvOIDCAllowedGroups: "mealquest-admin, family"}),
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "empty allowed group entry",
+			env:     with(map[string]string{EnvOIDCAllowedGroups: "mealquest-admin,,family"}),
+			badVars: []string{EnvOIDCAllowedGroups},
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "trailing comma in allowed groups",
+			env:     with(map[string]string{EnvOIDCAllowedGroups: "mealquest-admin,"}),
+			badVars: []string{EnvOIDCAllowedGroups},
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "blank OIDC client ID",
+			env:     with(map[string]string{EnvOIDCClientID: "  "}),
+			badVars: []string{EnvOIDCClientID},
+		},
 		{
 			name: "several invalid values are all named",
 			env: with(map[string]string{
@@ -211,7 +261,7 @@ func TestLoad(t *testing.T) {
 					t.Errorf("error message %q does not name %s", err.Error(), v)
 				}
 			}
-			if cfg != (Config{}) {
+			if !reflect.ValueOf(cfg).IsZero() {
 				t.Errorf("load() returned non-zero Config alongside error: %+v", cfg)
 			}
 		})
@@ -226,12 +276,21 @@ func TestLoadValues(t *testing.T) {
 	if err := os.WriteFile(secretPath, []byte("s3cret-value\r\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
+	clientSecretPath := filepath.Join(dir, "oidc_client_secret")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(clientSecretPath, []byte("client-s3cret\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
 	env := map[string]string{
 		EnvHTTPAddr:        "127.0.0.1:9000",
 		EnvPublicURL:       "http://localhost:9000",
 		EnvDataDir:         dir,
 		EnvShutdownTimeout: "1m30s",
 		EnvSecretKeyFile:   secretPath,
+
+		EnvOIDCIssuer:           "https://auth.example.com/application/o/mealquest/",
+		EnvOIDCClientID:         "mealquest",
+		EnvOIDCClientSecretFile: clientSecretPath,
+		EnvOIDCAllowedGroups:    " mealquest-admin ,family",
 	}
 	cfg, err := load(func(k string) (string, bool) { v, ok := env[k]; return v, ok })
 	if err != nil {
@@ -253,6 +312,18 @@ func TestLoadValues(t *testing.T) {
 	if cfg.SecretKey.Reveal() != "s3cret-value" {
 		t.Errorf("SecretKey.Reveal() = %q, want trailing newline trimmed", cfg.SecretKey.Reveal())
 	}
+	if got, want := cfg.OIDCIssuer.String(), "https://auth.example.com/application/o/mealquest/"; got != want {
+		t.Errorf("OIDCIssuer = %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+	if cfg.OIDCClientID != "mealquest" {
+		t.Errorf("OIDCClientID = %q", cfg.OIDCClientID)
+	}
+	if cfg.OIDCClientSecret.Reveal() != "client-s3cret" {
+		t.Errorf("OIDCClientSecret.Reveal() = %q", cfg.OIDCClientSecret.Reveal())
+	}
+	if want := []string{"mealquest-admin", "family"}; !slices.Equal(cfg.OIDCAllowedGroups, want) {
+		t.Errorf("OIDCAllowedGroups = %q, want %q", cfg.OIDCAllowedGroups, want)
+	}
 }
 
 func TestSecretRedacted(t *testing.T) {
@@ -260,7 +331,7 @@ func TestSecretRedacted(t *testing.T) {
 
 	s := Secret{value: "s3cret-value"}
 	for _, format := range []string{"%v", "%s", "%+v", "%#v"} {
-		cfg := Config{SecretKey: s}
+		cfg := Config{SecretKey: s, OIDCClientSecret: s}
 		for _, out := range []string{fmt.Sprintf(format, s), fmt.Sprintf(format, cfg)} {
 			if strings.Contains(out, "s3cret-value") {
 				t.Errorf("format %s leaked secret: %s", format, out)

internal/server/server.go

@@ -16,9 +16,15 @@ import (
 // SPA's index.html.
 var reservedPrefixes = []string{"/api", "/auth", "/media", "/health"}
 
+// RouteMounter registers its own routes on the router.
+type RouteMounter interface {
+	Mount(r chi.Router)
+}
+
 // NewRouter returns the HTTP handler for the service. version is reported by
-// GET /health; assets is the web build served for every other GET.
+// GET /health; auth mounts the /auth routes; assets is the web build served
-func NewRouter(logger *slog.Logger, version string, assets fs.FS) (http.Handler, error) {
+// for every other GET.
+func NewRouter(logger *slog.Logger, version string, auth RouteMounter, assets fs.FS) (http.Handler, error) {
 	notFound := apiErrorHandler(logger, http.StatusNotFound, "not_found", "not found")
 	methodNotAllowed := apiErrorHandler(logger, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "method_not_allowed", "method not allowed")
 
@@ -32,12 +38,14 @@ func NewRouter(logger *slog.Logger, version string, assets fs.FS) (http.Handler,
 	r.NotFound(notFound)
 
 	r.Get("/health", health(logger, version))
+	auth.Mount(r)
 	r.Route("/api", func(r chi.Router) {
 		r.MethodNotAllowed(methodNotAllowed)
 		r.NotFound(notFound)
 	})
-	// Catch-all for the PWA. /auth and /media have no routes yet; the frontend
+	// Catch-all for the PWA. Unknown /auth paths and /media (no routes yet)
-	// handler passes them to notFound rather than the SPA fallback.
+	// reach the frontend handler, which passes them to notFound rather than
+	// the SPA fallback.
 	r.Method(http.MethodGet, "/*", web)
 	r.Method(http.MethodHead, "/*", web)
 	return r, nil

internal/server/server_test.go

@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"testing/fstest"
+
+	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
 )
 
 const (
@@ -25,13 +27,39 @@ func newTestRouter(t *testing.T, version string) http.Handler {
 		"index.html":             {Data: []byte(fixtureIndex)},
 		"assets/index-AbC123.js": {Data: []byte(fixtureAsset)},
 	}
-	r, err := NewRouter(logger, version, assets)
+	r, err := NewRouter(logger, version, stubAuth{}, assets)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	return r
 }
 
+// stubAuth mounts a fixed GET /auth/login in place of the real auth flow.
+type stubAuth struct{}
+
+func (stubAuth) Mount(r chi.Router) {
+	r.Get("/auth/login", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		io.WriteString(w, "stub login")
+	})
+}
+
+func TestAuthRoutesMounted(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	router := newTestRouter(t, "dev")
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	router.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/auth/login", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || rec.Body.String() != "stub login" {
+		t.Errorf("GET /auth/login = %d %q, want the mounted handler", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+
+	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	router.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/auth/login", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
+		t.Errorf("POST /auth/login status = %d, want 405", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestHealth(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
@@ -99,7 +127,7 @@ func TestReservedPathsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
 		{http.MethodGet, "/api"},
 		{http.MethodGet, "/api/unknown"},
 		{http.MethodPost, "/api/unknown"},
-		{http.MethodGet, "/auth/callback"},
+		{http.MethodGet, "/auth/unknown"},
 		{http.MethodGet, "/media/photo.jpg"},
 		{http.MethodGet, "/health/deep"},
 		{http.MethodGet, "/auth/../quests/42"},