Feature 16: Google Calendar Sync (#130)

Co-authored-by: orchestrator-agent <20+orchestrator-agent@code.cubecraftcreations.com>

internal/auth/auth.go

@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, sessions Sessions, logger *slog.Logger
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	client := &http.Client{Timeout: providerTimeout, CheckRedirect: checkRedirect}
+	client := &http.Client{Timeout: providerTimeout, CheckRedirect: CheckRedirect}
 	discovery := *client
 	recorder := &statusRecorder{next: http.DefaultTransport}
 	discovery.Transport = recorder
@@ -205,11 +205,12 @@ func checkEndpoint(name, raw string) error {
 // maxRedirects matches net/http's default redirect limit.
 const maxRedirects = 10
 
-// checkRedirect is the provider client's redirect policy. On a 307 or 308 to
-// the same host Go resends the body and Authorization header, which carry the
-// code and client secret, so every target must pass secureurl.Check and an
-// https:// request never follows a redirect to plain http://, even loopback.
-func checkRedirect(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
+// CheckRedirect is the redirect policy of every client that talks to an
+// OAuth provider. On a 307 or 308 to the same host Go resends the body and
+// Authorization header, which carry the code and client secret, so every
+// target must pass secureurl.Check and an https:// request never follows a
+// redirect to plain http://, even loopback.
+func CheckRedirect(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
 	if len(via) >= maxRedirects {
 		return fmt.Errorf("stopped after %d redirects", maxRedirects)
 	}
@@ -350,7 +351,7 @@ func (a *Auth) verify(ctx context.Context, code string, state loginState) (Claim
 	token, err := a.oauth.Exchange(context.WithValue(ctx, oauth2.HTTPClient, a.client), code,
 		oauth2.VerifierOption(state.Verifier))
 	if err != nil {
-		return Claims{}, exchangeError(err)
+		return Claims{}, ExchangeError(err)
 	}
 	raw, ok := token.Extra("id_token").(string)
 	if !ok || raw == "" {
@@ -400,7 +401,7 @@ func (a *Auth) userinfoGroups(ctx context.Context, token *oauth2.Token, subject
 }
 
 // userinfoError reduces a failed userinfo request to a fixed category, like
-// exchangeError: go-oidc's error text can carry the response body.
+// ExchangeError: go-oidc's error text can carry the response body.
 func userinfoError(err error) error {
 	var transport *url.Error
 	if errors.As(err, &transport) {
@@ -425,10 +426,11 @@ func (a *Auth) member(groups []string) bool {
 	return slices.ContainsFunc(groups, func(g string) bool { return slices.Contains(a.allowed, g) })
 }
 
-// exchangeError reduces a failed code exchange to a fixed category and safe
-// metadata. The oauth2 error text can carry the token endpoint's response
-// body or error_description, which may echo credentials, so it is dropped.
-func exchangeError(err error) error {
+// ExchangeError reduces a failed OAuth code exchange to a fixed category and
+// safe metadata. The oauth2 error text can carry the token endpoint's
+// response body or error_description, which may echo credentials, so it is
+// dropped.
+func ExchangeError(err error) error {
 	var retrieve *oauth2.RetrieveError
 	var transport *url.Error
 	switch {

internal/auth/auth_test.go

@@ -1060,7 +1060,7 @@ func TestCheckRedirect(t *testing.T) {
 		{"https://auth.example.com/token", "ftp://auth.example.com/token", false},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range tests {
-		err := checkRedirect(request(tc.to), []*http.Request{request(tc.from)})
+		err := CheckRedirect(request(tc.to), []*http.Request{request(tc.from)})
 		if (err == nil) != tc.ok {
 			t.Errorf("redirect %s -> %s: error = %v, want ok=%v", tc.from, tc.to, err, tc.ok)
 		}
@@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ func TestCheckRedirect(t *testing.T) {
 	for i := range via {
 		via[i] = request("https://auth.example.com/token")
 	}
-	if err := checkRedirect(request("https://auth.example.com/token"), via); err == nil {
+	if err := CheckRedirect(request("https://auth.example.com/token"), via); err == nil {
 		t.Errorf("redirect after %d hops: error = nil, want limit", maxRedirects)
 	}
 }

internal/auth/cookie.go

@@ -27,38 +27,86 @@ type loginState struct {
 	Nonce    string `json:"n"`
 	Verifier string `json:"v"`
 	Return   string `json:"r"`
-	Expires  int64  `json:"e"` // Unix seconds
+	FlowExpiry
 }
 
-// loginCookie signs and verifies the login cookie with HMAC-SHA256.
+// loginCookie is the FlowCookie carrying loginState.
 type loginCookie struct {
-	key []byte
+	flow FlowCookie
 }
 
 func newLoginCookie(secretKey []byte) loginCookie {
-	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, secretKey)
-	mac.Write([]byte(loginCookieKeyLabel))
-	return loginCookie{key: mac.Sum(nil)}
+	return loginCookie{flow: NewFlowCookie(loginCookieName, loginCookieKeyLabel, loginCookieTTL, secretKey)}
 }
 
-func (c loginCookie) sign(payload string) string {
+func (c loginCookie) set(w http.ResponseWriter, s loginState, now time.Time) error {
+	return c.flow.Set(w, &s, now)
+}
+
+func (c loginCookie) clear(w http.ResponseWriter) { c.flow.Clear(w) }
+
+func (c loginCookie) read(r *http.Request, now time.Time) (loginState, error) {
+	var s loginState
+	if err := c.flow.Read(r, &s, now); err != nil {
+		return loginState{}, err
+	}
+	return s, nil
+}
+
+// FlowExpiry is embedded in every value a FlowCookie carries; Set fills it
+// and Read enforces it.
+type FlowExpiry struct {
+	Expires int64 `json:"e"` // Unix seconds
+}
+
+func (e *FlowExpiry) flowExpiry() *FlowExpiry { return e }
+
+// flowValue is a pointer to a struct that embeds FlowExpiry.
+type flowValue interface {
+	flowExpiry() *FlowExpiry
+}
+
+// FlowCookie carries a redirect flow's state — the OAuth state, PKCE
+// verifier and the like — from the request that sends the browser to a
+// provider to the callback it returns to. The value is JSON, signed with
+// HMAC-SHA256 under a key derived from the server secret and the cookie's
+// own label, and expires after a fixed time. It is not encrypted: it must
+// not hold anything the browser may not see.
+type FlowCookie struct {
+	name string
+	ttl  time.Duration
+	key  []byte
+}
+
+// NewFlowCookie returns the flow cookie name, valid for ttl, signed under a
+// key derived from secretKey and keyLabel. Each flow uses its own keyLabel so
+// one flow's cookie never verifies as another's. name must carry the __Host-
+// prefix: the cookie is Secure, host-only and Path=/.
+func NewFlowCookie(name, keyLabel string, ttl time.Duration, secretKey []byte) FlowCookie {
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, secretKey)
+	mac.Write([]byte(keyLabel))
+	return FlowCookie{name: name, ttl: ttl, key: mac.Sum(nil)}
+}
+
+func (c FlowCookie) sign(payload string) string {
 	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, c.key)
 	mac.Write([]byte(payload))
 	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
 }
 
-func (c loginCookie) set(w http.ResponseWriter, s loginState, now time.Time) error {
-	s.Expires = now.Add(loginCookieTTL).Unix()
-	data, err := json.Marshal(s)
+// Set stores v, which expires ttl after now, in the cookie.
+func (c FlowCookie) Set(w http.ResponseWriter, v flowValue, now time.Time) error {
+	v.flowExpiry().Expires = now.Add(c.ttl).Unix()
+	data, err := json.Marshal(v)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 	payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(data)
 	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
-		Name:     loginCookieName,
+		Name:     c.name,
 		Value:    payload + "." + c.sign(payload),
 		Path:     "/",
-		MaxAge:   int(loginCookieTTL / time.Second),
+		MaxAge:   int(c.ttl / time.Second),
 		Secure:   true,
 		HttpOnly: true,
 		// Lax so the cookie rides the provider's top-level redirect back.
@@ -67,9 +115,12 @@ func (c loginCookie) set(w http.ResponseWriter, s loginState, now time.Time) err
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (c loginCookie) clear(w http.ResponseWriter) {
+// Clear asks the browser to discard the cookie. A copy of it still verifies
+// until it expires, so a flow that must be single-use also consumes its
+// state on the server.
+func (c FlowCookie) Clear(w http.ResponseWriter) {
 	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
-		Name:     loginCookieName,
+		Name:     c.name,
 		Path:     "/",
 		MaxAge:   -1,
 		Secure:   true,
@@ -78,27 +129,28 @@ func (c loginCookie) clear(w http.ResponseWriter) {
 	})
 }
 
-func (c loginCookie) read(r *http.Request, now time.Time) (loginState, error) {
-	cookie, err := r.Cookie(loginCookieName)
+// Read verifies the cookie r carries and decodes it into v. It fails when
+// the cookie is missing, its signature is invalid or it has expired at now.
+func (c FlowCookie) Read(r *http.Request, v flowValue, now time.Time) error {
+	cookie, err := r.Cookie(c.name)
 	if err != nil {
-		return loginState{}, errors.New("login cookie missing")
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s cookie missing", c.name)
 	}
 	payload, sig, ok := strings.Cut(cookie.Value, ".")
 	if !ok || !hmac.Equal([]byte(sig), []byte(c.sign(payload))) {
-		return loginState{}, errors.New("login cookie signature invalid")
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s cookie signature invalid", c.name)
 	}
 	data, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(payload)
 	if err != nil {
-		return loginState{}, fmt.Errorf("login cookie encoding: %w", err)
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s cookie encoding: %w", c.name, err)
 	}
-	var s loginState
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &s); err != nil {
-		return loginState{}, fmt.Errorf("login cookie payload: %w", err)
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, v); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s cookie payload: %w", c.name, err)
 	}
-	if now.Unix() >= s.Expires {
-		return loginState{}, errors.New("login cookie expired")
+	if now.Unix() >= v.flowExpiry().Expires {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s cookie expired", c.name)
 	}
-	return s, nil
+	return nil
 }
 
 // returnPath validates the optional post-login return path. Empty means "/".